Stahn v. Catawba Mills

31 S.E. 498, 53 S.C. 519, 1898 S.C. LEXIS 181
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedNovember 9, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 31 S.E. 498 (Stahn v. Catawba Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stahn v. Catawba Mills, 31 S.E. 498, 53 S.C. 519, 1898 S.C. LEXIS 181 (S.C. 1898).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Jones.

This appeal comes up from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint with leave to answer. The complaint is by a stockholder in the Catawba Mills, a manufacturing corporation, against said corporation, its directors and others, seeking redress for alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of the corporate property. The grounds of demurrer may be stated to be substantially: (1) That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it does not appear that the Catawba Mills or its officers have been requested and have neglected or refused to institute this suit,. . nor does it appear that such request, if made, would have been useless. (2) That several causes of action have been improperly united, in that plaintiff seeks judgment in favor of the Catawba Mills against the Chester Mills for goods sold and delivered, and also against the officers of the Catawba Mills, who should be found responsible for said loan or credit to the defendant, Chester Mills.

1 At the same time, and, indeed, in the same paper containing the demurrer, defendants also answered to the merits. The Circuit Court, on motion, duly noticed, required defendants to elect whether they would stand upon the demurrer or the answer. This ruling is the basis of one of the grounds of appeal, but appellants have not argued or pressed the point, and we need only say that was not erroneous.

2 Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action? Judge Aldrich, in his opinion overruling the demurrer, shows conclusively that it does, and we can add very little to what he has said. In the case of Wenzel v. Brewing Co., 48 S. C., 80, which followed [529]*529Latimer v. R. R. Co., 39 S. C., 44, this Court stated the principle which must govern this case, in this language: “The general rule undoubtedly is, that when the directors or managing board of a corporation are charged with mismanagement or misappropriation of the corporate property, the action to restrain or redress such wrong must be instituted by the corporation, since the conduct complained of is a breach of the trust relation between the directors and the corporation. But to this general rule there are well recognized exceptions, viz: when the directors or managing board do, or threaten to do, some act ultra vires, or some, act of fraud, oppression or illegality, injurious to the corporation, or in violation of the rights of the stockholders, to prevent injustice, a stockholder is permitted to maintain an action in his own name. This is substantially the rule declared in Latimer v. R. R. Co., 39 S. C., 44, following and approving the principles announced in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S., 450. Further, before a stockholder can maintain a suit in these exceptional cases, he must show that he has endeavored to get redress of his grievances within the corporation, or he must show facts which would justify a court in concluding that an effort for redress within the corporation would be unavailing.” It is also a well established rule that an application for redress within the corporation, and refusal, need not be alleged, if it be shown that the directors or managing board are themselves the wrongdoers in some alleged breach of trust or fraudulent misappropriation of the corporate property, and have control of a majority of the stock, so as to control corporate action. In such a case it is reasonable to infer that an effort for redress within the corporation would be unavailing. Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass., 387; Eschweiler v. Stovell, 78 Wis., 316; s. C., 23 Am. St. Rep., 411; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co. (Mich.), 17 L. R. A., 417, and cases cited; Wheeler v. Pullman Iron and Steel Co. (Ill.), 17 L. R. A., 821, and cases cited. The complaint alleges, substantially, that the board of directors of both the Catawba Mills and the Ches[530]*530ter Mills consist of seven each, and that the defendants, Tompkins, Wylie, Smyly, and Miller, are directors of the Catawba Mills and Chester Mills; that Tompkins, Wylie, and Miller are respectively, president, vice-president, and secretary and treasurer of both mills; and that Smyly, director of both mills, is superintendent of the Chester Mill; •that neither Smyly nor Miller are bona fide owners and holders of stock in the said Catawba Mills, but that they hold their said stock for the use and benefit of the said Tompkins and his “dummies” on the said board of directors; that said Tompkins is in actual control of both mills, holds stock in the Chester Mills of the par value of $35,000, while his stock in the Catawba Mills is only of the par value of $2,100; that said Tompkins, Wylie, Smyly, and Miller, a majority of the directors in both mills, have, in the aggregate, larger pecuniary interests as shareholders and bondholders of the Chester Mills than of the Catawba Mills; that the Chester Mills is insolvent, or in imminent danger of insolvency, and has been so for some time past; that with full knowledge thereof, the officers of the Catawba Mills (which must rhean the directors, or the president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer thereof,) have, for months past, sold, on open account and without security, to the said Chester Mills, and are continuing to furnish to said insolvent corporation, large quantities of yarns, &c.; that the said Chester Mills is now indebted to the Catawba Mills on account of products so furnished in an amount aggregating $20,000; that said officers of the Catawba Mills have made no arrangement to collect or secure said indebtedness, although repeatedly urged to do so by plaintiff and other stockholders of the Catawba Mills; that, on the contrary, they are ever increasing the amount of said indebtedness; that the Catawba Mills has no business office in this State, but conducts its business in the office of said Tompkins and Miller, in Charlotte, N. C., where all the books and financial accounts are kept; that- a personal inspection of said books has heretofore been denied to other stockholders of [531]*531the Catawba Mills; that on application by letter on the part of plaintiff to said Miller, secretary and treasurer, failed to elicit the definite information desired, &c.; that the capital stock of Catawba Mills is not excessive, its plant practically new and well equipped, its indebtedness not large, and that, if wisely, discreetly, and honestly managed in the interest of its stockholders, it would earn a reasonable dividend upon its stock, &c. Then follows paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of the complaint, which we quote in full: “10. That by reason of the gross mismanagement on the part of the defendant, the said D. A.

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Bluebook (online)
31 S.E. 498, 53 S.C. 519, 1898 S.C. LEXIS 181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stahn-v-catawba-mills-sc-1898.