UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHANNON STAFFORD,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 1586 (LLA) v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shannon Stafford, proceeding pro se, brought this suit in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), alleging Fourth
Amendment violations. ECF No. 1-1. The FBI removed the action to this court, ECF No. 1, and
moves for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 13.
For the reasons explained below, the court will dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations drawn from Mr. Stafford’s complaint, ECF No. 1-1, are
accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion before the court, Jerome Stevens Pharms.,
Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court further takes judicial notice of
“public documents filed on a court docket.” Lewis v. Parker, 67 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195 n.6
(D.D.C. 2014) (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 2005)).
1 In November 2019, a jury found Mr. Stafford guilty of Intentional Damage to a Protected
Computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B), and Attempted Intentional
Damage to a Protected Computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(B) and (c)(4)(B).
Jury Verdict, United States v. Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2019), ECF No. 86. The
court later sentenced Mr. Stafford to a 366-day term of incarceration followed by a three-year term
of supervised release. Judgment, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Sep. 25, 2020), ECF No. 102,
at 2-3. The terms of Mr. Stafford’s supervised release included a mandatory condition that
Mr. Stafford “cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Stafford initially appealed his sentence but then dismissed the appeal. Order, Stafford,
No. 20-4510 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2021). He then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2021), ECF
No. 146. The court denied his motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380, 2023 WL 2633645, at *1
(D. Md. Mar. 24, 2023), Mr. Stafford appealed again, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal
for lack of a certificate of appealability, Stafford, No. 23-6478, 2023 WL 6058483, at *1
(4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023).
In February 2024, Mr. Stafford sued the FBI in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. ECF No. 1-1. In his complaint, Mr. Stafford explains that the FBI collected his DNA in
2019 as part of its investigation into his criminal case, and he asserts that his DNA was collected
again in 2021 when he was in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. ¶ 1. Mr. Stafford
alleges that he was later informed by his probation officer that the FBI had lost his DNA sample. Id.
¶ 2. Since then, Mr. Stafford has refused to allow the collection of another DNA sample, id. ¶¶ 4, 5,
arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment, id. ¶ 6. He seeks an injunction to prevent the FBI
from collecting another DNA sample, id. at 2.
2 The FBI removed the action to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), ECF No. 1, and
now moves to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 13. Mr. Stafford opposes the motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 15.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause
lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action
unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). This
liberal construction “is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009). Thus, “even a pro se
plaintiff must meet his burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction to survive a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
The court begins, as it must, with subject-matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d
59, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to both
Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), “the court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge[]”
because a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders all other defenses and objections moot).
Here, the FBI argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of
derivative jurisdiction. ECF No. 13-1, at 4-5. That doctrine arises from the theory “that a federal
3 court’s jurisdiction over a removed case derives from the jurisdiction of the state court from which
the case originated.” Merkulov v. U.S. Park Police, 75 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2014)
(quoting Cofield v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 206, 214 (D.D.C. 2014)). If the state court lacked
jurisdiction over a suit, the federal court does not “acquire jurisdiction” through removal and must
dismiss the case. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 1 The
doctrine requires dismissal “even if Plaintiff could have filed his complaint in federal court in the
first instance” but instead files in state court. Cofield, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (quoting Lambert Run
Coal Co., 258 U.S. at 382); see Arizona v.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHANNON STAFFORD,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 1586 (LLA) v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shannon Stafford, proceeding pro se, brought this suit in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), alleging Fourth
Amendment violations. ECF No. 1-1. The FBI removed the action to this court, ECF No. 1, and
moves for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 13.
For the reasons explained below, the court will dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations drawn from Mr. Stafford’s complaint, ECF No. 1-1, are
accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion before the court, Jerome Stevens Pharms.,
Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court further takes judicial notice of
“public documents filed on a court docket.” Lewis v. Parker, 67 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195 n.6
(D.D.C. 2014) (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 2005)).
1 In November 2019, a jury found Mr. Stafford guilty of Intentional Damage to a Protected
Computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B), and Attempted Intentional
Damage to a Protected Computer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A)-(B) and (c)(4)(B).
Jury Verdict, United States v. Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2019), ECF No. 86. The
court later sentenced Mr. Stafford to a 366-day term of incarceration followed by a three-year term
of supervised release. Judgment, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Sep. 25, 2020), ECF No. 102,
at 2-3. The terms of Mr. Stafford’s supervised release included a mandatory condition that
Mr. Stafford “cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Stafford initially appealed his sentence but then dismissed the appeal. Order, Stafford,
No. 20-4510 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2021). He then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2021), ECF
No. 146. The court denied his motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380, 2023 WL 2633645, at *1
(D. Md. Mar. 24, 2023), Mr. Stafford appealed again, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal
for lack of a certificate of appealability, Stafford, No. 23-6478, 2023 WL 6058483, at *1
(4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023).
In February 2024, Mr. Stafford sued the FBI in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. ECF No. 1-1. In his complaint, Mr. Stafford explains that the FBI collected his DNA in
2019 as part of its investigation into his criminal case, and he asserts that his DNA was collected
again in 2021 when he was in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. ¶ 1. Mr. Stafford
alleges that he was later informed by his probation officer that the FBI had lost his DNA sample. Id.
¶ 2. Since then, Mr. Stafford has refused to allow the collection of another DNA sample, id. ¶¶ 4, 5,
arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment, id. ¶ 6. He seeks an injunction to prevent the FBI
from collecting another DNA sample, id. at 2.
2 The FBI removed the action to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), ECF No. 1, and
now moves to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 13. Mr. Stafford opposes the motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 15.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause
lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action
unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). This
liberal construction “is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009). Thus, “even a pro se
plaintiff must meet his burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction to survive a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
The court begins, as it must, with subject-matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d
59, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to both
Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), “the court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge[]”
because a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders all other defenses and objections moot).
Here, the FBI argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of
derivative jurisdiction. ECF No. 13-1, at 4-5. That doctrine arises from the theory “that a federal
3 court’s jurisdiction over a removed case derives from the jurisdiction of the state court from which
the case originated.” Merkulov v. U.S. Park Police, 75 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2014)
(quoting Cofield v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 3d 206, 214 (D.D.C. 2014)). If the state court lacked
jurisdiction over a suit, the federal court does not “acquire jurisdiction” through removal and must
dismiss the case. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 1 The
doctrine requires dismissal “even if Plaintiff could have filed his complaint in federal court in the
first instance” but instead files in state court. Cofield, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (quoting Lambert Run
Coal Co., 258 U.S. at 382); see Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 n.17 (1981).
While Congress has “eliminated derivative jurisdiction as a barrier to actions removed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441,” Johnson v. D.C. Metro. Transit Auth., 239 F. Supp. 3d 293, 295
(D.D.C. 2017), “the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction still applies to claims removed under [28
U.S.C. §] 1442,” Merkulov, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (collecting cases). Thus, because the FBI
removed this case under Section 1442(a)(1), see ECF No. 1, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction
applies.
The central inquiry in the derivative-jurisdiction analysis is “whether, prior to removal, the
Superior Court . . . had jurisdiction of the subject matter” of the suit. McKoy-Shields v. First Wash.
Realty, Inc., No. 11-CV-1419, 2012 WL 1076195, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012). The answer here
is no.
As a general matter, “the United States cannot be sued without its consent.” Settles v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Congress may waive the United States’
sovereign immunity for certain claims, but such a waiver “must be unequivocally expressed.” United
1 “The term ‘State court’ includes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(d)(6).
4 States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
Through the Administrative Procedure Act, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity
when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in federal court, 5 U.S.C. § 702, but the United States has
not waived its sovereign immunity to be sued for injunctive relief in a state court like the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, Williams v. Pretrial Servs. Agency for D.C., No. 23-CV-1859,
2024 WL 4103708, at *3, (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024); see McCain v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
No. 23-CV-3288, 2023 WL 9023171, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2023) (holding that the Superior
Court did not have jurisdiction over a claim brought against a federal agency). Accordingly,
because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Stafford’s Fourth Amendment claim
seeking injunctive relief, this court did not “acquire jurisdiction” through removal and must
dismiss the case. Lambert Run Coal Co., 258 U.S. at 382.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the FBI’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 13,
and dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A contemporaneous order will issue.
LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge
Date: July 22, 2025