Stackpool v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles

Opinion

SUMMARY

December 16, 2021

2021COA150

No. 20CA1359, Stackpool v. Colorado Department of Revenue,

Division of Motor Vehicles — Add key words

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a person

convicted of a felony for driving under the influence of alcohol or

drugs may apply for early reinstatement of her privilege to drive

with an “interlock-restricted license” pursuant to section

42-2-132.5(4), C.R.S. 2021, before serving the full term of her

license revocation under section 42-2-125(1), C.R.S. 2021. The

majority holds that the Colorado Department of Revenue may not

bar the person from applying for early reinstatement of her privilege

to drive under such circumstances. Consequently, the division

reverses the district court’s judgment.

The partial dissent would affirm the district court’s judgment

by holding that section 42-2-125(1)(c) bars a person convicted of

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

felony DUI from applying for early reinstatement of her privilege to

drive with an interlock-restricted license before serving the full term

of her license revocation.

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA150

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1359

Jefferson County District Court No. 20CV30008

Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge

Kelly Driver Stackpool,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY

Brown, J., concurs

Bernard, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part

Announced December 16, 2021

Recht Kornfield, P.C., Abraham V. Hutt, Andrew E. Ho, Denver, Colorado, for

Plaintiff-Appellant

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Laurie Rottersman, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Denver,

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

1

¶ 1

“A person whose privilege to drive has been revoked for one

year or more because of a DUI [driving under the influence], DUI

per se, or DWAI [driving while ability impaired] conviction . . . may

apply for an early reinstatement” of her privilege to drive with an

“interlock-restricted license” after her privilege to drive has been

revoked for one month. § 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2021 (the

interlock statute). A driver who is issued an interlock-restricted

license must install and use a device that does not allow “a motor

vehicle to be started or to continue normal operation if the device

measures [a blood alcohol level] above the level established by the

department of public health and environment.” § 42-2-132.5(9)(a).

¶ 2

In this case, we consider whether a person convicted of felony

DUI may apply for early reinstatement of her privilege to drive with

an interlock-restricted license. To resolve this issue, we must

decide whether the reference to “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock

statute encompasses convictions for felony DUI or is limited to

convictions for misdemeanor DUI.

¶ 3

At the time the General Assembly enacted the interlock statute

in 2012, all DUIs were misdemeanors. See Ch. 278, sec. 1,

§ 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I), 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 1476-77. In 2015, the

2

General Assembly amended section 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021

(the DUI statute), to provide that DUI “is a class 4 felony if the

violation occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out

of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or

DWAI; vehicular homicide . . . ; vehicular assault . . . ; or any

combination thereof.” Ch. 262, sec. 1, § 42-4-1301(1)(a), 2015

Colo. Sess. Laws 990. But the General Assembly did not amend the

reference to “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute to refer to

“misdemeanor DUI . . . conviction” after it created the offense of

felony DUI. The interlock statute referred to “DUI . . . conviction”

before the amendment of the DUI statute and refers to “DUI

. . . conviction” today.

¶ 4

So does “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute mean, as

it did before the General Assembly created the crime of felony DUI,

misdemeanor DUI convictions only, or does it mean a conviction for

misdemeanor DUI or a conviction for felony DUI? Appellant, Kelly

Driver Stackpool, urges us to hold that the reference to “DUI” in the

interlock statute means a conviction for either misdemeanor DUI or

felony DUI. Appellee, the Colorado Department of Revenue

(Department), contends that the interlock statute does not allow

3

drivers convicted of felony DUI to reinstate their privilege to drive

early with an interlock-restricted license.

¶ 5

We agree with Stackpool and hold that the interlock statute

encompasses convictions for misdemeanor DUI and felony DUI and,

thus, provides that a person convicted of felony DUI may apply for

early reinstatement of her privilege to drive with an interlock-

restricted license. We therefore reverse the district court’s

judgment in favor of the Department on Stackpool’s request to

apply for early reinstatement of her privilege to drive.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

¶ 6

In August 2018, a Colorado state patrol trooper stopped

Stackpool for failing to drive in a single lane. A roadside breath test

showed that Stackpool’s blood alcohol content was more than twice

the legal limit. The trooper arrested her for DUI. The Department

initially revoked Stackpool’s driver’s license because her blood

alcohol content exceeded 0.08. See § 42-2-126(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2021

(“The [D]epartment shall revoke the license of a person for excess

[blood alcohol content] 0.08 . . . .”).

4

¶ 7

Under the interlock statute, Stackpool applied for early

reinstatement of her privilege to drive, and the Department issued

her an interlock-restricted license in November 2018.

¶ 8

On September 18, 2019, Stackpool pleaded guilty to DUI

— fourth or subsequent offense, a class 4 felony. See

§ 42-4-1301(1)(a). One month later, the Department sent Stackpool

two notices stating that it had revoked her privilege to drive. But

the notices contained inconsistent language.

¶ 9

One notice, citing section 42-2-125(1), C.R.S. 2021, informed

Stackpool that her privilege to drive had been revoked for two years

because she had been “convicted of 3 or more alcohol and/or drug

violations.” It further stated that, “in accordance with [section]

42-2-132.5, you may be eligible to reinstate early with an ignition

interlock restricted driving privilege after serving one (1) month

under revocation.” The parties agree that the Department premised

the first revocation notice on section 42-2-125(1)(i). The second

notice generally cited section 42-2-125 (the revocation statute),

which addresses “[m]andatory revocation of license and permit.”

That notice stated that the Department had revoked Stackpool’s

privilege to drive for one year because she had been “convicted of a

5

felony in which a motor vehicle was used” and that she was “not

eligible for any type of driving privileges during the revocation

period.” The Department premised the second revocation notice on

section 42-2-125(1)(c).

¶ 10

Stackpool requested an administrative hearing on the

Department’s determination that she was ineligible for early

reinstatement of her privilege to drive with an interlock-restricted

license because she had been convicted of a felony.

¶ 11

The hearing officer held that the Department did not err by

revoking Stackpool’s driver’s license for one year because she had

been “convicted of a felony DUI which requires the use of a motor

vehicle.” He noted that, as reflected on its website, the Hearing

Division of the Department took the position that

if you are convicted of a felony offense which

involved the use of a motor vehicle, your

license will be revoked for one year. You may

not drive while your license is under

revocation. There are no driving privileges that

can be granted by the Hearings Division while

under this type of action.

The hearing officer concluded that, in light of Stackpool’s revocation

under section 42-2-125(1)(c), he had “no authority to determine

[Stackpool’s] eligibility [for early reinstatement with an interlock-

6

restricted license under the interlock statute] or the propriety of the

[Department’s] denial.”

¶ 12

Stackpool appealed to the district court, which affirmed the

hearing officer’s decision. Stackpool appealed the district court’s

judgment.

II. Analysis

¶ 13

Stackpool contends that the district court erred by

(1) incorrectly interpreting the interlock statute to hold that drivers

convicted of felony DUI are not entitled to apply for an early

reinstatement of their privilege to drive with an interlock-restricted

license and (2) failing to grant her motion for change of judge. The

Department responds that the district court correctly affirmed the

hearing officer’s decision and asserts in its answer brief that

Stackpool’s appeal is moot because, during the pendency of the

appeal, the Department issued an interlock-restricted license to

her.

A. Mootness

¶ 14

At oral argument, the Department withdrew its assertion that

Stackpool’s appeal of the district court’s judgment affirming the

hearing officer’s decision is moot. However, because “[m]ootness is

7

a jurisdictional prerequisite,” Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70, ¶ 9,

444 P.3d 313, 316, that the parties can neither agree upon nor

waive, Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo. 2002), we must

determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider Stackpool’s

statutory interpretation argument under an exception to the

mootness doctrine.

¶ 15

Although “[a]ppellate courts generally will not render opinions

on the merits of an appeal when the issues have become moot,”

they “may resolve an otherwise moot case if the matter is one

capable of repetition yet evading review.” Johnson v. Griffin,

240 P.3d 404, 406 (Colo. App. 2009). Colorado cases addressing

this exception to the mootness doctrine differ in their interpretation

of the meaning of “capable of repetition.” See People in Interest of

Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶¶ 25-28, 338 P.3d 1017, 1022

(Hawthorne, J., dissenting). Some cases hold that an issue is

capable of repetition if it “may” recur, see, e.g., Byrne v. Title Bd.,

907 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1995), while other cases apply the

exception only if the issue is “likely” to recur, see, e.g., Carney v.

Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 30 P.3d 861, 864 (Colo. App. 2001). An issue

evades review when its effect does not persist long enough for

8

appellate review. See, e.g., People in Interest of Holyman, 865 P.2d

918, 920 (Colo. App. 1993) (holding that disputes involving orders

for short-term hospitalization will evade review because those

orders “will expire before . . . review . . . may be had before an

appellate court”).

¶ 16

While the issue of whether a driver convicted of felony DUI is

entitled to seek early reinstatement of her privilege to drive with an

interlock-restricted license is moot with respect to Stackpool, we

hold that it is an important issue capable of repetition yet evading

review. We need not resolve the courts’ differing interpretations of

the meaning of “capable of repetition” because we conclude that

this prong is satisfied here under the more stringent “likely to

recur” test.

¶ 17

Although the record does not indicate how often this issue

arises, the parties have brought to our attention a number of

district court decisions addressing whether drivers convicted of

felony DUI are eligible to apply for early reinstatement with an

interlock-restricted license. See Meyer v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue,

No. 21CV30839 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Arapahoe Cnty., Oct. 29, 2021);

Kier v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 19CV31407 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,

9

Jefferson Cnty., Jan. 28, 2020); Starling v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue,

No. 17CV30955 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Jefferson Cnty., Feb. 27, 2018). In

light of the Department’s position in this appeal, it is likely that the

district courts will continue to be presented with this question.

Because the statutory interpretation issue is likely to recur, it is

capable of repetition. See Carney, 30 P.3d at 864.

¶ 18

We also hold that the issue evades review. Here, as in Meyer,

Kier, and Starling, the Department revoked Stackpool’s privilege to

drive for one year. One year is insufficient time to litigate a case

such as this, particularly if the driver seeks certiorari review

following an appeal to this court. See Walton v. People, 2019 CO

95, ¶ 8, 451 P.3d 1212, 1215 (“Were we to wait for another case like

this one to find its way to us with a defendant still serving her

sentence, we might wait in vain. DUI sentences are often shorter

than the time necessary for appeal and certiorari review.”).

¶ 19

Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to decide Stackpool’s

statutory interpretation argument on the merits. See Rocky

Mountain Ass’n of Credit Mgmt. v. Dist. Ct., 193 Colo. 344, 345,

565 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1977) (“We adhere to the doctrine that where

the controversy is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ a court

10

may elect to settle the controversy so as to establish a precedent for

future action by trial courts.” (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

125 (1973))).

¶ 20

We conclude, however, that Stackpool’s argument regarding

the change of judge is moot. Because the Department granted

Stackpool the relief she seeks — reinstatement of her privilege to

drive with an interlock-restricted license — there is no possibility

that this case could be litigated further in the district court.

Accordingly, ordering the recusal of the district court judge would

have no practical legal effect. See Johnson, 240 P.3d at 406 (“An

issue is moot when a judgment would have no practical effect on an

existing controversy . . . .”).

B. Early Reinstatement of a Person’s Privilege to

Drive Following a Conviction for Felony DUI

1. Preservation

¶ 21

Before we reach the merits of Stackpool’s statutory

interpretation argument, we must decide whether Stackpool

preserved it. See Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 22, 452 P.3d

161, 167 (“We do not review issues that have been insufficiently

preserved.”).

11

¶ 22

The Department contends that, although Stackpool asserted

in the administrative hearing that she was eligible for early

reinstatement of her privilege to drive with an interlock-restricted

license pursuant to the interlock statute, she failed to argue, as she

does in this appeal, that subsections (1)(b.5) and (1)(i) of the

revocation statute compel the conclusion that a felony DUI

conviction is a “DUI . . . conviction” under the interlock statute. We

disagree.

¶ 23

At the administrative hearing, Stackpool requested “a finding

that [she was] eligible for an [i]gnition-restricted license” under the

interlock statute. Her arguments at the hearing did not distinguish

between subsection (1)(c) of the revocation statute, which refers to

convictions for “any felony in the commission of which a motor

vehicle was used,” and subsections (1)(b.5) and (1)(i), which address

convictions for DUI. § 42-2-125. Indeed, Stackpool did not refer to

any specific subsection of the revocation statute during the hearing.

¶ 24

Stackpool argued in her appeal to the district court that the

subsections of the revocation statute addressing felony and DUI

convictions conflict as to whether a driver convicted of felony DUI is

deemed to have a “DUI . . . conviction” for purposes of the interlock

12

statute. Stackpool raised this argument to challenge the hearing

officer’s holding that she was not entitled to early reinstatement of

her privilege to drive with an interlock-restricted license because

she had been convicted of felony DUI.

¶ 25

Notably, the Department did not argue in the district court

that Stackpool failed to preserve her statutory interpretation

argument. And the district court analyzed subsections (1)(b.5),

(1)(c), and (1)(i) of the revocation statute in its judgment. We

conclude that Stackpool preserved the statutory interpretation

issue because, “[u]nder these circumstances, we are able to review

whether the district court erred in” its analysis of the interlock

statute. See Ledroit L. v. Kim, 2015 COA 114, ¶ 48, 360 P.3d 247,

254.

¶ 26

Next, we consider the applicable standard of review.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 27

“Upon receipt of the notice of revocation, the licensee or the

licensee’s attorney may request a hearing . . . .” § 42-2-125(4).

“After such hearing, the licensee may appeal the decision of the

[D]epartment to the district court as provided in section 42-2-135[,

C.R.S. 2021].” Id. “Every person . . . whose license has been finally

13

. . . revoked by or under the authority of the [D]epartment may,

within thirty-five days thereafter, obtain judicial review in

accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S. [2021].” § 42-2-135(1).

The reviewing court may reverse an agency’s action that, among

other things, was arbitrary or capricious, denied a statutory right,

constituted an abuse of discretion, or was contrary to law.

§ 24-4-106(7)(b); see Hanson v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2012 COA

143, ¶ 13, 411 P.3d 1, 3 (“[A] reviewing court may reverse the

Department’s determination if it . . . erroneously interpreted the

law . . . .”), aff’d, 2014 CO 55, 328 P.3d 122.

¶ 28

We review agency determinations regarding questions of

statutory interpretation de novo. Long v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue,

2012 COA 130, ¶ 7, 296 P.3d 329, 332. In cases involving review of

a hearing officer’s statutory analysis, we sit “in the same position as

the district court.” Id.

3. The Statutory Conditions Requiring the Immediate

Revocation of a Person’s Privilege to Drive

¶ 29

Section 42-2-125(1) specifies the conditions under which the

Department “shall immediately revoke the license . . . of any driver.”

Section 42-2-125(2) states: “Unless otherwise provided in this

14

section, the period of revocation shall be not less than one

year . . . .”

¶ 30

Three of those conditions are relevant to this case. The

Department will immediately revoke the license of a driver if one of

the following occurs:

 The driver has been convicted of “an offense described in

[the DUI statute] or [a DUI per se]. Except as provided in

[the interlock statute], the period of revocation based

upon this paragraph (b.5) shall be nine months.”

§ 42-2-125(1)(b.5).

 The driver has “[b]een convicted of any felony in the

commission of which a motor vehicle was used.”

§ 42-2-125(1)(c). (This subsection does not include a

reference to the interlock statute.)

 The driver has “[b]een convicted of DUI, DUI per se, or

DWAI and has two previous convictions of any of those

offenses. The [D]epartment shall revoke the license of

any driver for an indefinite period and only reissue it

upon proof to the [D]epartment that the driver has

completed a level II alcohol and drug education and

15

treatment program certified by the office of behavioral

health in the department of human services . . . and that

the driver has demonstrated knowledge of the laws and

driving ability through the regular motor vehicle testing

process. The [D]epartment shall not reissue the license

in less than two years.” § 42-2-125(1)(i). (This

subsection also does not refer to the interlock statute.)

C. Rules of Statutory Interpretation

¶ 31

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, our primary

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s

intent in drafting the statute. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.

Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). “[W]e look to the entire

statutory scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and

sensible effect to all of its parts, and we avoid constructions that

would render any words or phrases superfluous or that would lead

to illogical or absurd results.” Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18,

477 P.3d 694, 698.

¶ 32

“We begin by looking to the express language of the statute,

construing words and phrases according to grammar and common

usage.” Gerganoff, 241 P.3d at 935; see Elder, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d at

16

698 (“[W]e apply words and phrases in accord with their plain and

ordinary meanings.”). If the statute is unambiguous, our analysis

is complete, and we apply the statute as it is written. Elder, ¶ 18,

477 P.3d at 698.

¶ 33

However, if the statute is ambiguous, we “resort to other rules

of statutory construction,” such as “the legislature’s intent [in

enacting the statute], the circumstances surrounding the statute’s

adoption, and the possible consequences of different interpretations

to determine the statute’s proper construction.” Id. “A statute is

ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of multiple

interpretations.” Id.

¶ 34

If provisions of a statutory scheme irreconcilably conflict with

one another, “the specific provision prevails over the general

provision.” Jenkins v. Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo.

2009); see § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2021 (“If the conflict between the

provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as

an exception to the general provision . . . .”); see also Martin v.

People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001) (“A general provision, by

definition, covers a larger area of the law. A specific provision, on

the other hand, acts as an exception to that general provision,

17

carving out a special niche from the general rules to accommodate a

specific circumstance.”). “This rule applies unless the general

statute was enacted more recently than the specific statute, and the

legislature manifestly intends that the later-enacted general statute

prevail over the earlier-enacted specific statute.” Jenkins, 208 P.3d

at 241-42.

D. The District Court Erred by Holding that the Interlock Statute

Does Not Permit a Driver Convicted of Felony DUI to Apply for

Early Reinstatement of Her Privilege to Drive

¶ 35

The Department’s argument for affirmance of the district

court’s judgment rests on its interpretation of the relevant

subsections of the revocation statute and the interlock statute.

Under the Department’s reasoning, because subsection (1)(c) of the

revocation statute does not refer to the interlock statute, and

because the interlock statute itself does not refer to convictions for

felony DUI, a driver convicted of felony DUI is not entitled to early

reinstatement of her driving privileges with an interlock-restricted

license. Because section 42-2-125(5) provides that the Department

may issue “more than one revocation” if such revocations occur “as

a result of the same episode of driving,” the Department asserts

that it revoked Stackpool’s privilege to drive under both subsections

18

(1)(c) and (1)(i) and that, consequently, she is ineligible to seek early

reinstatement of her privilege to drive under the revocation

premised on subsection (1)(c).

¶ 36

But the Department’s argument focuses too closely on the

subsections of the revocation statute and not closely enough on the

language of the DUI statute and the reference to “DUI

. . . conviction” in the interlock statute. Subsections (1)(b.5), (1)(c),

and (1)(i) of the revocation statute do not explicitly tell us whether

the reference to a “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute is

limited to misdemeanor DUI convictions or whether it includes both

misdemeanor DUI and felony DUI convictions.

¶ 37

We agree with Stackpool’s argument that the interlock statute

must refer to convictions of misdemeanor DUI and felony DUI alike

for four reasons. First, the DUI statute encompasses both types of

offenses and does not make an exception for revocations that may

also fall under subsection (1)(c) of the revocation statute. Second,

subsection (1)(b.5) expressly refers to adults convicted of “an offense

described” in the DUI statute — which can be either misdemeanor

DUI or felony DUI. § 42-2-125(1)(b.5). (Although the parties agree

that the Department revoked Stackpool driver’s license under

19

subsection (1)(i), and not (1)(b.5), the Department asserts that

subsection (1)(c) addresses all felony convictions, including

convictions for felony DUI, and that subsection (1)(b.5) is limited to

convictions for misdemeanor DUI.) Third, the revocation periods in

the revocation statute are not unconditional. And fourth, the

subsections of the revocation statute that refer to DUI convictions

— subsections (1)(b.5) and (1)(i) — are more specific than the

general reference to “felony in the commission of which a motor

vehicle was used” in subsection (1)(c). See § 42-2-125(1)(b.5), (1)(c),

(1)(i).

¶ 38

We discuss these four points in turn.

1. The Reference to a “DUI . . . Conviction” in the Interlock

Statute Means a Conviction for Either a Felony DUI or a

Misdemeanor DUI

¶ 39

The DUI statute is a key source for determining whether the

reference to “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute includes

convictions for felony DUI because the DUI statute sets forth the

elements of all DUI offenses in the State of Colorado. For purposes

of this case, the DUI statute provides that

[d]riving under the influence is a

misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the

violation occurred after three or more prior

20

convictions, arising out of separate and

distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se,

or DWAI; vehicular homicide . . . ; vehicular

assault . . . ; or any combination thereof.

§ 42-4-1301(1)(a).

¶ 40

As explained above, following the enactment of the 2015

amendments to the DUI statute, a “DUI” can be either a felony or a

misdemeanor. Although the General Assembly has used “felony

DUI” when it intended to refer only to felony DUI convictions after

the enactment of the 2015 amendments, see § 17-2-201(5.9), C.R.S.

2021, no Colorado statute refers to “misdemeanor DUI.” The

General Assembly’s use of “felony DUI” when it intended to refer to

felony convictions for DUI in section 17-2-201(5.9) tells us that it

knew how to signify when a statute applies only to that offense and,

more importantly, that it was aware of the distinction between

misdemeanor DUI and felony DUI convictions. See Jenkins,

208 P.3d at 242.

¶ 41

More significantly, neither the interlock statute nor any other

Colorado statute expressly states whether the General Assembly’s

use of “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute means felony

DUI, misdemeanor DUI, or both.

21

¶ 42

It is a truism that, at the time the General Assembly amended

the DUI statute to create the offense of felony DUI, it knew that a

DUI conviction could be either a misdemeanor or a felony. “[W]e

assume the General Assembly is aware of its enactments . . . .”

Jenkins, 208 P.3d at 242. This change to the meaning of “DUI” in

the DUI statute necessarily changed the meaning of “DUI” in all

other statutes that generally refer to “DUI,” including the interlock

statute. See Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,

2018 CO 44, ¶ 12, 418 P.3d 1173, 1176 (“We aim to ascribe the

same meaning to words or phrases used throughout a statutory

scheme, absent any manifest indication to the contrary.”); see also

People v. Delgado, 2016 COA 174, ¶ 20, 410 P.3d 697, 700

(“Because these provisions are in the same article of the Colorado

statutes, we apply the rule of consistent usage and give the word

[“DUI”] the same meaning in both parts of the statute.”). Thus, the

DUI statute operates like a dictionary — it provides the meaning of

“DUI” in the other Colorado statutes that generally refer to “DUI”

without including restrictive language.

¶ 43

The interlock statute does not include such restrictive

language. Rather, it generally refers to a “DUI . . . conviction.”

22

§ 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I). In the more than six years since the creation

of felony DUI, the General Assembly could have revised the

interlock statute so that it referred to only misdemeanor DUI.

During that time, the General Assembly tinkered with other

language in the interlock statute. See Ch. 462, sec. 708,

§ 42-2-132.5(11), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3300; Ch. 262, sec. 3,

§ 42-2-132.5(1), 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 995-96. Its decision not to

change the reference to “DUI . . . conviction” to “misdemeanor DUI

. . . conviction” when it amended the interlock statute in recent

years tells us that it “obviously intended not to change” the

reference to “DUI . . . conviction” in the interlock statute. See

People v. Czajkowski, 193 Colo. 352, 355, 568 P.2d 23, 25 (1977);

see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. City of Woodland Park, 2014 CO

35, ¶ 10, 333 P.3d 55, 58 (“We presume that the legislature did not

use language idly.”).

¶ 44

Moreover, while the interlock statute establishes a general rule

that persons who have their licenses revoked for one year or more

because of a “DUI . . . conviction” may apply for early reinstatement

with an interlock-restricted license, nothing in the interlock statute

carves out an exception to this general rule for felonies in general or

23

felony DUIs specifically. The interlock statute does not say, for

example, “except for a person convicted of a felony, a person whose

privilege to drive has been revoked . . . because of a DUI

. . . conviction . . . may apply for an early reinstatement.” Nor does

it say, “except for convictions that result in revocation under section

42-2-125(1)(c), a person whose privilege to drive has been revoked

. . . because of a DUI . . . conviction . . . may apply for an early

reinstatement.” In other words, the fact that the DUI conviction is

for a felony rather than a misdemeanor is of no consequence to a

DUI offender’s ability to seek early reinstatement with an interlock-

restricted license under the interlock statute.

¶ 45

Our interpretation of the interlock statute aligns with the

General Assembly’s intent that a person convicted of DUI may be

granted the privilege to drive again if, through use of technology,

she can be barred from driving if not sober. See § 42-2-126(1)(c)

(providing that the purpose of the per se revocation statute is to

“prevent the relicensing of a person until the [D]epartment is

satisfied that the person’s alcohol problem is under control and that

the person no longer constitutes a safety hazard to other highway

users”). The General Assembly reasonably could have sought to

24

punish individuals who commit intentional felony vehicular

offenses, such as use of a vehicle to aid and abet an armed robbery,

differently than drivers convicted of DUI.

¶ 46

Because we must “give consistent, harmonious, and sensible

effect to all” parts of a statutory scheme, Elder, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d at

698, we hold that the general reference to “DUI . . . conviction” in

the interlock statute means any DUI conviction — a felony DUI or a

misdemeanor DUI.

2. Subsection (1)(b.5) of the Revocation Statute Refers to Adults

Convicted of Either Misdemeanor DUI or Felony DUI

¶ 47

We reject the Department’s argument that subsection (1)(b.5)

only applies to convictions for misdemeanor DUI because its

enumerated revocation period is nine months — three months

shorter than the one-year revocation period for felonies under

subsection (1)(c). The Department places too much weight on the

mismatch in revocation periods.

¶ 48

Subsection (1)(b.5) expressly cross-references the DUI statute,

which specifies when a DUI conviction is a misdemeanor and when

it is a felony. The General Assembly did not limit the reference to

the DUI statute in subsection (1)(b.5) to misdemeanor DUI

25

convictions. Thus, the unambiguous language of subsection

(1)(b.5) includes a driver’s conviction for felony DUI.

¶ 49

Like the reference to a conviction for DUI in the interlock

statute, the reference to a conviction for DUI in the revocation

statute logically includes a conviction for felony DUI in the absence

of limiting language. Even though a felony DUI conviction also falls

within subsection (1)(c), it is nonetheless a conviction for DUI for

purposes of the interlock statute.

¶ 50

We similarly reject the Department’s assertion that a person

convicted of felony DUI is not entitled to a reduction in the one-year

revocation period set forth in section 42-2-125(2). Our reading of

the applicable statutes does not run afoul of the revocation period

language in section 42-2-125(2), which does not provide that the

one-year revocation period cannot be reduced.

3. The Revocation Periods for Reissuance of a Driver’s License in

the Revocation Statute Are Not Unconditional

¶ 51

We conclude that the revocation periods in the revocation

statute are not unconditional and, therefore, do not preclude a

person convicted of felony DUI from applying for early reinstatement

of her privilege to drive under the interlock statute.

26

¶ 52

The Department’s reading of subsection (1)(i), which includes a

reference to a two-year license revocation period, supports our

determination that drivers convicted of felony DUI are entitled to

apply for early reinstatement under the interlock statute. The

parties agree that subsection (1)(i) applies to misdemeanor DUI and

felony DUI convictions alike. Significantly, the Department

concedes that subsection (1)(i) applies to drivers with “third (or

subsequent) DUI conviction[s],” which would include drivers

convicted of felony DUI, as well as drivers convicted of misdemeanor

DUI. Indeed, in this case, the Department revoked Stackpool’s

privilege to drive under subsection (1)(i) following her fourth

conviction for DUI.

¶ 53

Because, as the Department acknowledges, a person convicted

of misdemeanor DUI may apply for early reinstatement of her

privilege to drive under the interlock statute, the reference to a two-

year revocation period in subsection (1)(i) cannot bar such drivers

from obtaining the benefits of the interlock statute. Under the

Department’s reasoning, a person convicted of misdemeanor DUI

and subject to subsection (1)(i) may apply for early reinstatement

under the interlock statute after a one-month license revocation

27

despite the reference to a two-year revocation period in subsection

(1)(i).

¶ 54

Logically, the same reference to a two-year revocation period

cannot be conditional when applied to a person convicted of

misdemeanor DUI but unconditional when applied to a person

convicted of felony DUI. Under subsection (1)(i), a person convicted

of felony DUI is equally entitled to the benefits of the interlock

statute as a person convicted of misdemeanor DUI. Subsection

(1)(i) is not bifurcated into versions applicable to persons convicted

of misdemeanor DUI and persons convicted of felony DUI. The

revocation period in subsection (1)(i) does not have different

meanings depending on whether a driver has been convicted of

misdemeanor DUI or convicted of felony DUI.

¶ 55

Under this logic, the other revocation periods specified in the

revocation statute — which, like the revocation period in subsection

(1)(i), do not say they are unconditional — also cannot bar the

application of the interlock statute. Further, reading the revocation

periods as unconditional would, in effect, nullify the interlock

statute. The reference to a revocation of “one year or more” in the

interlock statute, § 42-2-132.5(4), would be meaningless if the

28

specified revocation periods did not allow for exceptions. See Dep’t

of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16, 441 P.3d 1012,

1016 (“We must avoid constructions that would render any words

or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd

results.”). The revocation periods in the revocation statute therefore

do not preclude a driver convicted of felony DUI from applying for

early reinstatement of the privilege to drive with an interlock-

restricted license. Thus, we disagree with the Department’s

contention that persons convicted of felony DUI can seek

reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license only after serving

a “full revocation period.”

4. The Specific Subsections of the Revocation Statute Addressing

DUI Convictions, and Not the More General Subsection

Addressing Felonies in the Commission of Which a Motor

Vehicle Was Used, Inform Our Determination of Whether a

Driver Convicted of Felony DUI Is Entitled to Early

Reinstatement

¶ 56

The maxim that a specific provision of a statutory scheme

governs over a conflicting more general provision, see Jenkins, 208

P.3d at 241, reinforces our reading of the interlock statute.

¶ 57

The subsections of the revocation statute referring to DUI

convictions — subsections (1)(b.5) and (1)(i) — are more specific

29

than the general reference to “felony in the commission of which a

motor vehicle was used” in subsection (1)(c). See § 42-2-125(1)(b.5),

(1)(c), (1)(i). In addition, the General Assembly enacted subsection

(1)(b.5) of the revocation statute in 2008 — thirty-five years after it

enacted the general felony revocation subsection. Ch. 221, sec. 2,

§ 42-2-125(1)(b.5), 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 833; Ch. 76, sec. 2, § 13-

4-22(1)(d), 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 290.

¶ 58

Moreover, although the General Assembly also enacted the

predecessor provision to subsection (1)(i) in 1973, see Ch. 76,

sec. 2, § 13-4-22(1)(j), 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 290, it has not

manifested its intent that the general statute, subsection (1)(c),

prevail over the more specific statute, subsection (1)(i). See Jenkins,

208 P.3d at 241-42. Contrary to the Department’s assertion, there

is no indication anywhere in the revocation statute that the General

Assembly intended for subsection (1)(c) to supersede subsection

(1)(b.5) or subsection (1)(i). Thus, we hold that subsections (1)(b.5)

and (1)(i) address the Department’s revocation of an individual’s

driver’s license following a conviction for any DUI — whether a

felony or misdemeanor.

30

¶ 59

And, as with the interlock statute, it is significant that, at no

time following the enactment of subsection (1)(c) did the General

Assembly add a reference to “misdemeanor DUI” to subsection

(1)(b.5) or subsection (1)(i) to exclude felony DUI convictions from

their scope. However, the General Assembly has amended the

revocation statute numerous times since 2015 when the DUI

statute was amended to create felony DUI. See, e.g., Ch. 460,

sec. 2, § 42-2-125(1)(m), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3093; Ch. 152,

sec. 23, § 42-2-125(1)(m), 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws 1082; Ch. 263,

sec. 20, § 42-2-125(1), 2017 Colo. Sess. Laws 1257.

¶ 60

In sum, we disagree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that

a person convicted of felony DUI is not eligible to apply for early

reinstatement of her privilege to drive under the interlock statute.

We reverse the district court’s judgment because Stackpool was

entitled to apply for early reinstatement of her privilege to drive with

an interlock-restricted license.

III. Conclusion

¶ 61

The district court’s judgment is reversed.

31

JUDGE BROWN concurs.

CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD concurs in part and dissents in

part.

32

CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD, concurring in part and dissenting

in part.

¶ 62

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that we should

reverse the trial court, so I respectfully dissent from Part II.D. of the

majority opinion. Rather, I would affirm the trial court’s decision. I

concur with the rest of the majority’s opinion.

¶ 63

The primary goal in interpreting statutes is to “give effect to

legislative intent.” People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 17. “We begin

with the plain language of the statute, reading [it] as a whole and

giving words and phrases their commonly understood meanings.”

Id. “If the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as

written.” Id. “[W]e look to the entire statutory scheme in order to

give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its

parts . . . .” UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO

107, ¶ 22. “We also avoid constructions that would render any

words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or

absurd results.” Winninger v. Kirchner, 2021 CO 47, ¶ 20.

¶ 64

I conclude, when reading the statutes that are at issue in this

case as a whole, that they are clear and unambiguous; that the

legislative scheme can be interpreted in a way that is consistent,

33

harmonious, and sensible; that this interpretation does not render

any words or phrases superfluous; and that this interpretation does

not lead to absurd or illogical results.

¶ 65

Section 42-2-125, C.R.S. 2021, announces a general rule: the

Department of Revenue must “immediately revoke” drivers’ licenses

in certain situations. Indeed, the statute is entitled “Mandatory

revocation of license and permit.” This case focuses on three of the

situations described in section 42-2-125.

¶ 66

First, subsection (1)(c) requires the department to revoke the

licenses of those who have “[b]een convicted of any felony in the

commission of which a motor vehicle was used.” (Emphasis added).

¶ 67

Second, subsection (1)(i) mandates the department to revoke

the licenses of those who have “[b]een convicted of DUI, DUI per se,

or DWAI and ha[ve] two previous convictions of any of those

offenses.”

¶ 68

Subsection (1)(c) and subsection (1)(i) have been around for a

long time. They were already on the books when title 42 was

extensively amended in 1994. See Ch. 337, sec. 1, § 42-2-125,

1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 2133.

34

¶ 69

The third subsection of 42-2-125, subsection (1)(b.5),

mandates the department to revoke the licenses of those drivers

who are “twenty-one years of age or older [who have] been convicted

of an offense described in section 42-4-1301(1)(a) or (2)(a)[, C.R.S.

2021].” Section 42-4-1301 is the statute prohibiting driving under

the influence and related offenses.

¶ 70

The legislature enacted subsection (1)(b.5) in 2008. See

Ch. 221, sec. 2, § 42-2-125, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 833. At that

time, all the offenses described in section 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a)

were misdemeanors. § 42-4-1301, C.R.S. 2008.

¶ 71

As part of the general rule requiring the department to revoke

the licenses of drivers in certain situations, section 42-2-125 also

sets out the length of the revocation period. Subsection (2) states

that, “[u]nless otherwise provided in this section, the period of

revocation shall be not less than one year . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

This one-year period applies to revocations under subsection (1)(c)

— revocations when a motor vehicle has been used in the

commission of any felony — because section 42-2-125 does not

provide a different period for such revocations.

35

¶ 72

But subsection (1)(i) — revocations for DUI, DUI per se, or

DWAI, preceded by two previous convictions for the same conduct

— and subsection (1)(b.5) — revocations for offenses described in

section 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a) — have different revocation

periods. Subsection (1)(i) states that “[t]he department shall not

reissue the license in less than two years.”

¶ 73

Subsection (1)(b.5) reads that, “[e]xcept as provided in section

42-2-132.5, the period of revocation based upon this paragraph

(b.5) shall be nine months.” Subsection (1)(b.5) is specifically

addressed in section 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2021, which

states that designated first-time DUI and DUI per se offenders “may

apply for an early reinstatement with an interlock-restricted license

under the provisions of this section after the person’s privilege to

drive has been revoked for at least one month.”

¶ 74

Section 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I) is central to the licensee’s

contention in this case. It states that “[a] person whose privilege to

drive has been revoked for one year or more because of a DUI, DUI

per se, or DWAI conviction . . . may apply for an early reinstatement

with an interlock-restricted license under the provisions of this

36

section after the person’s privilege to drive has been revoked for one

month . . . .”

¶ 75

The legislature enacted this statute in 2012. Ch. 278, sec. 1,

§ 42-2-132.5, 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 1477. As of 2012, all the

statutes that I have described above worked together seamlessly.

Convictions for DUI, DUI per se, and DWAI were misdemeanors,

which did not fall within the coverage of felonies found in

subsection (1)(c). So drivers who were convicted of such

misdemeanor offenses were entitled to apply for interlock-restricted

licenses under the provisions of section 42-2-132.5(4), subject to

any limitations imposed by that statute.

¶ 76

Then, in 2015, the legislature added the crime of felony DUI to

section 42-4-1301(1)(a). Ch. 262, sec. 1, § 42-4-1301, 2015 Colo.

Sess. Laws 990. This statute now reads that “[d]riving under the

influence is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation

occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out of

separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or

DWAI; vehicular homicide . . . ; vehicular assault . . . ; or any

combination thereof.” § 42-4-1301(1)(a). Our supreme court held

that the legislature intended to create a separate offense when it

37

created the crime of felony DUI. Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO 79M,

¶ 22 (“Several aspects of the statutory language point to the

conclusion that the legislature intended to treat felony DUI as a

distinct offense that includes the prior convictions as elements.”).

¶ 77

So what was the effect of this brand new felony on the relevant

statutory scheme that existed before 2015? I think that:

1. The offense of felony DUI now falls under subsection

(1)(c). In other words, this is a felony in which, during

its commission, a motor vehicle was used. The

legislature knew that subsection (1)(c) existed when it

created the offense of felony DUI. See Dawson v. Reider,

872 P.2d 212, 221 (Colo. 1994) (“[I]t is presumed that

the General Assembly acts with full knowledge of

existing . . . statutory law . . . .”).

2. Because it is a felony, there cannot be a reduction in the

one-year length of the revocation because section

42-2-125 does not provide for one. See § 42-2-125(2).

As a result, subsection (1)(i) and subsection (1)(b.5) do

not apply to felony DUI, either.

38

3. Section 42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I) — the interlock-restricted

license section — does not apply to felony DUI because

a. it was enacted three years before the crime of

felony DUI came into existence, meaning that the

legislature only contemplated that it would apply to

misdemeanors;

b. the legislature did not amend it to include felony

DUI within that statute’s coverage, which, as our

supreme court has recognized in Linnebur, is a

separate offense, see People v. Jones, 2017 COA

116, ¶ 29 (“When the General Assembly added” one

subsection to a statute, “it did not make any

corresponding amendment to” a different statute.

“If the General Assembly had intended to broaden

the meaning of [the second statute], it could have

amended that provision to explicitly include” the

situation described in the first statute.); and

c. by not including felony DUI in section

42-2-132.5(4)(a)(I), the legislature demonstrated its

intent to bar those convicted of felony DUI from

39

applying for early reinstatement with an interlock-

restricted license after their drivers’ licenses have

been revoked for one month.