Staggs v. Staggs

96 N.W.2d 736, 250 Iowa 938, 1959 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 417
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJune 9, 1959
Docket49718
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 96 N.W.2d 736 (Staggs v. Staggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Staggs v. Staggs, 96 N.W.2d 736, 250 Iowa 938, 1959 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 417 (iowa 1959).

Opinion

Peterson, J.

Hubert A. 'Staggs and Vivian Dold were married at Seymour in Wayne County a short time prior to 1950. They lived with Hubert’s parents on a 150-acre farm, owned by the father, near Seymour. In August of 1950 a daughter, Delores, was bom. Early in 1952 Vivian left the Staggs home and went to the home of her parents in Seymour. She never returned. She was pregriant, 'and in June of 1952 ■a boy, Larry, was bom. These two children are (the subject of this modification proceeding. Sometime after Larry was born Hubert started a divorce action against Vivian, praying for divorce and custody of the two children. She filed a cross-petition making similar claims. On May 16, 1955, .a divorce was granted on her cross-petition 'amid she was granted custody of the two children with right of visitation iby the father on Saturday of each week. She was a registered nurse 'and shortly after the divorce moved to Burlington and accepted a responsible position at Mercy Hospital. On March 1, 1957, she became the mother of an illegitimate child. The father was Earl Jay, a schoolteacher whom she had known for eight or nine years. Upon discovery of this change Hubert filed an application for modification of decree, asking that the (custody of the two children be granted to' him. Upon trial the court sustained his application, granting defendant visitation rights on (Saturday and Sunday. Custody was changed immediately after trial. Defendant has appealed.

Appellant assigns six errors relied upon for reversal, but the material allegations can be consolidated under two alleged errors. 1. The trial court erred in permitting the offering of *940 some testimony as to facts -and conditions arising p-ri-or to the divorce. 2. The trial -c-ourt erred in -transferring the -custody of the two- children from defendant to plaintiff under the testimony in the case.

This case is similar to most divorce cases, and oases involving questions of modification, in that it very largely turns upon the facts of ¡the particular case under trial. Such facts at times have similarities, but are rarely identical. This is true of .the -case -at bar. Certain very general and broad principles have been established in divorce oases, which are of assistance in analyzing the facts and rendering a determination.

The case is triable de novo-, but in a ease of this type we give substantial weight to- the -decision of the- trial court. Rust v. Trapp, Iowa, N. O. R., 201 N.W. 565; Wood v. Wood, 220 Iowa 441, 262 N.W. 773; Ellison v. Platts, 226 Iowa 1211, 286 N.W. 413; Zuerrer v. Zuerrer, 238 Iowa 402, 27 N.W.2d 260; Maron v. Maron, 238 Iowa 587, 28 N.W.2d 17. This theory is of special significance in this case. .Much depends on the observance of the trial court as to the testimony and demeanor of plaintiff and defendant as witnesses.

The best interest of the children involved in oases of this nature is -our primary consideration. It is not our first purpose to- chastise -or unduly -criticize a p'arent. While it is inevitable tbat feelings will be hurt, whatever may ¡be- the decision, such feelings and the deep desires of -each p-arent must be our second consideration. Neve v. Neve, 210 Iowa 120, 230 N.W. 339; Robbins v. Robbins, 234 Iowa 650, 12 N.W.2d 564; Zuerrer v. Zuerrer and Maron v. Maron, both supra; Stevenson v. McMillan, 250 Iowa 737, 95 N.W.2d 719; Thein v. Squires, 250 Iowa 1149, 97 N.W.2d 156; Ball v. Ball, 250 Iowa 763, 96 N.W.2d 317.

I. .Appellant assigns as error the offering of certain evidence -as to- an occurrence prior to- the- marriage of Hubert and Vivian. Defendant told plaintiff she was pregnant and they would have to- get married. Hubert’s mother was doubtful concerning the matter and asked Vivian to 'submit to a doctor’s examination, which she refused to do. She might have been sincere, but it developed after marriage that the statement was not true. This was the beginning ’of continuous disagreement *941 between Vivian and Hubert’s mother. This being an equity case no rulings were made during the trial as to objections. The matter was in fact without prejudice because the .trial court in rendering its decision gave no attention to this matter in its findings of fact.

It is obvious and we have often held that we cannot retry a divorce case under the cloak of an application for modification. The decree normally is a finality. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 209 Iowa 666, 228 N.W. 652; Neve v. Neve, supra; Jensen v. Jensen, 237 Iowa 1323, 25 N.W.2d 316.

There are exceptions to the general rule. If incidents happened prior to •the decree which -are material and relevant as to the question of the future welfare of children, such facts for such purpose can he shown. We have recently so held in Ball v. Bali, supra.

Appellant cited one case in support of her assignment of error as to this question. Metzger v. Metzger, 224 Iowa 546, 550, 278 N.W. 187, 189. The icase does not support the -assigned error. It involved a change in the amount of the alimony. The case quoted with approval from Keyser v. Keyser, 193, Iowa 16, 17, 186 N.W. 438, as follows: “When this is done [alimony fixed], such decree is conclusive, and should not be- disturbed, unless it ‘is made to- appear that the enforcement of the decree will be attended by positive wrong or injustice, under changed conditions. This is the well established and recognized rule of this count.”

Under section 598.14, 1958 'Iowa Code, the court retains jurisdiction as to children and other matters:

“When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be right.
“Subsequent changes may be made by it in these respects when circumstances render them expedient.” (Emphasis ours.)

There is some discretion lodged with the trial court as to matters which may be material in consideration of an application for modification by reason of changed conditions. We hold the trial court did not abuse this discretion in permitting evidence concerning the premarital indiscretion of Hubert and Vivian, in view of the fact that latex events in the life of Vivian *942 indicate a tendency along this line. It .is proper that we should say that any fault involved was Hubert’s equally with Vivian’s.

II. In order to properly evaluate the matter of the welfare of the two children it is necessary that we malee a somewhat detailed statement of the facts. Delores, now age nine, was bom sometime .after the marriage of Hubert and Vivian, on thé farm occupied jointly with Hubert’s parents. Hubert was not a hired man, but operated the farm with his father. As heretofore suggested there was not a feeling of good will existing as between Vivian and Hubert’s mother.

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96 N.W.2d 736, 250 Iowa 938, 1959 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/staggs-v-staggs-iowa-1959.