Stamp v. Schenk

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Stamp v. Schenk

267 A.D.2d 1017, 700 N.Y.S.2d 901, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13766

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 30, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 267 A.D.2d 1017 (Stamp v. Schenk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Stamp v. Schenk, 267 A.D.2d 1017, 700 N.Y.S.2d 901, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13766 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly dismissed the third cause of action as barred by the Statute of Limitations. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true and resolving all inferences that reasonably flow therefrom in favor of plaintiff (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366), we conclude that the third cause of action accrued no later than May 1, 1992 (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402). Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence in admissible form tending to show any other accrual date (see, CPLR 3211 [c]). Even assuming the applicability of a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]), we conclude that the third cause of action is time-barred because the action was not commenced until September 1998. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dillon, J. — Dismiss Pleading.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt and Balio, JJ.

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—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly dismissed the third cause of action as barred by the Statute of Limitations. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true and resolving all inferences that reasonably flow therefrom in favor of plaintiff (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366), we conclude that the third cause of action accrued no later than May 1, 1992 (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402). Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence in admissible form tending to show any other accrual date (see, CPLR 3211 [c]). Even assuming the applicability of a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]), we conclude that the third cause of action is time-barred because the action was not commenced until September 1998. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dillon, J. — Dismiss Pleading.) Present — Pine, J. P., Wisner, Hurlbutt and Balio, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

267 A.D.2d 1017, 700 N.Y.S.2d 901, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13766, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stamp-v-schenk-nyappdiv-1999.

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