Stacey Wade-James v. Genzyme Corporation

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: February 7, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01364
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 STACEY WADE-JAMES, Case № 2:24-cv-01364-ODW (SSCx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. 14 G ENZYME CORPORATION, d/b/a DISMISS [25] SANOFI et al., 15

Defendants. 16

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Stacey Wade-James claims that her former employer, Defendant 20 Genzyme Corporation d/b/a Sanofi (“Sanofi”), unlawfully discriminated against her 21 based on her Christian faith when it failed to accommodate her request for exemption 22 from Sanofi’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate and terminated her employment. (First Am. 23 Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 66–108, ECF No. 23.) Sanofi moves to dismiss three of 24 Wade-James’s causes of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 25.) For the reasons 26 below, the Court GRANTS Sanofi’s Motion.1 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 From approximately June 2015 to October 2021, Sanofi employed Wade-James 3 to work as a Senior Cardiovascular Representative. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 44.) In August 2021, 4 Sanofi’s US Crisis Committee issued a written notice to employees announcing a new 5 policy requiring Wade-James and other similarly situated employees to become 6 vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 4, 2021. (Id. ¶ 16.) Wade-James submitted 7 a religious accommodation request to be exempted from the policy. (Id. ¶ 25.) In her 8 request, Wade-James informed Sanofi that she believed her body was a “temple of God” 9 and the COVID-19 vaccine was akin to “unclean food” and should not be consumed. 10 (Id. ¶ 26.) Sanofi’s Associate Director of Employee Relations interviewed Wade-James 11 about her religious accommodation request, asking Wade-James “intrusive questions, 12 such as whether [she] had ever had vaccinations as a child and as an adult.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 13 In response to requests to provide information or documentation indicating that the 14 COVID-19 vaccine was against Christian beliefs, Wade-James shared biblical 15 scriptures. (Id. ¶ 30.) Wade-James perceived that the Associate Director “appeared to 16 reject” Wade-James’s biblical scriptures, and understood that to mean that Sanofi was 17 “hostile to her religious beliefs.” (Id.) 18 Based on the information Wade-James provided, Sanofi denied Wade-James’s 19 accommodation request because it found that she “did not substantiate the existence of 20 a sincerely held religious belief that is in conflict with obtaining a Covid-19 vaccine.” 21 (Id. ¶ 36.) Sanofi reiterated that Wade-James was required to become vaccinated by 22 October 4, 2021, and that failure to do so would result in her termination effective 23 October 5, 2021. (Id. ¶ 38.) Wade-James appealed and, after further review, Sanofi 24 denied the appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42.) In the appeal denial, Sanofi again notified 25 Wade-James that she was required to submit proof of vaccination by October 4, 2021, 26 as a condition of continued employment, and that failure to do so would result in 27 2 All factual references derive from Wade-James’s First Amended Complaint, unless otherwise noted, 28 and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 termination. (Id. ¶ 43.) Thereafter, on October 5, 2021, two of Sanofi’s managers and 2 its Human Resources Representatives met with Wade-James to provide notice of her 3 employment termination, which was made effective that day due to failure to comply 4 with Sanofi’s vaccine mandate. (Id. ¶ 44.) In her exit materials, Wade-James indicated 5 that Sanofi’s denial of her religious accommodation request was discriminatory. (Id. 6 ¶ 47.) 7 Wade-James subsequently initiated this action against Sanofi for religious 8 discrimination in violation of California Government and Labor Codes.3 (Decl. John 9 Ayers-Mann ISO Removal Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 1-1.) Wade-James alleged 10 eight causes of action, including unlawful religious discrimination, failure to 11 accommodate, failure to prevent discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and 12 failure to timely provide access to employee payroll records. (Id. ¶¶ 63–139.) Sanofi 13 moved to dismiss several causes of action. (Mot. Dismiss Compl., ECF No. 10.) The 14 Court granted Sanofi’s motion in part, dismissing the first through third causes of action 15 with leave to amend, and the sixth cause of action without leave to amend. (Order re 16 Mot. Dismiss Compl. (“Prior Order”) 14, ECF No. 20.) The Court denied the balance 17 of the motion. (Id.) 18 Wade-James timely amended her complaint and now alleges the following five 19 causes of action: (1) unlawful discrimination (Gov’t Code § 12490(a)4); (2) failure to 20 reasonably accommodate (Gov’t Code § 12490(l)); (3) failure to prevent discrimination 21 (Gov’t Code § 12940(k)); (4) failure to timely provide access to employee payroll 22 records (Lab. Code § 226); and (5) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code 23 § 17200). (Id. ¶¶ 66–114, 133–37.5) Sanofi moves to dismiss Wade-James’s first three 24 causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (See generally 25 Mot.) The Motion is fully briefed. (Opp’n, ECF No. 26; Reply, ECF No. 27.) 26 27 3 Unless otherwise noted, all further references are to California codes. 28 4 These Government Code sections are part of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). 5 The First Amended Complaint does not include paragraphs numbered 115 through 132. 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 3 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 4 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 5 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 6 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 7 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to raise a 8 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 9 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 10 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 13 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 14 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the pleadings 15 and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . 16 in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 17 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, 18 unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State 19 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 21 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 23 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines that 24 the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly 25 cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 26 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly denied . . . if amendment would 27 be futile.” Carrico v. City & County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 28 2011). 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 The Court previously dismissed Wade-James’s causes of action for disparate 3 treatment and failure to accommodate because Wade-James failed to allege facts 4 sufficient to show religious discrimination. (Prior Order 8–12.) Wade-James reasserts 5 these causes of action, again alleging that Sanofi discriminated against her based on her 6 Christian faith when it denied her accommodation request and terminated her 7 employment. (FAC ¶¶ 66–96.6) Sanofi argues that Wade-James fails to cure the prior 8 deficiencies and again does not sufficiently allege religious discrimination, which is a 9 required component for her first three causes of action. (Mot. 5; Reply 2–6.) 10 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a claim for religious discrimination may 11 “be asserted under several different theories, including disparate treatment and failure 12 to accommodate.” See Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 13 2004).7 In claiming that Sanofi discriminated against her based on her religious beliefs, 14 Wade-James relies on both of these theories. (See FAC ¶¶ 66–76 (asserting first cause 15 of action for religious discrimination based on disparate treatment), 77–96 (asserting 16 second cause of action for failure to accommodate religious belief).) 17 A. Discrimination based on Disparate Treatment (First Cause of Action) 18 Under FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual from 19 employment or discriminate against them “because of . . . religious creed.” Gov’t Code 20 § 12940(a). To sufficiently allege religious discrimination under a theory of disparate 21 treatment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a “member of a protected class,” 22 6 In the First Amended Complaint, in two paragraphs, Wade-James mentions her race as a potential 23 additional basis for unlawful discrimination. (FAC ¶¶ 67, 72.) However, neither conclusory reference supports a plausible inference of discrimination based on race. As every other allegation in the First 24 Amended Complaint is directed at religious discrimination, the Court focuses its analyses there. 25 7 Although Peterson addressed religious discrimination in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, California courts look to Title VII and similar statutes when analyzing claims under 26 FEHA. See Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In light of the similarities between FEHA and Title VII, courts routinely rely on both California and federal case law.”); 27 Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We may look to federal 28 authority regarding Title VII and similar civil rights statutes when interpreting analogous statutory provisions of FEHA.”). 1 (2) she was “qualified” for her position, (3) she experienced an “adverse employment 2 action,” and (4) “similarly situated individuals outside [her] protected class were treated 3 more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action 4 give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. 5 Wade-James “need not plead facts constituting all elements” of a prima facie 6 discrimination case to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 7 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 796–97 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Sheppard v. David Evans & 8 Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012)). Still, courts “look to those elements 9 to analyze a motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and 10 common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, 11 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id.; see Richards 12 v. City of Citrus Heights, No. 2:20-cv-02159-KJM-JDP, 2022 WL 866164, at *3 13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2022) (“The Ninth Circuit has also held that a complaint’s factual 14 allegations must permit a ‘plausible’ inference that the plaintiff could establish a prima 15 facie case of discrimination at trial.”). 16 The Court previously found that Wade-James failed to plead her first cause of 17 action for unlawful discrimination because she did not sufficiently allege the second 18 through fourth Peterson elements. (Prior Order 8–11.) In her First Amended 19 Complaint, Wade-James reasserts her first cause of action for religious discrimination 20 based on disparate treatment. (FAC ¶¶ 66–76.) Sanofi argues that Wade-James’s first 21 cause of action should be dismissed because she fails to cure the previously identified 22 deficiencies. (Mot. 7.) Specifically, Sanofi contends that Wade-James was not 23 qualified for her position at the time of termination and fails to identify similarly 24 situated employees outside of her alleged protected class who were treated more 25 favorably. (Id. at 7–10.) The Court agrees with Sanofi that Wade-James fails to 26 sufficiently allege that similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were 27 treated more fairly than her. She also fails to show that other circumstances surrounding 28 the adverse employment actions plausibly suggest a discriminatory motive. 1 The fourth element of a FEHA claim for unlawful discrimination based on 2 disparate treatment requires a plaintiff to show that the employer acted with a 3 discriminatory motive. Nguyen v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00292-TLN- 4 KJN, 2018 WL 3913805, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018), aff’d, 817 F. App’x 514 5 (9th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff may do this by showing that similarly situated employees 6 outside of her protected class “were treated more favorably, or other circumstances 7 surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” 8 Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603. 9 Wade-James alleges that Sanofi approved religious accommodation requests 10 from a “group of employees” in Oncology even though their requests contained 11 identical language. (FAC ¶ 54; Opp’n 5, 8.) She also alleges that Sanofi approved a 12 religious accommodation request from a Christian female employee that was “nearly 13 identical” to Wade-James’s. (FAC ¶ 55; Opp’n 5.) However, Wade-James does not 14 allege how these employees were similarly situated to her or that they were outside her 15 protected class; indeed, the Christian female employee is within her protected class as 16 a Christian. These allegations are insufficient to show disparate treatment. See Dunbar 17 v. Twentieth Century Fox Television, No. 2:22-cv-01075-DMG (JCx), 2024 WL 18 2107712, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2024) (on summary judgment, finding disparate 19 treatment claim failed where plaintiff did not show other similarly situated individuals 20 outside plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably). Wade-James also 21 argues that other circumstances give rise to an inference of Sanofi’s discriminatory 22 motive because Sanofi’s “intrusive” questioning shows that it was “hostile to her 23 religious beliefs.” (FAC ¶¶ 28–30; Opp’n 5.) However, courts have rejected that such 24 conclusory allegations support finding discriminatory motive, especially where the 25 employer’s questions sought clarification of the employee’s accommodation request. 26 See Weiss v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. 738 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1224 (N.D. Cal. 2024) 27 (“The follow up questions were designed to ensure [defendant’s] compliance with the 28 law and were not, as [plaintiff] suggests, unduly intrusive.”). 1 In sum, Wade-James’s allegations do not give rise to a plausible inference that 2 Sanofi acted with a motive to discriminate against her religion when it denied 3 Wade-James’s accommodation request and terminated her employment. See Nguyen, 4 2018 WL 3913805, at *3–4 (finding plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of disparate 5 treatment insufficient where plaintiff did not provide any plausible support for 6 discriminatory motive). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sanofi’s Motion and 7 DISMISSES Wade-James’s first cause of action. The Court previously granted 8 Wade-James leave to amend to cure this same deficiency, and she fails to do so. As 9 such, the Court finds further amendment would be futile and declines to grant leave to 10 amend again. 11 B. Failure to Reasonably Accommodate (Second Cause of Action) 12 FEHA requires “employers to accommodate [an employee’s] religious beliefs 13 unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of Cal. State 14 Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Gov’t Code § 12940(l)(1)). “To 15 establish religious discrimination on the basis of a failure-to-reasonably-accommodate 16 theory,” a plaintiff must show that (1) “[s]he had a bona fide religious belief, the 17 practice of which conflicts with an employment duty”; (2) “[she] informed [her] 18 employer of the belief and conflict”; and (3) “the employer discharged, threatened, or 19 otherwise subjected [her] to an adverse employment action because of [her] inability to 20 fulfill the job requirement.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606 (citing Heller v. EBB Auto. Co., 21 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)). “An employee seeking an accommodation need 22 only provide ‘enough information . . . to permit the employer to understand the 23 existence of a conflict between the employee’s religious practices and the employer’s 24 job requirements.’” Weiss, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 1223 (alteration in original) (quoting 25 Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439). 26 The Court previously dismissed Wade-James’s second cause of action for failure 27 to accommodate because she failed to allege facts showing that she informed Sanofi of 28 a conflict between her religious beliefs as a Christian and Sanofi’s vaccination policy. 1 (Prior Order 11–12.) In her First Amended Complaint, Wade-James again alleges that 2 Sanofi failed to reasonably accommodate her religion when it denied her exemption 3 request. (FAC ¶¶ 77–96.) Sanofi argues that Wade-James once more fails to articulate 4 a conflict between her religious beliefs and Sanofi’s vaccination policy or that she 5 adequately communicated that conflict to Sanofi. (Mot. 10–12; Reply 4–5.) 6 Wade-James alleges that she informed Sanofi in her religious accommodation 7 request that she could not take the vaccine because “her body was a ‘Temple of God,’ 8 and the COVID-19 vaccine . . . was akin to ‘unclean food’ that should not be 9 consumed.” (FAC ¶ 26.) The Court previously rejected this same allegation in 10 Wade-James’s initial complaint, and it remains insufficient. (Prior Order 12.) 11 Elsewhere in the First Amended Complaint, Wade-James expands on her sincerely held 12 religious beliefs, alleging that she “prayed to God and consulted Scripture to decide 13 whether she should be vaccinated”; “[r]eceiving the COVID-19 vaccine would violate 14 the trust she is required to have in the healing power of God”; the “vaccine has been 15 turned into an idol,” which she may not worship; and the vaccine is a substance “that 16 might ‘defile’ the body.” (FAC ¶ 23.) Even if the Court found these allegations 17 sufficient to show a conflict with Sanofi’s vaccination policy, nowhere does 18 Wade-James allege that she informed Sanofi of these additional bases for a potential 19 conflict. (See generally FAC.) Her opposition similarly lacks any such assertion. (See 20 generally Opp’n 8–9.) 21 Thus, Wade-James again fails to sufficiently allege that she held a bona fide 22 religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty, and that she 23 informed her employer of the belief and the conflict. See Weiss, 738 F. Supp. 3d 24 at 1221, 1223 (dismissing failure to accommodate claim where plaintiff informed 25 employer only that her body was a temple of God and her religion prohibited the 26 introduction of foreign substances such as the COVID-19 vaccine); Coates v. Legacy 27 Health, No. 3:23-cv-00931-JR, 2024 WL 1181827, at *5–6 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2024) 28 (dismissing failure to accommodate claim where plaintiff stated on exemption request 1 that plaintiff’s “body is temple of the Holy Spirit who lives inside [them],” but did not 2 identify any conflicting religious tenet or teaching). Thus, Wade-James’s claim that 3 Sanofi did not reasonably accommodate her religion fails. 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sanofi’s Motion and DISMISSES 5 Wade-James’s second cause of action. As the Court previously granted Wade-James 6 leave to amend this claim to cure this same deficiency, and she fails to do so, dismissal 7 is without leave to amend. 8 C. Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Third Cause of Action) 9 FEHA also makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail to take all reasonable steps 10 necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” Gov’t Code 11 § 12940(k). A claim for failure to prevent discrimination is “‘dependent on a claim of 12 actual’ discrimination and harassment.” Canale v. AutoZone, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-03295- 13 CSK, 2025 WL 104778, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2025) (quoting Dickson v. Burke 14 Williams, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1315 (2015)). “Indeed, an employee cannot 15 seek to hold an employer liable for failing to prevent discrimination that did not 16 happen.” Weiss, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 1225 (citing Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 63 Cal. 17 App. 4th 280, 284 (1998)). 18 Wade-James’s third cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination is 19 derivative of her first two religious discrimination causes of action. Weiss, 738 F. Supp. 20 3d at 1225; see Achal, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 804 (“[A] failure to prevent discrimination 21 claim is essentially derivative of a discrimination claim.”). As she fails to adequately 22 plead religious discrimination, she necessarily also fails to plead this derivative cause 23 of action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sanofi’s Motion and DISMISSES Wade- 24 James’s third cause of action. For the same reasons stated above, this dismissal is also 25 without leave to amend. 26 V. CONCLUSION 27 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Sanofi’s Motion to dismiss 28 Wade-James’s first, second, and third causes of action WITHOUT LEAVE TO 1 | AMEND. (ECF No. 25.) Sanofi shall answer Wade-James’s First Amended Complaint 2 || as to the remaining fourth and fifth causes of action within twenty-one days of the date 3 || of this order 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 February 7, 2025 8 yea 9 bhed ih Me WL 10 OTIS DYWRIGHT, II UNITED STATES’ DISTRICT JUDGE

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