Stacy Bridges v. Director, Division of Workforce Services
This text of 2024 Ark. App. 47 (Stacy Bridges v. Director, Division of Workforce Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 47 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. E-22-404
STACY BRIDGES Opinion Delivered January 24, 2024
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW V. [NO. 2022-BR-00048]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN WORKFORCE SERVICES PART APPELLEE
CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge
Appellant Stacy Bridges appeals from an order issued by the Arkansas Board of
Review (Board) affirming the determination of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) requiring her
to repay $6,096 in unemployment-compensation benefits. We affirm in part and remand in
part.
I. Background and Procedural History
The record indicates that Bridges received $81 in weekly state unemployment benefits
for the weeks ending January 23 through May 8, 2021, for a total of $1,296. In addition,
Bridges received $300 in weekly Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
(“FPUC”) during that same time period for a total of $4,800 in FPUC benefits. The record
also contains a notice of agency determination dated September 29, 2021, that disqualified
Bridges from receiving benefits beginning January 8, 2021. The decision disqualifying Bridges from unemployment benefits was ultimately upheld by the Board in case No. 2022-
BR-00047 after Bridges was found, after a Paulino1 hearing, to have filed an untimely appeal
of a decision by the Division of Workforce Services (Division) to the Tribunal.2 That
underlying disqualification is therefore not before us. In this separate appeal, we address
only the issue of repayment.
On November 4, 2021, the Division issued a notice of nonfraud overpayment to
Bridges based on the Division’s determination that she had been disqualified from receiving
benefits. Bridges timely filed an appeal of the overpayment determination to the Tribunal.
A hearing was held on the overpayment issue on November 30, 2021, after which the
Tribunal found that the overpayment was not due to Division error and that Bridges was,
therefore, liable for repayment.
Bridges appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board. After reviewing the record, the
Board affirmed and adopted the decision of the Tribunal. Bridges has appealed the
overpayment determination.
II. Standard of Review
Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.
Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
1 Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676, 559 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). 2 We previously remanded for additional findings or to supplement the record, because the order affirming the disqualification of benefits was not included in our record. Bridges v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 498.
2 that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of
unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is
evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board
could have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Id.
However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the
Board. Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App.
171, 517 S.W.3d 427.
III. Analysis
This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d
852, confirmed that, for purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the
repayment may be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct
result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against
equity and good conscience.” Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)). Carman also holds that FPUC
repayment may be waived if the State determines that the payment of the FPUC was without
fault on the part of the individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and
good conscience. Id. at 8, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).
In the present case, the Board affirmed and adopted the decision of the Tribunal,
which found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of a final disqualifying Board
determination and not due to an error by the Division. As stated above, to avoid repayment
3 of state unemployment benefits, the overpayment must have been caused as a direct result
of the Division’s error, and it must be against principles of equity and good conscience to
require repayment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2). Because Bridges failed to satisfy
the first prong of her state unemployment-waiver analysis that overpayment was received as
a result of an error by the Division, we affirm the Board’s decision requiring Bridges to repay
$1,296 in state unemployment benefits.
However, Bridges also received FPUC benefits. For the repayment of federal benefits
to be waived, the Division must find that the federal payments were made without fault on
the part of the claimant and that repayment would be contrary to equity and good
conscience. See 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2). Here, neither the Tribunal nor the Board performed
the required federal-waiver analysis to determine whether the $4,800 in FPUC benefits must
be repaid, and no findings were made with regard to that analysis. Whether sufficient
findings of fact have been made is a threshold question in an appeal from an administrative
board. Id. If adequate findings of fact are not made on the issue presented, we remand to the
Board for it to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which to perform proper
appellate review. Id. Therefore, we must remand for further findings as to, first, whether
Bridges was at fault and, second, whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good
conscience before requiring her to repay the $4,800 in FPUC benefits.
In sum, we affirm the decision requiring Bridges to repay the $1,296 in state benefits
and remand for further findings regarding whether Bridges is required to repay the $4,800
in FPUC benefits for the reasons set forth above.
4 Affirmed in part; remanded in part.
GRUBER and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Stacy Bridges, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.
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