St. Mary's Hospital v. Industrial Commission

43 N.W.2d 465, 257 Wis. 411, 1950 Wisc. LEXIS 248
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedJune 30, 1950
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 43 N.W.2d 465 (St. Mary's Hospital v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Mary's Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 43 N.W.2d 465, 257 Wis. 411, 1950 Wisc. LEXIS 248 (Wis. 1950).

Opinions

Fsitz, C. J.

In findings and an interlocutory award of compensation made after a hearing before two examiners of the Industrial Commission, and affirmed by the commission, they found (so far as here material) :

That applicant, Dorothy Lockhart, entered St. Mary’s Hospital (hereinafter called “hospital”) school of nursing on September IS, 1942, and continued as a student nurse until May 2, 1944; that in April, 1943, she became ill with a diagnosis of erythema nodosum; that a tonsillectomy was performed on her on April IS, 1944; that in April, 1944, she was informed that an X-ray report indicated a suspicious lesion of possible tuberculosis, but nothing definite; that the hospital informed her she could continue work or go to bed, and she continued as a student nurse until May 2, 1944; that she was a patient at the hospital from May 3, 1944, to July 21, 1944, and went home and returned to the hospital as a patient from September 16, 1944, to September 27, 1944; that sanatorium care was recommended in September, 1944, and on October 11, 1944, she entered the Wisconsin State Sanatorium (hereinafter called “sanatorium”), where a diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis was made; that she was a patient there until discharged October 10, 1945; that she and Margaret Wilkinson had worked together as student nurses in the hospital in March, 1943, and at that time Margaret Wilkinson was a highly infectious source of tuberculosis ; that the applicant contracted pulmonary tuberculosis through contact with Margaret Wilkinson in the performance [414]*414of her duties as a student nurse of the hospital; that she had no tuberculosis training; that she was first told in October, 1944, that her tuberculosis came from her employment with Margaret Wilkinson; that since October 10, 1945, the applicant has not been able to work except on a split-shift basis with intervening rest periods; that she sustained injury in the nature of pulmonary tuberculosis while performing service growing out of and incidental to her employment with the hospital and the disease arose out of her employment by the hospital; that the date of injury was May 2, 1944; that application for adjustment of her claim for compensation was filed July 3, 1946; that the record herein is sufficient to establish that the applicant did not know the nature of her disability and its relation to her employment prior to October, 1944; that she ought to have known the nature of her disability and its relation to her employment no earlier than October, 1944; and that the filing of her claim for compensation (on July 3, 1946) was timely and the claim is not barred by operation of sec. 102.12, Stats.

Upon these findings the examiners awarded compensation to the applicant by the interlocutory order; and the Industrial Commission affirmed the award, and filed a memorandum opinion in which the commission stated:

“Applicant’s last day of work was May 2, 1944. That constitutes the date of injury under sec. 102.01 (2), Stats. Application was filed on July 3, 1946, more than two years after the last day of work. Sec. 102.12 provides that regardless of whether notice was received, if no payment of compensation (other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made, and no application filed with the commission within two years from the date of the injury or death, or from the date the employee or his dependent knew or ought to have known the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred.”

The plaintiffs contend that in March or April, 1944, the applicant knew she had tuberculosis, and that it resulted from her work. On the other hand the applicant and the Industrial Commission contend that while she may have had a suspicion [415]*415or conjectured that she had tuberculosis as a result of her work, the fact is that she did not have reliable information and such knowledge as to charge her with the requisite statutory knowledge to require the filing of an application by her until October, 1944, and that therefore her application was filed within the required period, and was not barred in view of the provision in sec. 102.12, Stats. 1943, that,—

. . Absence of notice shall not bar recovery if it is found that the employer was not misled thereby. Regardless of whether notice was received, if no payment of compensation (other than medical treatment or burial expense) is made, and no application filed with the commission within two years from the date of the .injury or death, or from the date the employee or his dependent knew or ought to have known the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred.” 1

As stated in Larson v. Industrial Comm. 224 Wis. 294, 297, 271 N. W. 835,—

“These provisions [sec. 102.12] were intended to cover cases where there might be some factual basis for ignorance of the character of the disability, and its causal relation to the work in which applicant was engaged. In nearly every accident case this will immediately be apparent, and the provision was directed primarily to cases of industrial disease where it was factually possible for some time after the onset of the disease for the applicant to be in doubt or ignorant, (1) as to what the disease was, and (2), whether it had in fact any relation to his employment.”

As stated in Trustees, M. R. Sanatorium v. Industrial Comm. 224 Wis. 536, 541, 542, 543, 272 N. W. 483,—

“What an employee may think as to the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment is not alone sufficient to start the running of the two-year statute of limitations. To so hold would be to adopt an unthinkably harsh rule. What an employee thinks must be based on [416]*416something more than suspicion and conjecture in order to start the running of the statute of limitations. Such thought must be based upon knowledge of, or upon reliable information regarding the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment. ... In our opinion, the compensation law does not put upon an employee the duty of knowing the nature of his disability and its relation to his employment before those things are reasonably ascertainable by the medical profession.”

Consequently, until the applicant knew or ought to have known the nature of the disability and its relation to her employment, her right to compensation therefor had not become barred under sec. 102.12, Stats., which was relied upon by the commission in awarding compensation to her.

The evidence in the record clearly establishes that the applicant contracted tuberculosis in the course of her employment as a student nurse at the hospital; that her tuberculosis probably came from her contact while working with Margaret Wilkinson in March, 1943, in the hospital supply room; that her last day of work was May 2, 1944; and that her application for adjustment of her claim was filed with the Industrial Commission on July 3, 1946.

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Related

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Bluebook (online)
43 N.W.2d 465, 257 Wis. 411, 1950 Wisc. LEXIS 248, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-marys-hospital-v-industrial-commission-wis-1950.