Stallworth v. Myers

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedJanuary 16, 2025
Docket1:15-cv-00309
StatusUnknown

This text of Stallworth v. Myers (Stallworth v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stallworth v. Myers, (S.D. Ala. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

CALVIN L. STALLWORTH ) AIS #0000Z649, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION: 1:15-cv-309-KD-M ) TERRY RAYBON ) Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Calvin L. Stallworth is an Alabama prisoner serving a death sentence following his 1998 conviction for two counts of capital murder. After unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Stallworth petitioned this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Under Death Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His First Amended § 2254 Petition (Doc. 22) is the operative petition before the Court. On September 27, 2023, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing all of Stallworth’s claims except for the sole claim that Stallworth is intellectually disabled and his execution would therefore constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (as applied to Alabama through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). (Doc. 48). 1 As explained in the Court’s prior ruling, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of Stallworth’s intellectual disability claim was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Doc. 48 at

1 The opinion was issued by Senior Judge Callie S. Granade. The case was then transferred to the undersigned. 185). Accordingly, the Court is “unconstrained by § 2254(d)’s deference and must undertake a de novo review of the record.” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2016). The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 2, 2024.

I. DISCUSSION2

Stallworth contends he is ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled. (Doc. 22 at 86). To prove he is intellectual disabled under Alabama law, Stallworth must show: (1) that he has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (IQ of 70 or below), (2) that he has significant deficits in adaptive functioning, and (3) that those problems manifested before he reached the age of 18. Ferguson v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Ferguson v. Hamm, 144 S. Ct. 815, 218 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2024) (citing Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239, 248 (Ala. 2007)).3 Stallworth bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets these requirements. See Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1345 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Smith, 213 So. 3d at 252).

2 The factual background and procedural history of Stallworth’s case, as well as the legal standard governing his habeas claims, are set forth in detail in this Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 48). Familiarity with that ruling is presumed for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion and Order

3 The Atkins court left to the States “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. Alabama laid out its judicial definition of intellectual disability in Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002), and formally adopted that definition in Smith, 213 So. 3d at 248, a definition the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has accepted. See Ferguson, 69 F.4th at 1254; Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F. 3d 1248, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, Jenkins v. Dunn, --- U.S. ----, 141 S. Ct. 2635, 209 L. Ed. 2d 758 (2021). A. Evidence of Stallworth’s Intellectual Functioning4 The first component of intellectual disability is “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below).” Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F. 3d 1248, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Perkins, 851 So. 2d at 456). This inquiry centers on an individual’s IQ, but because IQ testing is inherently imprecise, other factors must be considered. The Eleventh

Circuit recently explained the issue: Whether [a defendant] has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning turns on whether he has an IQ equal to or less than 70. But the medical community recognizes that the IQ test is imprecise. Each IQ test score has a “standard error of measurement.” The standard error of measurement accounts for a margin of error both below and above the IQ test-taker’s score. The standard error of measurement thus allows clinicians to calculate a range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies.

For that reason, the intellectual functioning inquiry must recognize that an IQ test score represents a range rather than a fixed number. So when the lower end of that range is equal to or less than 70, an offender must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.

Smith, 67 F.4th at 1345 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701(2014), the Supreme Court explained the concept of the “standard error of measurement” or “SEM” in detail: Each IQ test has a “standard error of measurement,” ibid., often referred to by the abbreviation “SEM.” A test’s SEM is a statistical fact, a reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself. See R. Furr & V. Bacharach, Psychometrics 118 (2d ed. 2014) (identifying the SEM as “one of the most important concepts in

4 The IQ Scores of Stallworth: Test Date IQ Test Given Full Scale Score 2 SEM(95% confidence) 1982 WISC-R 84 79-89 1986 WISC-R 80 75-80 1998 WAIS-R 77 72-82 1998 WAIS-R 78(verbal only) 2014 SB-5 72 67-77 2024 SB-5 60 55-65 2024 WAIS-IV 65 60-70 measurement theory”). An individual’s IQ test score on any given exam may fluctuate for a variety of reasons. These include the test-taker’s health; practice from earlier tests; the environment or location of the test; the examiner’s demeanor; the subjective judgment involved in scoring certain questions on the exam; and simple lucky guessing. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, R. Schalock et al., User’s Guide To Accompany the 11th Edition of Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 22 (2012) (hereinafter AAIDD Manual); A. Kaufman, IQ Testing 101, pp. 138–139 (2009).

The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score. For purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies. See APA Brief 23 (“SEM is a unit of measurement: 1 SEM equates to a confidence of 68% that the measured score falls within a given score range, while 2 SEM provides a 95% confidence level that the measured score is within a broader range”). A score of 71, for instance, is generally considered to reflect a range between 66 and 76 with 95% confidence and a range of 68.5 and 73.5 with a 68% confidence. See DSM–5, at 37 (“Individuals with intellectual disability have scores of approximately two standard deviations or more below the population mean, including a margin for measurement error (generally +5 points)....

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Related

Atkins v. Virginia
536 U.S. 304 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Ex Parte Perkins
851 So. 2d 453 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 2002)
Giles Ex Rel. Dowdell v. Barnhart
182 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (M.D. Alabama, 2002)
Hall v. Florida
134 S. Ct. 1986 (Supreme Court, 2014)
Samra v. Warden, Donaldson Correctional Facility
626 F. App'x 227 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Daniel v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
822 F.3d 1248 (Eleventh Circuit, 2016)
Keith Tharpe v. Warden
834 F.3d 1323 (Eleventh Circuit, 2016)
Ex parte State
213 So. 3d 239 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 2007)

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Stallworth v. Myers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stallworth-v-myers-alsd-2025.