IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STAFFORD HEALTHCARE SEATAC, LLC, No. 85702-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION GALE M. PAGE,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — As personal representative of her mother’s estate,
Rashida Miller appeals the trial court’s grant of default judgment in favor of Stafford
Healthcare SeaTac LLC. Based largely on deficiencies in briefing and the record
designated on appeal, Miller fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief and we affirm.
FACTS
The record designated in this appeal consists of three items: roughly 300
pages of documents filed in the trial court, the amended answer and counterclaim,
and a declaration of Rashida Miller filed contemporaneously with the answer and
counterclaim. We do not have the complaint that initiated the suit or any subsequent
pleadings, nor was a report of proceedings transmitted to this court. As such, we
glean only the barest of procedural facts from the trial court record: Miller asserts
that her mother, Gale Page, became a resident at Stafford Healthcare SeaTac in
November 2021 after her health declined dramatically and Miller was no longer able No. 85702-9-I/2
to provide residential care for Page. A dispute arose with regard to payment for
Page’s residential care and she was discharged from the facility.
Based only on the case caption in the default judgment from the trial court, it
appears that Stafford filed suit against Page, but again, we do not have the complaint
before us. On June 2, 2023, Miller filed an answer and counterclaim on Page’s
behalf, signing as her attorney-in-fact. 1 On July 18, the court entered a default
judgment against Page in the amount of $22,637.44, awarded costs of $240, and
noted that Page did not appear in person or through counsel at a hearing on July
10.
On August 15, Miller filed a notice of appeal in King County Superior Court
that designated only the default judgment in favor of Stafford and again asserted her
role as attorney-in-fact for Page. The same notice of appeal was filed in this court
a week later. Miller filed an opening brief in the case on October 30 but it was
rejected by a commissioner of this court as there had been no motion to substitute
a party. In January 2024, Miller filed a motion in this court to substitute herself as
the appellant in this case because Page had passed away in September 2023. The
commissioner granted that motion and Miller’s opening brief was accepted. Counsel
for Stafford formally withdrew in September 2023 and no response brief was filed.
ANALYSIS
In her opening brief, Miller notes that she is a pro se litigant and presents two
assignments of error: that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment and
1 There is only a power of attorney document for healthcare in the materials Miller filed in
the trial court. Nothing before us establishes that Miller was Page’s attorney-in-fact for purposes of litigation.
-2- No. 85702-9-I/3
in “not considering fact based evidence provided to them during the trial court
process, incorrect orders were entered for clerical errors and no time was
communicated to all parties for a hearing.” She further requests that this court
release her from “any penalties or obligations for unpaid bills to Stafford Healthcare
LLC or their attorneys” and further seeks an award of “$2.2 million dollars to be
granted to the estate of G. Page and any additional considerations the court feels
necessary.”
I. Compliance with Rules of Appellate Procedure
As set out in RAP 1.1(a), the Rules of Appellate Procedure “govern
proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals for review of a trial court
decision.” “These rules will be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate
the decision of cases on the merits.” RAP 1.2(a). However, we hold pro se litigants
to the same standard as attorneys. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,
850 P.2d 527 (1993). RAP 9.6 directs that the party seeking review is responsible
for designating the record on appeal and arranging for its transmission to this court,
though it also allows any party to supplement the record as needed. RAP 10.3 sets
out the requirements for the brief of appellant generally and RAP 10.3(a)(5) explains
that it must include a “fair statement of the facts and procedure relevant to the issues
presented for review, without argument. Reference to the record must be included
for each factual statement.” (Emphasis added.) RAP 10.3(a)(6) further requires that
the brief contain “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together
with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record. . . .
The court ordinarily encourages a concise statement of the standard of review as to
-3- No. 85702-9-I/4
each issue.” (Emphasis added.) Miller’s failure to comply with the RAPs results in
procedural barriers to appellate review.
Miller does not provide the standard of review for a default judgment and the
inadequate record designated for appeal provides no way for us to understand the
procedural history of the case. The argument she presents in briefing does not cite
to the trial record, contravening the requirements in RAP 10.3(a)(5) and (6). Without
the ability to see what occurred in the trial court, we are unable to determine the
proper standard of review or controlling authority in order to assess whether the
court committed error.
Further, the authority Miller does offer is not controlling or, in some cases,
valid. She provides four separate citations to RCWs in her brief which she sets out
as follows: “4.8.30 [sic] (Default Judgment),” “4.8.40 [sic] (Counterclaims),”
“2.24.050 (Admissibility of Evidence),” and “4.06.110 (Time of Hearing).” However,
RCW 4.08.030 is entitled, “Either spouse or either domestic partner may sue for
community—Necessary parties,” and has nothing to do with default judgments.
Similarly, RCW 4.08.040 does not address counterclaims, but rather, when spouses
or domestic partners may join or defend an action. RCW 2.24.050 does not address
“admissibility of evidence,” but instead explains that actions taken by court
commissioners are subject to revision by the superior court. The Washington State
Rules of Evidence govern admissibility of evidence in our state court system.
Finally, there is no RCW 4.06.110 in our state code, in fact there is no chapter 4.06
RCW at all. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, we are not
required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent
-4- No. 85702-9-I/5
search, has found none.” Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d 41, 57, 476 P.3d
589 (2020); see also DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372
P.2d 193 (1962).
II. Substantive Challenges
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STAFFORD HEALTHCARE SEATAC, LLC, No. 85702-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION GALE M. PAGE,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — As personal representative of her mother’s estate,
Rashida Miller appeals the trial court’s grant of default judgment in favor of Stafford
Healthcare SeaTac LLC. Based largely on deficiencies in briefing and the record
designated on appeal, Miller fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief and we affirm.
FACTS
The record designated in this appeal consists of three items: roughly 300
pages of documents filed in the trial court, the amended answer and counterclaim,
and a declaration of Rashida Miller filed contemporaneously with the answer and
counterclaim. We do not have the complaint that initiated the suit or any subsequent
pleadings, nor was a report of proceedings transmitted to this court. As such, we
glean only the barest of procedural facts from the trial court record: Miller asserts
that her mother, Gale Page, became a resident at Stafford Healthcare SeaTac in
November 2021 after her health declined dramatically and Miller was no longer able No. 85702-9-I/2
to provide residential care for Page. A dispute arose with regard to payment for
Page’s residential care and she was discharged from the facility.
Based only on the case caption in the default judgment from the trial court, it
appears that Stafford filed suit against Page, but again, we do not have the complaint
before us. On June 2, 2023, Miller filed an answer and counterclaim on Page’s
behalf, signing as her attorney-in-fact. 1 On July 18, the court entered a default
judgment against Page in the amount of $22,637.44, awarded costs of $240, and
noted that Page did not appear in person or through counsel at a hearing on July
10.
On August 15, Miller filed a notice of appeal in King County Superior Court
that designated only the default judgment in favor of Stafford and again asserted her
role as attorney-in-fact for Page. The same notice of appeal was filed in this court
a week later. Miller filed an opening brief in the case on October 30 but it was
rejected by a commissioner of this court as there had been no motion to substitute
a party. In January 2024, Miller filed a motion in this court to substitute herself as
the appellant in this case because Page had passed away in September 2023. The
commissioner granted that motion and Miller’s opening brief was accepted. Counsel
for Stafford formally withdrew in September 2023 and no response brief was filed.
ANALYSIS
In her opening brief, Miller notes that she is a pro se litigant and presents two
assignments of error: that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment and
1 There is only a power of attorney document for healthcare in the materials Miller filed in
the trial court. Nothing before us establishes that Miller was Page’s attorney-in-fact for purposes of litigation.
-2- No. 85702-9-I/3
in “not considering fact based evidence provided to them during the trial court
process, incorrect orders were entered for clerical errors and no time was
communicated to all parties for a hearing.” She further requests that this court
release her from “any penalties or obligations for unpaid bills to Stafford Healthcare
LLC or their attorneys” and further seeks an award of “$2.2 million dollars to be
granted to the estate of G. Page and any additional considerations the court feels
necessary.”
I. Compliance with Rules of Appellate Procedure
As set out in RAP 1.1(a), the Rules of Appellate Procedure “govern
proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals for review of a trial court
decision.” “These rules will be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate
the decision of cases on the merits.” RAP 1.2(a). However, we hold pro se litigants
to the same standard as attorneys. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,
850 P.2d 527 (1993). RAP 9.6 directs that the party seeking review is responsible
for designating the record on appeal and arranging for its transmission to this court,
though it also allows any party to supplement the record as needed. RAP 10.3 sets
out the requirements for the brief of appellant generally and RAP 10.3(a)(5) explains
that it must include a “fair statement of the facts and procedure relevant to the issues
presented for review, without argument. Reference to the record must be included
for each factual statement.” (Emphasis added.) RAP 10.3(a)(6) further requires that
the brief contain “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together
with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record. . . .
The court ordinarily encourages a concise statement of the standard of review as to
-3- No. 85702-9-I/4
each issue.” (Emphasis added.) Miller’s failure to comply with the RAPs results in
procedural barriers to appellate review.
Miller does not provide the standard of review for a default judgment and the
inadequate record designated for appeal provides no way for us to understand the
procedural history of the case. The argument she presents in briefing does not cite
to the trial record, contravening the requirements in RAP 10.3(a)(5) and (6). Without
the ability to see what occurred in the trial court, we are unable to determine the
proper standard of review or controlling authority in order to assess whether the
court committed error.
Further, the authority Miller does offer is not controlling or, in some cases,
valid. She provides four separate citations to RCWs in her brief which she sets out
as follows: “4.8.30 [sic] (Default Judgment),” “4.8.40 [sic] (Counterclaims),”
“2.24.050 (Admissibility of Evidence),” and “4.06.110 (Time of Hearing).” However,
RCW 4.08.030 is entitled, “Either spouse or either domestic partner may sue for
community—Necessary parties,” and has nothing to do with default judgments.
Similarly, RCW 4.08.040 does not address counterclaims, but rather, when spouses
or domestic partners may join or defend an action. RCW 2.24.050 does not address
“admissibility of evidence,” but instead explains that actions taken by court
commissioners are subject to revision by the superior court. The Washington State
Rules of Evidence govern admissibility of evidence in our state court system.
Finally, there is no RCW 4.06.110 in our state code, in fact there is no chapter 4.06
RCW at all. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, we are not
required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent
-4- No. 85702-9-I/5
search, has found none.” Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d 41, 57, 476 P.3d
589 (2020); see also DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372
P.2d 193 (1962).
II. Substantive Challenges
The deficient record and noncompliance with the RAPs prevent
comprehensive review of Miller’s assignments of error. Nonetheless, we endeavor
to explain to this pro se appellant why that is so.
A. Entry of Default Judgment
Our civil rules for superior courts specifically allow that a motion for default
may be made “when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that
fact is made by motion and affidavit.” CR 55(a)(1). Subsection (b) of that rule sets
out the procedure for entry of default judgment and (c) provides the process for
setting aside a default, namely by referring to CR 60.
While Miller assigns error to the court’s entry of default judgment against her
mother, she fails to explain, by citing to the record from the trial court or controlling
authority, how that ruling was erroneous under the civil rules. Further, there is no
indication that Page attempted to set aside the order on default by bringing a motion
to vacate under CR 60. Because the record transmitted on appeal does not
establish how the default was brought to the attention of the trial court or the factual
basis it considered in reaching its ruling, Miller has failed to demonstrate error.
-5- No. 85702-9-I/6
B. Failure to Consider Evidence and Communication of Court Dates
In her other assignment of error, Miller asserts that the trial court failed to
consider evidence submitted in defense of Stafford’s claims, clerical errors resulted
in entry of incorrect orders, and dates and times of hearings were not communicated
to all necessary parties. To reiterate, the only information we have from the trial
court with regard to the nature of the default is set out in the default judgment. There,
the court expressly stated that a hearing was set on July 10, 2023 and that Stafford
appeared through counsel, but “[d]efendant GALE PAGE did not appear in person
or by counsel.” If Page failed to appear at the hearing due to clerical errors or
because she did not receive proper notice of the hearing, either claim could have
been a basis to bring a motion to vacate the default under CR 60. Again, we have
no indication from the record that such a motion was presented.
If the assertion of failure to consider evidence is premised on Miller’s
contention that the court failed to consider the answer and accompanying exhibits
she filed on her mother’s behalf, CR 12(a)(1) directs that a defendant must serve an
answer “within 20 days, exclusive of the date of service, after the service of the
summons and complaint upon the defendant pursuant to [CR] 4.” Again, the
complaint filed by Stafford is not in the record before us, so we cannot determine if
the answer was timely under the rule. More critically, however, CR 11(a) plainly
states,
Every pleading, motion, and legal memorandum of a party represented by an attorney shall be dated and signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, whose address and Washington State Bar Association membership number shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign and
-6- No. 85702-9-I/7
date the party’s pleading, motion, or legal memorandum and state the party’s address.
Miller noted in her brief on appeal that she is a pro se litigant, after having filed a
motion to substitute for her mother in this appeal since Page passed away. We
accept Miller’s self-designation as a concession that she is not an attorney licensed
in the State of Washington. While she signed the answers and counterclaim as,
“Power of Attorney for G. Page,” this does not entitle her, a non-lawyer, to represent
another person in litigation. “‘Washington law, with limited exception, requires
individuals appearing before the court on behalf of another party to be licensed in
the practice of law.’ . . . Representing another person or entity in court is the practice
of law. To practice law, one must be an attorney. RCW 2.48.170.” Dutch Vill. Mall,
LLC v. Pelletti, 162 Wn. App. 531, 535, 256 P.3d 1251 (2011) (citation omitted)
(quoting Lloyd Enters., Inc. v. Longview Plumbing & Heating Co., 91 Wn. App. 697,
701, 958 P.2d 1035 (1998).
While we have endeavored to provide some explanation for the procedural
outcome of this case, we are hampered by an insufficient record. Because Miller’s
claims on appeal lack citations to the trial court record or sufficient argument of
controlling legal authority, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
-7-