Stafne v. Quality Loan Service Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 15, 2025
• Docket: 23-3509
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT ERIK STAFNE, Counsel for No. 23-3509 Plaintiff, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-00223-RSL Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORPORATION, of Washington; MCCARTHY & HOLTHUS, LLP; WARREN LANCE; FIRST HORIZON LOAN CORPORATION; SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.; STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 13, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Scott Erik Stafne, the attorney in the underlying merits case, appeals from an

order imposing sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review for abuse of discretion the district

court’s imposition of sanctions. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d

644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we need

not recount them here. We affirm.

Stafne’s primary argument is that District Judge Lasnik did not have proper

authority to issue the sanctions order, or any other order, because he is a senior

judge. Stafne has been making—and losing—this argument since at least 2018.1

As we concluded in one such prior case, Stafne’s “argument that the senior district

judge who heard his case was a retired judge merely acting as an Article III judge

in this case, is without merit. Senior judges ‘are, of course, life-tenured Article III

judges.’” Bank of New York Mellon v. Stafne, 824 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 2020)

(citing Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 72 (2003) (cleaned up)).

Stafne also argues that the district judge should not have decided any merits

1 See Bergeron v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for New Century Home Equity Loan Tr. 2006-1, No. C24-0929JLR, 2024 WL 3566130 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2024); Stafne v. Burnside, No. 22-35547, 2024 WL 2318169 (9th Cir. May 22, 2024); de Botton v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., No. 23-0223RSL, 2023 WL 8472422 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2023); Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C17- 0874JLR, 2021 WL 615299 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2021); Bank of New York Mellon v. Stafne, 824 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 2020); Stafne v. Zilly, 337 F.Supp.3d 1079 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 820 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2020).

2 23-3509 motions while Stafne had a pending appeal: a challenge to the denial of Stafne’s

motion to remand, again based on Judge Lasnik’s alleged lack of authority as a

senior judge. While an appeal generally “confers jurisdiction on the court of

appeals and divests the district court of its control[,]” Griggs v. Provident

Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), we have explained “that the denial of

a motion to remand is not a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Est. of

Bishop By & Through Bishop v. Bechtel Power Corp., 905 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th

Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir.

1978) (denial of a motion to disqualify the trial judge is neither final nor

appealable). Stafne’s appeal was “dismissed for lack of jurisdiction” because there

was no final order; jurisdiction was never transferred to us from the district

court. Stafne never moved for a stay while his appeal was pending and instead

failed to oppose several motions for summary judgment or timely oppose the

motion for sanctions.

Additionally, Stafne’s appeal was based on the same theory that senior

judges lack authority, which Stafne knew was frivolous having previously lost on

this issue multiple times—and being warned by the court. See e.g. Bergeron v.

Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for New Century Home Equity Loan Tr. 2006-1,

No. C24-0929JLR, 2024 WL 3566130, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2024) (“the

court concludes the motion is frivolous. Stafne merely repeats arguments and

3 23-3509 authorities that this court and others have rejected numerous times under binding

precedent that firmly upholds the constitutionality of senior status.”).

Finally, to the extent Stafne repeats his argument that the district judge did

not have authority to issue sanctions because Stafne had sought his recusal, the

district court determined there was no conflict of interest.2 Denial of the

disqualification itself is neither final nor appealable. Washington, 573 F.2d at

1122.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions. We

warn Stafne once again that his argument with respect to senior judges is

foreclosed by circuit precedent and that continuing to advance this frivolous

argument will result in future sanctions.

AFFIRMED.

2 The district court found there was no evidence Judge Lasnik’s retirement fund had invested in mortgage-backed securities and regardless, the judge did not participate in the management of the fund. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)(i) (“Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a ‘financial interest’ in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund”).

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