Staggs v. Commonwealth

877 S.W.2d 604, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 74, 1993 WL 482025
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedJune 23, 1994
Docket93-SC-006-DG
StatusPublished

This text of 877 S.W.2d 604 (Staggs v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Staggs v. Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d 604, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 74, 1993 WL 482025 (Ky. 1994).

Opinions

COMBS, Justice.

James Robert Staggs was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary review, and reverse.

The single issue on review is whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting into evidence, over objection, the testimony of Sandra Graves, Ph.D., acknowledged by the defense as an expert in the field of art therapy.

The alleged victim, R.S., had been enrolled in an art therapy group for children of alcoholics. The child rendered a drawing depicting his family, which drawing caused concern to the therapist, who referred the matter to authorities for investigation. During the ensuing investigation, the child and his brother alleged that their father, Staggs, had committed sexual acts against them. Staggs was indicted for both sodomy and sexual abuse of R.S., and for sexual abuse of the other child. Both children testified against him at trial. He was convicted of sexual abuse of R.S., and acquitted of the other charges.

The drawing was admitted into evidence during R.S.’s testimony. The drawing was also presented to Dr. Graves, who, after being qualified as an expert, testified at considerable length concerning the drawing and its [605]*605message. The defense objected to permitting testimony interpreting the drawing, but was overruled. Dr. Graves explained that art therapy is a “specialized form of psychotherapy5’ in which the subject might express graphically, often subconsciously, thoughts or emotions which are not expressed verbally due to repression or prohibition. She averred that art therapy is a technique generally recognized in the mental health field.

As for the scientific method of art therapy, Dr. Graves testified that certain graphical traits — distinctive use of line, form, color, content, etc. — are normal among persons of a given developmental stage. Drawings exhibiting deviations from the norm — unusual details, pressure, scenes, scale, shading or coloring — are alarming and may indicate that the person has been subjected to sexual abuse or other trauma. Dr. Graves illustrated with a number of examples — drawings rendered by children at the same developmental stage, the “normal” ones, she said, having been drawn by children who had not been sexually abused, the “abnormal” ones, she said, having been made by victims of sexual abuse. The trial court sustained a defense objection that there was no competent evidence to show that the children doing “abnormal” pieces had in fact been sexually abused. (There was no objection, except possibly by inference, that there was likewise no evidence that the “normal” control group — if it was a control group — had not been sexually abused.) Nonetheless, and without further objection, Dr. Graves persisted in presenting her examples in terms of abnormal drawings by sexually abused children.

Turning to the family drawing made by R.S., Dr. Graves pointed out a number of perceived deviations: the father was depicted as having “special importance,” being of greater size and fuller in form than the stick figures representing the other members of the family; the genital area of the father was heavily shaded; the caption “Dad” was written in the area of the penis; the children were positioned between the father and the mother, R.S. being next to the father; and an odd line appeared across the father’s torso. These deviations, Dr. Graves said, “lead me to believe that this child has been engaged in ... sexual abuse.”

On cross-examination, however, Dr. Graves stated that she could “never ethically tell from one drawing” whether sexual abuse had occurred. Contradictorily, she added that she was “relatively certain” that it had occurred. She stated that she “would have to ask the child” about certain features of the drawing before reaching a conclusion, but admitted that she had never talked with the child. At another point, she stated that the drawing would lead her to recommend that the matter be investigated further.

While not challenging Dr. Graves’s expertise, the appellant maintains that there was no sufficient showing that art therapy itself is generally accepted in the medical community as a reliable tool in diagnosing sexual abuse. He further contends that the sample drawings used by Dr. Graves are irrelevant and hearsay; and further that Dr. Graves’s testimony improperly embraced an ultimate issue of fact, and moreover that its probative value was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.

This matter arose and was tried prior to the effective date of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. We therefore are not called to interpret KRE 702. On the question of the acceptance of art therapy as a reliable scientific technique applicable to an issue in this case, our pre-KRE rule is that enunciated in the decision of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Circuit 1923):

[Wjhile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

Id. at 1014. We have also said:

The party offering the evidence has the burden of proving that this new evidence has gained general acceptance as reliable in the relevant scientific community.

Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 678 (1993).

While we have no reason to doubt Dr. Graves’s integrity or sincerity, we do not find [606]*606her testimony that art therapy is “a generally recognized therapy technique in the mental health field” sufficient to establish that it is generally accepted as reliable for the purpose for which it was used in this case. It is only natural that art therapists themselves firmly believe in the validity and reliability of the discipline. Particularly in view of the recentness of its appearance in the courtroom, we believe it is appropriate to require some evidence from the larger scientific community to establish not only that the technique is generally accepted, but that it is accepted as reliable for the purpose for which it is intended to be used at trial. In Frye, for example the court did not inquire whether polygraph practitioners found the method generally accepted, but rather whether “physiological and psychological authorities” recognized it as valid. Similarly, in our recent case of Harris, supra, evidence of DNA analysis was held admissible where both a DNA analyst and a geneticist recognized as an expert in molecular biology and population genetics testified regarding the methodology, accuracy, and acceptance of the technique.

It is also incumbent upon the Commonwealth, when offering expert opinion on a matter of scientific knowledge, to establish that the tests or analyses conducted in the present case conformed to the accepted methodology of the science. With respect to Dr. Graves’s sample drawings, specifically, there was indeed, as the trial court ruled, no competent evidence to demonstrate that the children who had drawn the “abnormal” samples had in fact been sexually abused; there was moreover no evidence that the “normal” population had not been sexually abused, and no evidence of the size of the population from which the samples had been selected, or the manner of selection. Cf. Lantrip v. Commonwealth,

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Related

Harris v. Commonwealth
846 S.W.2d 678 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1992)
See v. Commonwealth
746 S.W.2d 401 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1988)
Honeycutt v. Commonwealth
408 S.W.2d 421 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1966)
State v. Logue
372 N.W.2d 151 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1985)
Commonwealth v. Rose
725 S.W.2d 588 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1987)
Hester v. Commonwealth
734 S.W.2d 457 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1987)
Lantrip v. Commonwealth
713 S.W.2d 816 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1986)
Shelton v. Commonwealth
134 S.W.2d 653 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1939)
Frye v. United States
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Circuit, 1923)

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Bluebook (online)
877 S.W.2d 604, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 74, 1993 WL 482025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/staggs-v-commonwealth-ky-1994.