Stafford Co. v. Draper Corp.

255 F. 548, 166 C.C.A. 616, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1240
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedNovember 21, 1918
DocketNo. 1353
StatusPublished

This text of 255 F. 548 (Stafford Co. v. Draper Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stafford Co. v. Draper Corp., 255 F. 548, 166 C.C.A. 616, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1240 (1st Cir. 1918).

Opinion

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree in favor of the plaintiff relating to United States letters patent, No. 821,123, granted to C. F. Roper, May 22, 1906. The defenses are anticipation and noninfringement. It was found in the court below that claims 1 and 9 of the patent were valid and infringed, and that claims 12, 13, and 18 were invalid, not being sufficiently definite. The present appeal of the defendant is from so much of the interlocutory decree as held claims 1 and 9 valid and infringed. No appeal was taken by the plaintiff from the interlocutory decree as to claims 12, 13, and 18.

[1] The plaintiff’s patent is for an improvement in filling-exhaustion-indicating mechanism “for detecting and indicating substantial exhaustion of the filling in the running shuttle, and thereupon to cause either automatic loom stoppage or automatic replenishment of the shuttle without stoppage.”

In the hearing before us only one of the prior art devices relied upon in the court below was urged in opposition to the finding of validity; that device is shown in United States letters patent No. 698,579, granted to W. I. Stimpson, April 29, 1902. It is true, as the defendant contends, that the feeler members of this device are brought in contact with the filling or the filling and its carrier on each alternate beat of the lay, the same as is the case in the plaintiff’s device; but the distinction between the two devices lies in the respective means provided and their mode of operation for effecting a change in the filling mechanism. In the plaintiff’s device one of the feelers is pointed, so that it sinks into or penetrates the filling, when there is filling on the bobbin, which feature is essential to the working of the device; while in that of Stimpson, although one of the feelers is narrower than the other, it is not pointed, and its mode of operation is not dependent upon its possessing a penetrative capacity. On the contrary, such capacity would seem to be detrimental to its operation. Then, again, the operation of the plaintiff’s feelers is dependent upon the softness or penetrability of the filling mass, as compared with the harder material of which the bobbin is composed, a feature in no way material in the operation of the Stimpson mechanism. In the plaintiff’s device, when the filling on the bobbin has become so reduced as to exert no pressure upon the impinging member, the penetrating member then contacts with the hard surface of the bobbin, both members are moved forward in unison, and the change is effected; while in the device of Stimpson the change is effected only when one of the feeler members is moved forward relatively a predetermined distance by an annular enlargement on the barrel of the bobbin, which is so located with reference to one of the feeler members as to effect this result when the filling has been sufficiently exhausted to permit it.

In the court below it was found that the “patented device effects in operation a substantial saving, by diminishing the amount of the filling left on the carrier at each loom stoppage or replenishment, to an extent not attainable by any prior mechanical exhaustion-indicating device. It embodies therefore a useful improvement, and one which I also find to have been patentably new, notwithstanding that it was [550]*550made * * * in á ‘refined’ art.” We think the proofs fully sustain the findings as to utility and patentable novelty.

[2] The question of infringement as to claims 1 and 9 remains to be considered. These claims read as follows:

“1. In a loom, a shuttle to contain a carrier having a mass of filling wound thereon, filling-replenishing mechanism, and means to control the time of its operation, said means including two adjacent and yieldingly mounted, relatively movable members one of which is adapted to penetrate, and the other to impinge against, the filling mass in the shuttle, to effect relative movement of said members, substantial exhaustion of the filling permitting the penetrating member to engage the carrier and move in unison with the impinging member, to cause the operation of the controlling means.”
“9. In filling-exhaustion-indicating mechanism for looms, in combination, two adjacent and relatively movable members one of which is adapted to penetrate, and the other to impinge against, the filling mass in the shuttle to effect relative movement of said members, substantial exhaustion of the filling causing the members to move in unison, and means operated by or through such unison movement to control the operation of the loom.”

Upon this question it was found in the court below that the defendant’s feeler device, like that of the plaintiff,- consisted of two members movable relatively under certain circumstances and movable in unison under certain other circumstances, depending upon the filling on the carrier, and adapted to co-operate with the filling mass or its carrier at each alternate beat of the lay; that both members are moved forward against spring pressure,at each contact; that one of the members “presents a blunt surface at its point of contact,” and is no more adapted to penetrate or sink into the filling mass than the “impinging member” of the patent; that the other member is differently shaped at its point of contact, “and while rather better adapted than its fellow to ‘penetrate’ or ‘sink into’ the filling mass, it is still by no means so well adapted for that purpose as is the penetrating member of the patent”; that “there is a distinct difference in penetrative capacity” between the two members of the defendant’s device; and that “without such difference the mechanism would neither work so well, nor effect so much saving in filling.” In other words that it embodies the penetration idea of the patent.

It was further found that the mode or order of operation of the defendant’s feeler device in effecting a change was a mere reversal of that of the patent, and it was ruled that its mode of operation, to a substantial extent at least, was the equivalent of that of the patented device and that the defendant infringed.

In discussing the question of infringement it is important to keep in mind that the distinctive feature of the plaintiff’s patent is the penetrative or sinking-in character of the pointed member of its feeler. In Stimpson’s device of the prior art, the feeler members measure a predetermined distance from the surface of the yarn on the bobbin to the rim of the annular enlargement on the barrel of the bobbin, before calling a change. In the plaintiff’s device the feeler members, on calling a change, measure a predetermined distance from the surface of the yarn to the bobbin; and this is true, likewise, of the defendant’s device. The feeler members in all three devices move relatively to one another in reaching this predetermined measuring point. The new [551]*551idea of the plaintiffs device consists in the patentee having laid hold of the principle of the relative density of the yarn and the bobbin and provided a feeler mechanism one member of which was adapted to penetrate the yarn and the other to impinge upon it and, when the yarn was sufficiently reduced, to measure the predetermined distance, which, upon being followed by a unison movement of the members, would call a change.

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Bluebook (online)
255 F. 548, 166 C.C.A. 616, 1918 U.S. App. LEXIS 1240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stafford-co-v-draper-corp-ca1-1918.