Stafford & Son v. Means

91 S.E. 513, 19 Ga. App. 341, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 118
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 16, 1917
Docket8140
StatusPublished

This text of 91 S.E. 513 (Stafford & Son v. Means) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stafford & Son v. Means, 91 S.E. 513, 19 Ga. App. 341, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinion

Wade, C. J.

Stafford & Son brought suit to the August term, 1915, of the superior court of Monroe county, against Mrs. Means, to recover $3,677.30 principal, besides interest and attorney’s fees, on eight promissory notes of the defendant to the plaintiffs, four of which were dated June 13, 1910, and due on October 15, November 1, November 15, and December 1, 1910, respectively—the three first for $500 and the last for $507.30 principal, besides interest, etc.; and four others dated March 18, 1912, and due October 1, October 15, November 1, November 15, 1912, respectively, for $417.50 principal each, besides interest, etc. The indebtedness represented by the four notes' first mentioned was secured by a deed of the same date to 303]4 acres of land therein described, intended to operate under the provisions of sections 3306, 3310, and 6037 of the Civil Code of 1910. This deed provided that the indebtedness represented by the notes should become due and payable as stated therein, and further provided as follows: “but in the event it is so desired on the part of the said Mrs. Means [the maker of the deed], she is to have five years in which to pay same in full, provided she shall make annual payments on the same of at least the amount of one of the said notes, thereby reducing said indebtedness each year.” The contract further stipulated that Mrs. Means should “turn over and transfer to said Stafford & Son rent notes for 10 bales- of lint cotton each year as a part of the security for the indebtedness” secured by the deed, and that “a failure to turn, over and transfer the rent notes as herein above stipulated shall be a forfeiture of the right to have any of said notes or indebtedness extended over and beyond the date named therein. February 15th of each year shall be the date or last day on which to turn over and transfer said rent notes.” On March 38, 1912, Mrs. Means executed and delivered to Stafford & Son another deed, covering the lands described in the deed of June 13, [343]*3431910, for the purpose of securing the four notes last mentioned above. This deed referred to the deed of June 13, 1910, and made the following recital: “And whereas I, the said Mrs. A. A. Means, desire to further secure the payment of the four promissory notes herein above mentioned, which is an additional indebtedness contracted and made with said Stafford & Son since the execution of the security deed above referred to, now, therefore, for and in consideration of said indebtedness, the extension of the payment thereof to the several dates named in said notes, and as well as for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, the said Mrs. A. A. Means, do hereby grant, bargain, sell, alien, convey, and confirm unto the said Stafford & Son, their heirs, executors, and assigns, the said farm containing 303% acres, which is described above and is fully described in said deed dated June 13, 1910, and recorded June 16, 1.910, in deed record 34, at pages 663, 664, in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Monroe county, Georgia, which deed and conveyance is hereby referred to and made a part of this contract and subject to.and including all the terms, stipulations, and conditions named in said former deed of conveyance; and all the rights, options, powers, and privileges therein contained and provided are hereby referred to and adopted and made a part of this contract and conveyance. And it is fully understood and agreed that the said four notes which represent an existing indebtedness due by said Mrs. Means to said Stafford & Son shall be secured by and fall under the terms and stipulations of said conveyance as fully and completely and amply as if embodied in said deed, and said deed shall be of full force and virtue until the said indebtedness therein named, and that named herein as well, shall be fully paid off and discharged.” The deed contained also the following further recitals and agreement: “It is further understood and hereby agreed, that, whereas I, the said Mrs. A. A. Means, am so indebted to said Stafford & Son in the way and manner herein above stated, aggregating approximately $4,000, which is very likely more than I can pay during the year 1912; I therefore hereby agree and bind myself, my heirs, representatives, and assigns, to pay first, out of all my crops, all my income, including ten bales of rent cotton from my old Means place, or from any other resources Or income that I may have, all my indebtedness [344]*344to said Stafford & Son which, shall be created or made the present year (and which is not secured by and under the terms of this contract and conveyance and the conveyance of June 13, 1910, which is a part of this contract), before requiring or asking that any payment made shall be credited upon the notes secured hereby. It is also further understood and agreed hereby that in view of the increased amount of my indebtedness to said Stafford & Son subsequent to the execution and delivery of the deed of 1910, and the necessity for a longer period of time in which to pay off all of said indebtedness, the said Stafford & Son agree to give said Mrs. Means two years, and if absolutely necessary three years, in addition to the five years stipulated in the said conveyance of 1910, in which to pay off and discharge all the indebtedness secured by this and the said 1910 conveyance.”

The defendant interposed a demurrer, in which it was insisted, •(1) that the petition did not state a case authorizing a recovery against the defendant; (2) that the petition showed on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to institute a suit upon the alleged indebtedness; and (3) that the petition showed upon its face that the indebtedness sued upon was not due, “for the reason that the contract of March 18, 1912, was a new and distinct contract, in itself extending the time of payment two years in addition to the five years stipulated in the conveyance of 1910, fin which to pay off and discharge all indebtedness secured by this and the said 1910 conveyance/ and it appears from the face of the pleadings that the said two years have not elapsed.” The court sustained this demurrer; whereupon the plaintiff excepted and brought the case to the Supreme Court for review, and from, that court the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, under the recent amendment of the constitution.

The original contract allowed the maker of the security deed the full term of five years in which to pay the indebtedness thereby secured, but also required the debtor to turn over and transfer to Stafford & Son rent notes for ten bales of rent cotton each year, as a part of the security, and stipulated that upon a failure so to- turn over and transfer these rent notes, “the right to have any of said notes or indebtedness extended over and beyond the due date named therein” should be forfeited. TTnder the contract of 1912 the original contract of June 13, 1910, was referred to [345]*345and made a part thereof, and the second contract was made, “subject to and including all the terms, stipulations, and conditions named in said former deed of conveyance;” and- “the rights, options, powers, and privileges therein contained and provided” were adopted and made a part of the second contract, but there is an. apparent conflict between the terms of that contract and the original contract.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 S.E. 513, 19 Ga. App. 341, 1917 Ga. App. LEXIS 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stafford-son-v-means-gactapp-1917.