St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comanche County

1929 OK 208, 277 P. 932, 136 Okla. 265, 1929 Okla. LEXIS 184
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedMay 21, 1929
Docket20145
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 1929 OK 208 (St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comanche County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comanche County, 1929 OK 208, 277 P. 932, 136 Okla. 265, 1929 Okla. LEXIS 184 (Okla. 1929).

Opinion

SWINDALL, J.

This action comes to this court on appeal from the judgment and decision of the Court of Tax Review of the state, of Oklahoma upon the third cause of action stated in the protest of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a corporation, involving the 1928 tax levies for Comanche 'county, state of Oklahoma, and the subdivisions thereof. The decision sustains the levy, and the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a corporation, protestant, appeals, and will be referred to in this opinion as the railway company.

There are several grounds of protest stated by the railway company, but the only one brought here for consideration is the third cause of action, in which the railway company alleges that 4.94 mills of said levy of 19.94 mills against the property of th'e railway company for the year 1928, for the benefit of the Lawton school district, is wholly illegal and void, for the reason that it was made for the purpose of creating a sinking fund for the payment of principal and interest on bonded indebtedness of said Lawton school district contracted prior to the annexation of the Fort Sill Military Reservation ; that this petitioner had no property of any character subject to taxation or assessment located within the limits which existed prior to th'e annexation of the uaid Fort' Sill Military Reservation; that by reason thereof, the rate of levy as made and provided by the county excise board is contrary to the provision of section 10469, Compiled Oklahoma Statutes, 1921, and contrary to the laws and th'e Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, in that it seeks to tax property of this petitioner in a taxing jurisdiction wherein no such property of this petitioner was situated.

. This cause was submitted to the Court of Tax Review upon an agreed statement of *266 facts, which, in so far as it relates to the third cause of action, states:

“That it is agreed that Lawton school district levied a total rate of 19.94 nulls, 15 mills of which being for general fund and 4.94 mills being for a sinking fund. It is further agreed that on October 20, 1924, territory comprising the Et. Sill Military Reservation, within Comanche county, Okla., was annexed to the Lawton school district, and that prior' to said annexation the Law-ton school district issued bonds in the total amount of $383,074.13, and that same were outstanding at the time of the annexation of the Et. Sill Military Reservation, and that no bonds have been issued by said Law-ton school district subsequent to the annexation of the Ft. Sill Military Reservation; that the 4.94 mills heretofore referred to, as levied for sinking fund purposes, were made for the purpose of paying annual interest coupons and cheating annual accruals to meet bonds at maturity. It is further stipulated and agreed that Lawton school district, as heretofore referred to, is an independent district, organized under the laws of the state of Oklahoma.”

To sustain its contention, the railway company cites Cheek v. Eye, 96 Okla. 44, 219 Pac. 883; Mitsler v. Eye, 107 Okla. 289, 231 Pac. 1045; Consolidated School District No. 97 v. Sloan, 135 Okla. 29, 273 Pac. 271, and Crawford, Treas., v. Brisley, 131 Okla. 230, 268 Pac. 713.

We have carefully examined these authorities, and cannot agree with counsel for the railway company that they are in point in this case. They all hav'e to do with section 10469, relating to consolidated school districts, and the statutes relating to consolidated school districts specifically provide that the assets of a disorganized district shall be applied to the payment of the floating indebtedness of the district, if any, then to the bonded indebtedness, and any residue to become the property of the consolidated district: and where several districts are consolidated. any one of which disorganized districts had a bonded indebtedness prior to its consolidation, then the territory formerly included in each disorganized district shall be taxed to pay the bonded indebtedness as it existed in the respective disorganized' districts prior to the disorganization of the districts, where the assets of the disorganized districts are not sufiicient to pay the floating indebtedness and the bonded indebtedness.

However, there is no such provision in the statutes, relative to independent school distr’cts. and the authorities seem to be unanimous in holding that it is for,the Legislature to determine in regard to such bonded indebtedness.

In the case of Powers v. the County Commissioners of Wood County, 8 Ohio St. at page 290, it is said:

“The property, if annexed, will be subject to taxation to pay a prior indebtedness of the town of Perrysburg; and it is, therefore, claimed that private property will be thus taken for public purposes without compensation. That injustice may be, and has, sometimes, b'een done by the annexation of territory to a town, which has contracted an improvident debt, is, no doubt, true; and, sometimes, and perhaps more frequently the owners of contiguous territory have had the benefit, by r'eflected value and convenience, of expenditures for which they have not contributed anything. The question is one beyond the reach of practical consideration, in the absence of any statute; and it would require a very artificial and unsound mode of reasoning to hold that territory could not be annexed to a town which owed debts, until the owners of such territory were paid a compensation in money for a proportional part of such debts, on the ground that the property annexed was condemned for public use.
‘‘It is not indeed to be presumed that a municipal corporation has contracted a debt without being correspondingly benefited.”

In the case of Wade et al. v. City of Richmond, and Thomas v. Same, 18 Grat. (Va.) 583, the Supreme Court of that state said:

“The General Assembly having the authority to ’extend the boundaries of the city, the justice or expediency of it is not a question of which the courts can take jurisdiction.”
“That the taxpayers' of t'he county may have the burthen of taxation increased, or the creditors may have their security lessened by the reduction of the va^e of the subjects of taxation, or that the inhabitants in the annexed district may be subjected to heavier taxation, does not affect the constitutionality of the act.”

Dillon’s Municipal Corporations <4th Ed.) voi. 1, par. 185, p.- 267, (5th Ed.) vol. 1, par. 355, p. 617, lays down the rule thus:

“Not only may the Legislature originally fix the. limits of the corporation, but it may, unless specially restrained in the Constitution, subsequently annex, or authorize the annexation of contiguous or other territory, and this without the consent, and even against the remonstrance, of the majority of the persons residing in the corporation or on the annexed territory. And it is no constitutional objection to the exercise of this power of compulsory annexation *267 that the property thus brought within the ’corporate limits will be subject to taxation to discharge a pre-existing municipal indebtedness, since t'his is a matter which, in the absence oí special constitutional restriction, belongs wholly to the legislature to determine.”

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Bluebook (online)
1929 OK 208, 277 P. 932, 136 Okla. 265, 1929 Okla. LEXIS 184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-louis-s-f-ry-co-v-comanche-county-okla-1929.