Standard Chartered Bank v. Milus

826 F. Supp. 310, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20164, 1990 WL 504830
CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedAugust 14, 1990
DocketCiv. 89-039-PHX-RGS, 90-119 PHX-RCB
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 826 F. Supp. 310 (Standard Chartered Bank v. Milus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Chartered Bank v. Milus, 826 F. Supp. 310, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20164, 1990 WL 504830 (D. Ariz. 1990).

Opinion

ORDER

STRAND, District Judge.

This case arises out of the allegedly fraudulent activities of Paul Milus, formerly executive vice president and chief credit officer of United Bank (“Bank”). Milus allegedly gave millions in undercollateralized loans to two financially illiquid borrowers—Victorio Company (“Victorio”) and Lawrence Malanfant (“Malanfant”)—to keep loans to them from going into default and being written off of the Bank’s books.

Milus’ alleged motivation for keeping the Victorio and Malanfant loans afloat stems from the then-pending purchase of the Bank by Union Bank of California, a subsidiary of plaintiff Standard Chartered Bank. Milus stood to gain personally from the sale because he owned many shares of United Bank stock acquired through a stock option plan. Those shares had increased in value as a result of the pending sale, and would decrease substantially should the pending sale fall through. Writing off the Victorio and Malanfant loans would have allegedly put the upcoming sale of the Bank in jeopardy, because Union Bank of California could have canceled the purchase if, before closing, the Bank suffered any materially adverse change in its financial condition, or if its stockholder equity did not equal 135 million dollars.

Plaintiffs have sued, in this consolidated action, both Milus and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (“USF & G”). USF & G is in the ease because it issued a financial institution bond to the Bank, which the Bank asserts insures the loan losses it suffered from Milus’ alleged conduct. USF & G has filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment, on the ground that the financial institution bond does not cover losses stemming from Milus’ conduct. 1

The applicable provision of the financial institution bond reads:

[USF & G] ... agrees to indemnify the insured for:
FIDELITY
(A) Loss resulting directly from dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by an Employee acting alone or in collusion with others.
Such dishonest or fraudulent acts must be committed by the Employee with the manifest intent:
(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss, and
*312 (b) to obtain financial benefit for the Employee or another person or entity.
However, if some or all of the Insured’s loss results directly or indirectly from Loans, that portion of the loss is not covered unless the Employee was in collusion with one or more parties to the transactions and has received, in connection therewith, a financial benefit with a value of at least $2,500.
As used throughout this Insuring Agreement, financial benefit does not include any employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment, including: salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing or pensions.

Defendant USF & G exhibit A (Financial Institution Bond, Fidelity Insuring Agreement A) (emphasis added).

USF & G argues that the Bank’s losses from the Victorio and Malanfant loan transactions are not within coverage of the above fidelity clause on three grounds. First, it argues that Milus was not in collusion with either Peter Wray, the principal officer and Milus’ main contact at Victorio, or Lawrence Malanfant. Second, it argues that the term “in connection therewith” requires that any financial benefit derived by Milus must have come from Peter Wray of Victorio or Lawrence Malanfant in the form of a bribe or kickback. Finally, USF & G argues that the benefit Milus allegedly derived from the enhanced value of stock received from a stock option plan qualifies as “employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment”. As explained below, the court concludes that there was no evidence to support a finding of collusion between Milus and either Peter Wray of Victorio, or Lawrence Malanfant. Therefore it need not address USF & G’s second and third contentions.

COLLUSION

By the terms of the Fidelity Agreement, coverage would not apply unless Peter Wray of Victorio and Lawrence Malanfant colluded with Milus in connection with their respective loan transactions. The term “collusion” is not defined by the contract. But the parties agree that the term collusion is synonymous ■with the term conspiracy as it is used in the criminal context.

Plaintiff argues that under the analysis of Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed, 1674 (1943) there was tacit collusion between Milus and Peter Wray, and between Milus and Lawrence Malanfant. In Direct Sales, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of a pharmaceutical manufacturer for conspiracy with a doctor to distribute narcotics, over objection that the there was insufficient evidence of agreement. The company had provided “vast” quantities of morphine sulfate to the doctor, who had a rural practice in a community of 2,000. The doctor purchased over 79,000 units of morphine sulphate per year, when the annual requirement of the average doctor was 400 units. The government had warned the company repeatedly that doctors ordering large quantities were selling the morphine illegally. Nevertheless, the company continued to “push” the illegal sale of morphine tablets by offering substantial quantity discounts. The court concluded that under those facts, it was possible for a jury to infer conspiracy, or concert of action between the doctor and pharmaceutical company, based on the company’s clear, unequivocal knowledge that the doctor was putting the morphine sulphate to illegal use, plus the company’s efforts to promote his activities by providing quantity discounts. Id. at 710-11, 63 S.Ct. at 1268-69.

Plaintiffs assert that the facts of this case parallel Direct Sales because first, Milus approved the loans in question under such egregious circumstances that Peter Wray and Malanfant must have known that Milus was approving the loans for his own unauthorized purposes; and, second, Peter Wray and Lawrence Malanfant encouraged those unauthorized approvals by providing Milus with substantially overvalued or worthless collateral, such as grossly high appraisals on land securing the loans and valueless third and fourth mortgage positions on land and artwork.

Defendant USF & G objects to plaintiffs’ use of the Direct Sales tacit agreement theory, asserting that under Arizona law, the existence of a conspiracy between Milus and Peter Wray, and Milus and Malanfant requires evidence of agreement between them *313 to exchange a benefit for the loans. The court finds it unnecessary to examine the extent to which Direct Sales constitutes Arizona law, because even under the Direct Sales approach, the facts of this case do not create a sufficient inference of tacit collusion.

To begin with, in Direct Sales

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Progressive Casualty Insurance v. First Bank
828 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Texas, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
826 F. Supp. 310, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20164, 1990 WL 504830, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-chartered-bank-v-milus-azd-1990.