St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of St. Paul v. Robison

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of St. Paul v. Robison

1919 OK 133, 180 P. 702, 72 Okla. 269, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 374

CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

DecidedApril 29, 1919

Docket9497

StatusPublished

Cited by22 cases

This text of 1919 OK 133 (St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of St. Paul v. Robison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of St. Paul v. Robison, 1919 OK 133, 180 P. 702, 72 Okla. 269, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 374 (Okla. 1919).

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Opinion

RAINEY, J.

A. M. Robison recovered a judgment in the county court ■ of Beckham county, against the St. Paul Eire ,& Marine Insurance Company of St. Paul, Minn., in the sum of $146.20 for damages to his crop of cotton under a hail insurance policy issued to him by the defendant company. The plaintiff sued for $222, and the insurance company, in its answer, admitted that damage had accrued to the plaintiff in the sum of $60, and confessed judgment for said amount, but denied that he had suffered any greater damage, and pleaded a counterclaim in the sum of $33 90, represented by a promissory noté given in payment of the premium on the policy. The cause was tried to a jury, resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount aforesaid and for cancellation of the note.

It is contended that the court erred in sustaining objections to questions propounded to plaintiff on cross-examination by defendant’s counsel relative to rabbits eating a part of the young cotton. Counsel say:

“The evidence thus attempted to be adduced was wholly competent, and we submit that defendant had the right and should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff fully as to his damage, and whether or not he was now making claim for the five acres that ‘rabbits’ or ‘something’ had destroyed and the exclusion of the same as immaterial was prejudicial error.”

•The exclusion of this testimony was not prejudicial error, for the reason that the court permitted counsel to thoroughly cross-examine plaintiff as to the amount of damage claimed by him and as to the effect of the hail on his crop and the condition it was in at the time of the hail. The plaintiff had repeatedly testified that he claimed damage by hail on all of his cotton covered by the policy, and the court, in. its instructions, clearly stated to the jury that 'plaintiff could only recover under the policy .for dam. age to his crop that was caused by! thei hail. Testimony was also admitted by the court tending to prove that rabbits had done some damage to a part of the crop, and this was doubtless taken into consideration by the jpry in fixing the amount of the recovery', although 'the court did not specifically instruct the jury not to-allow the plaintiff for any damage caused by rabbits: However, the defendant company cannot complain of the court’s failure to instruct on this particular phase -of the ease, in view of the fact that the instructions given limited the plaintiff’s recovery to damages actually suffered by the hail, and the defendant did not request an instruction relative to the damage, if any, caused by the rabbits. Chicago, I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Radford, 36 Okla. 657, 129 Pac. 834; Seay et al. v. Plunkett, 44 Okla. 794, 145 Pac. 496.

Objection is made to the form of the verdict, but since the verdict was received by the court without any objection on the part of defendant to its form and no exception was taken or opportunity given the court to have the same amended, the alleged error cannot be considered here. Collier et al. v. Gannon, 40 Okla. 275, 137 Pac. 1179; Brown et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Temple, 35 Okla. 726, 130 Pac. 140.

There is not any merit in the claim that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, for the evidence introduced by the plaintiff reasonably tends to prove that all of his crop was damaged by hail in the amount found by the jury and collectable under the terms of the policy

The court instructed the jury that if it found for the plaintiff that it allow him interest at 6 per cent: from December 1, 1916, on the amounts found, and it is urged by the defendant that said instruction is viola-tive of section 2848, Rev. Daws of 1910. In the case of City of Chickasha v. Hollingsworth, 56 Okla. 341, 15 Pac. 859, this court held that interest was not recoverable on unliquidated damages, where it was necessary for a judgment on verdict to be rendered in order to ascertain the amount of such damage. The instruction was therefore erroneous, and the judgment was- excessive in the small amount of the interest so- allowed, which is less than $5. '

The jrrdgment will therefore be modified by deducting therefrom interest on .the damages allowed from December 1, 1916, to the date of the verdict, which was April 17, 1917, and as so modified, will be affirmed.

HARDY, O. J., and OWEN, PITCHEORD, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

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RAINEY, J.

A. M. Robison recovered a judgment in the county court ■ of Beckham county, against the St. Paul Eire ,& Marine Insurance Company of St. Paul, Minn., in the sum of $146.20 for damages to his crop of cotton under a hail insurance policy issued to him by the defendant company. The plaintiff sued for $222, and the insurance company, in its answer, admitted that damage had accrued to the plaintiff in the sum of $60, and confessed judgment for said amount, but denied that he had suffered any greater damage, and pleaded a counterclaim in the sum of $33 90, represented by a promissory noté given in payment of the premium on the policy. The cause was tried to a jury, resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount aforesaid and for cancellation of the note.

It is contended that the court erred in sustaining objections to questions propounded to plaintiff on cross-examination by defendant’s counsel relative to rabbits eating a part of the young cotton. Counsel say:

“The evidence thus attempted to be adduced was wholly competent, and we submit that defendant had the right and should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff fully as to his damage, and whether or not he was now making claim for the five acres that ‘rabbits’ or ‘something’ had destroyed and the exclusion of the same as immaterial was prejudicial error.”

•The exclusion of this testimony was not prejudicial error, for the reason that the court permitted counsel to thoroughly cross-examine plaintiff as to the amount of damage claimed by him and as to the effect of the hail on his crop and the condition it was in at the time of the hail. The plaintiff had repeatedly testified that he claimed damage by hail on all of his cotton covered by the policy, and the court, in. its instructions, clearly stated to the jury that 'plaintiff could only recover under the policy .for dam. age to his crop that was caused by! thei hail. Testimony was also admitted by the court tending to prove that rabbits had done some damage to a part of the crop, and this was doubtless taken into consideration by the jpry in fixing the amount of the recovery', although 'the court did not specifically instruct the jury not to-allow the plaintiff for any damage caused by rabbits: However, the defendant company cannot complain of the court’s failure to instruct on this particular phase -of the ease, in view of the fact that the instructions given limited the plaintiff’s recovery to damages actually suffered by the hail, and the defendant did not request an instruction relative to the damage, if any, caused by the rabbits. Chicago, I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Radford, 36 Okla. 657, 129 Pac. 834; Seay et al. v. Plunkett, 44 Okla. 794, 145 Pac. 496.

Objection is made to the form of the verdict, but since the verdict was received by the court without any objection on the part of defendant to its form and no exception was taken or opportunity given the court to have the same amended, the alleged error cannot be considered here. Collier et al. v. Gannon, 40 Okla. 275, 137 Pac. 1179; Brown et al. v. First Nat. Bank of Temple, 35 Okla. 726, 130 Pac. 140.

There is not any merit in the claim that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, for the evidence introduced by the plaintiff reasonably tends to prove that all of his crop was damaged by hail in the amount found by the jury and collectable under the terms of the policy

The court instructed the jury that if it found for the plaintiff that it allow him interest at 6 per cent: from December 1, 1916, on the amounts found, and it is urged by the defendant that said instruction is viola-tive of section 2848, Rev. Daws of 1910. In the case of City of Chickasha v. Hollingsworth, 56 Okla. 341, 15 Pac. 859, this court held that interest was not recoverable on unliquidated damages, where it was necessary for a judgment on verdict to be rendered in order to ascertain the amount of such damage. The instruction was therefore erroneous, and the judgment was- excessive in the small amount of the interest so- allowed, which is less than $5. '

The jrrdgment will therefore be modified by deducting therefrom interest on .the damages allowed from December 1, 1916, to the date of the verdict, which was April 17, 1917, and as so modified, will be affirmed.

HARDY, O. J., and OWEN, PITCHEORD, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.

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1919 OK 133, 180 P. 702, 72 Okla. 269, 1919 Okla. LEXIS 374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-paul-fire-marine-ins-co-of-st-paul-v-robison-okla-1919.

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