Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Association

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedAugust 5, 1997
DocketI.C. No. 081366
StatusPublished

This text of Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Association (Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Association, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1997).

Opinion

The undersigned have reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before former Deputy Commissioner Dillard. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award, except for various modifications or additions throughout the Opinion.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS

1. At the time of the injury by accident giving rise hereto, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the defendant-employer regularly employed three or more employees, one of whom was the plaintiff.

2. The defendant, SCT Yarns, Inc., is a duly qualified self-insurer with Hewitt, Coleman Associates, Inc., as its servicing agent.

3. That the Opinion and Award filed by former Deputy Commissioner Richard L. Dillard, Jr. on 3 January 1992 is incorporated into the record of this hearing.

4. The depositions of Dr. C. Michael Nicks and Shirley Tuft and the medical records of Dr. Donald F. D'Alessandro are allowed into evidence.

The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On 6 August 1990, plaintiff worked as a spinner for SCT Yarns, Inc. ("SCT). On this date, she developed a compensable occupational disease known as impingement syndrome of the right shoulder. Subsequently, plaintiff became unable to perform her regular-duty job as a spinner and was placed in a light-duty position as a roller picker.

2. On 1 October 1990, plaintiff's right shoulder was operated on by Dr. C. Michael Nicks, an orthopaedist.

3. Plaintiff returned to work at SCT on 25 October, 1990 in her previous capacity as a roller picker. Plaintiff was able to perform this job without difficulty and in November or early December, 1990, plaintiff was placed back in her original job as a spinner. Plaintiff worked as a spinner until 28 February 1991 when she had a hysterectomy. Plaintiff remained out of work due to the hysterectomy until 14 April 1991 and returned to her regular-duty job as a spinner on 15 April 1991.

4. On 10 July 1991, plaintiff alleged that a "knot" appeared on her right shoulder while she was at work. Plaintiff visited her treating orthopaedist, Dr. Michael Nicks, later that day and Dr. Nicks prescribed light-duty work with certain restrictions. Specifically, Dr. Nicks restricted plaintiff from performing heavy lifting and overhead work which involved right-side humeral flexion of greater than sixty degrees at the shoulder.

5. Light-duty work within the doctor's restrictions was not available at SCT at that time and plaintiff requested medical leave. Plaintiff's request was granted and plaintiff was placed on medical leave beginning 11 July, 1991. Plaintiff received company-funded short term disability benefits during the next thirteen weeks.

6. On 13 January 1992, SCT offered plaintiff a modified (emphasis added) roller picker job which was within the restrictions prescribed by Dr. Nicks. Namely, this modified position allowed plaintiff to work using only her left hand and did not require her to lift her right arm higher than sixty degrees. After SCT Yarns offered plaintiff the position, plaintiff accepted it stating that she "saw no problem" with her ability to perform this job since she was left-handed and had previously performed this job when it was a position with more overhead work while her right arm was placed in a sling. Also present at this meeting were plaintiff's department manager, Tony Black, and first-shift supervisor, Ken Lingerfelt.

7. Plaintiff visited Dr. Nicks later that afternoon on 13 January 1992 for a routine follow-up visit. Plaintiff inaccurately indicated in a subsequent telephone conversation with Margaret Sigmon, SCT's personnel manager, that Dr. Nicks would not approve the modified roller picker position. Ms. Sigmon thereafter spoke with Dr. Nicks by telephone later the same day and Dr. Nicks stated, contradicting plaintiff's representation, that plaintiff should return to work. Specifically, Dr. Nicks told Ms. Sigmon that the restrictions which he placed on plaintiff had not changed, that plaintiff had been very difficult to deal with and that if themodified roller picker job was within the limitations he prescribed, he felt that she should take it. Dr. Nicks was of the opinion that plaintiff was capable of performing light work within the restrictions he placed on her. In fact, Dr. Nicks specifically testified in his deposition that "I would think she would be able to perform anything outside the restriction that we placed on her." (Nicks Dep. p. 24).

8. After Ms. Sigmon spoke with Dr. Nicks she sent a letter via registered, return-receipt mail dated 14 January 1992. The letter stated that Ms. Sigmon had spoken with Dr. Nicks, that themodified roller picker position was within the limitations prescribed by Dr. Nicks and that the company expected plaintiff to return to work on 17 January 1992.

9. On 16 January 1992, Ms. Sigmon received a telephone call from plaintiff, wherein plaintiff requested that Ms. Sigmon "guarantee" that she would not feel any pain while performing themodified roller picker job. Ms. Sigmon informed plaintiff that no one could make such a guarantee and that since themodified roller picker position was within the restrictions set forth by Dr. Nicks, the company expected her to return to work the next morning.

10. Plaintiff failed to return to work for SCT on 17 January 1992 and after two full days of plaintiff's failure to appear, the company considered that she had voluntarily resigned pursuant to established company policy.

11. On 24 January 1992, plaintiff telephoned Ms. Sigmon and Ms. Sigmon stated that plaintiff was considered to have voluntarily resigned for failure to return to work. Subsequent to this conversation, plaintiff had not spoken with Ms. Sigmon to inquire about returning to work in the modified roller picker position.

12. Plaintiff presented the testimony of Shirley Tuft, a co-worker at SCT, that if believed, would establish that themodified roller picker position involved substantial overheard work which was not within the restrictions set forth by Dr. Nicks. The undersigned are unable to accept Ms. Tuft's testimony as credible, however, since the evidence adduced from Ms. Tuft's deposition revealed that the roller picker job to which Ms. Tuft referred was not a "modified" job. At the initial hearing, SCT's personnel manager, Margaret Sigmon, plaintiff's department manager, Tony Black and plaintiff's supervisor, Ken Lingerfelt, revealed that a modified roller picker position was offered to plaintiff and this job as within the restrictions set forth by her physician. Namely, the position would allow plaintiff to work solely with her left arm and would not require any overhead movements or humeral flexion of greater than sixty degrees at the right shoulder. Plaintiff's argument first made at Full Commission that since plaintiff alleged that the job was to be temporary, plaintiff had a right to refuse the job is not accepted as persuasive. Suitable work within plaintiff's restrictions was offered which even plaintiff initially verified she could perform. However, she nevertheless refused to even attempt the work and never contacted the employer again.

13. Plaintiff offered as an exhibit the job description for anon-modified

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Saums v. Raleigh Community Hospital
476 S.E.2d 372 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guaranty Association, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stamey-v-nc-self-insurance-guaranty-association-ncworkcompcom-1997.