SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
St. Louis County, Missouri, et al., ) ) Appellants, ) ) vs. ) No. SC93439 ) State of Missouri, et al., ) ) Respondents. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County Honorable Patricia S. Joyce, Judge
Opinion issued March 25, 2014
St. Louis County, the county superintendent of police, the county sheriff, a deputy
police officer, a deputy sheriff and a county transportation officer (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed a four-count petition seeking a declaration that the deputy sheriff salary
supplementation fund established by section 57.278 is unconstitutional and improperly
administered. 1 The circuit court dismissed the petition on grounds that the Plaintiffs
lacked standing and that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. The judgment is
reversed to the extent it dismisses Count IV on grounds that the superintendent of police
lacks standing and that his claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The remainder of the
judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded.
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013. FACTS
Section 57.278 establishes the deputy sheriff salary supplementation fund and
requires county sheriffs to collect a $10 service of process fee. The sheriffs remit the fee
to the fund. County sheriffs can file a grant application with the Missouri Sheriff
Methamphetamine Relief Task Force (MoSMART) to obtain a grant from the fund to
supplement “salaries and benefits of county deputy sheriffs.” Section 650.350.8.
The county superintendent of police submitted an application seeking a grant from
the fund. MoSMART denied the superintendent’s application on grounds that “the
application was not submitted by the Sheriff of St. Louis County as required by the
qualifications of the Deputy Sheriff Salary Supplementation Fund.”
Plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment. Count I alleged that section
57.278.1 constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority in violation of article
III, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution. Count II alleged that the statute violates
article IV, section 51 because the members of the MoSMART board were not appointed
with the advice and consent of the senate. Count III alleged that the criteria for assessing
grant applications have not been properly promulgated as a rule. Count IV alleged that
MoSMART’s rejection of the grant application was unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and
an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiffs allege that to obtain service on the state in this
case, they had to collect and remit the $10 fee imposed by section 57.278. Plaintiffs also
allege that deputies and the transportation officer have an interest in obtaining salary
supplementation from the fund. The circuit court dismissed the case on grounds that none of the plaintiffs had standing and that all claims were barred by sovereign
immunity. Plaintiffs appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A judgment dismissing a cause of action for lack of standing is subject to de novo
review. Mo. State Med. Ass'n v. State, 256 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. banc 2008). An
appellate court assumes that all of the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ petition are true.
Foster v. State, 352 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Mo. banc 2011).
ANALYSIS
Litigation of a claim requires plaintiffs to show that they have standing by
demonstrating a personal interest in the litigation arising from a “threatened or actual
injury.” Roberts v. BJC Health System, 391 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Mo. banc 2013)(quoting
State ex rel. Williams v. Mauer, 722 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. banc 1986)). In a declaratory
judgment, the criterion for standing is whether the plaintiff has a legally protectable
interest at stake. Battlefield Fire Protection District v. City of Springfield, 941 S.W.2d
491, 492 (Mo. banc 1997). A legally protectable interest exists if the plaintiff is directly
and adversely affected by the action in question or if the plaintiff’s interest is conferred
by statute. Id. Although standing can be based on an interest that is “attenuated, slight or
remote,” in all cases there must be a showing of an actual personal interest or stake in the
outcome of the litigation. Roberts, 391 S.W.3d at 438. The requirement of a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation means that the remedy sought must relate to the
alleged injury. If the plaintiff’s grounds for relief and remedy sought cannot alleviate the
alleged injury, then, by necessity, the litigation cannot vindicate the plaintiff’s alleged
3 personal interest or stake in the outcome of the litigation. If that is the case, then the
plaintiff has no standing to bring the claims he or she alleges.
I. Counts I-II
In Counts I and II, Plaintiffs asserted that section 57.278 is unconstitutional and
requested the circuit court to enjoin any expenditures from the fund except as specifically
authorized by the court. In the petition, Plaintiffs alleged interests in receiving grant
money and in not having to collect and remit the $10 service fee to the fund to file the
instant lawsuit. Neither alleged interest is sufficient to confer standing to bring these
claims.
The alleged interest in receiving grant money does not constitute a “legally
protectable” interest sufficient to confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of
section 57.278. None of the Plaintiffs has any right to a grant of money from the fund.
By definition, grants from the fund are discretionary expenditures determined by
MoSMART. Plaintiffs are interested in obtaining grant money, but they have no legally
protectable interest in the receipt of discretionary grant money. At most, the
superintendent, as the grant applicant, has an interest in a non-arbitrary consideration of
the grant application. Counts I and II, however, assert only that that section 57.278 is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and that the MoSMART board was
appointed improperly and has no authority to act. Nothing in either count would
vindicate that interest.
The alleged interest stemming from collecting and remitting the $10 service fee to
the fund to file the instant lawsuit is also insufficient to confer standing. Plaintiffs allege
4 no grounds challenging the validity of the $10 fee collected as part of the filing fees for
initiating this lawsuit. Even if Plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that section 57.278 is
unconstitutional, the $10 fee mandated by section 650.350 still would be collected and
remitted to the fund. As such, no Plaintiff has alleged any legally protectable interest that
can be vindicated by a declaration that section 57.278 is unconstitutional as alleged in
Counts I and II. The circuit court properly dismissed Counts I and II for lack of standing.
II. Count III
In Count III, Plaintiffs alleged that the criteria for assessing grant applications
have not been promulgated properly as a rule. Plaintiffs requested that the circuit court
enjoin the state from expending money from the fund and to declare that the criteria it
uses absent a rule are invalid.
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SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
St. Louis County, Missouri, et al., ) ) Appellants, ) ) vs. ) No. SC93439 ) State of Missouri, et al., ) ) Respondents. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County Honorable Patricia S. Joyce, Judge
Opinion issued March 25, 2014
St. Louis County, the county superintendent of police, the county sheriff, a deputy
police officer, a deputy sheriff and a county transportation officer (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed a four-count petition seeking a declaration that the deputy sheriff salary
supplementation fund established by section 57.278 is unconstitutional and improperly
administered. 1 The circuit court dismissed the petition on grounds that the Plaintiffs
lacked standing and that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. The judgment is
reversed to the extent it dismisses Count IV on grounds that the superintendent of police
lacks standing and that his claim is barred by sovereign immunity. The remainder of the
judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded.
1 All statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2013. FACTS
Section 57.278 establishes the deputy sheriff salary supplementation fund and
requires county sheriffs to collect a $10 service of process fee. The sheriffs remit the fee
to the fund. County sheriffs can file a grant application with the Missouri Sheriff
Methamphetamine Relief Task Force (MoSMART) to obtain a grant from the fund to
supplement “salaries and benefits of county deputy sheriffs.” Section 650.350.8.
The county superintendent of police submitted an application seeking a grant from
the fund. MoSMART denied the superintendent’s application on grounds that “the
application was not submitted by the Sheriff of St. Louis County as required by the
qualifications of the Deputy Sheriff Salary Supplementation Fund.”
Plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment. Count I alleged that section
57.278.1 constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority in violation of article
III, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution. Count II alleged that the statute violates
article IV, section 51 because the members of the MoSMART board were not appointed
with the advice and consent of the senate. Count III alleged that the criteria for assessing
grant applications have not been properly promulgated as a rule. Count IV alleged that
MoSMART’s rejection of the grant application was unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and
an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiffs allege that to obtain service on the state in this
case, they had to collect and remit the $10 fee imposed by section 57.278. Plaintiffs also
allege that deputies and the transportation officer have an interest in obtaining salary
supplementation from the fund. The circuit court dismissed the case on grounds that none of the plaintiffs had standing and that all claims were barred by sovereign
immunity. Plaintiffs appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A judgment dismissing a cause of action for lack of standing is subject to de novo
review. Mo. State Med. Ass'n v. State, 256 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. banc 2008). An
appellate court assumes that all of the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ petition are true.
Foster v. State, 352 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Mo. banc 2011).
ANALYSIS
Litigation of a claim requires plaintiffs to show that they have standing by
demonstrating a personal interest in the litigation arising from a “threatened or actual
injury.” Roberts v. BJC Health System, 391 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Mo. banc 2013)(quoting
State ex rel. Williams v. Mauer, 722 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. banc 1986)). In a declaratory
judgment, the criterion for standing is whether the plaintiff has a legally protectable
interest at stake. Battlefield Fire Protection District v. City of Springfield, 941 S.W.2d
491, 492 (Mo. banc 1997). A legally protectable interest exists if the plaintiff is directly
and adversely affected by the action in question or if the plaintiff’s interest is conferred
by statute. Id. Although standing can be based on an interest that is “attenuated, slight or
remote,” in all cases there must be a showing of an actual personal interest or stake in the
outcome of the litigation. Roberts, 391 S.W.3d at 438. The requirement of a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation means that the remedy sought must relate to the
alleged injury. If the plaintiff’s grounds for relief and remedy sought cannot alleviate the
alleged injury, then, by necessity, the litigation cannot vindicate the plaintiff’s alleged
3 personal interest or stake in the outcome of the litigation. If that is the case, then the
plaintiff has no standing to bring the claims he or she alleges.
I. Counts I-II
In Counts I and II, Plaintiffs asserted that section 57.278 is unconstitutional and
requested the circuit court to enjoin any expenditures from the fund except as specifically
authorized by the court. In the petition, Plaintiffs alleged interests in receiving grant
money and in not having to collect and remit the $10 service fee to the fund to file the
instant lawsuit. Neither alleged interest is sufficient to confer standing to bring these
claims.
The alleged interest in receiving grant money does not constitute a “legally
protectable” interest sufficient to confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of
section 57.278. None of the Plaintiffs has any right to a grant of money from the fund.
By definition, grants from the fund are discretionary expenditures determined by
MoSMART. Plaintiffs are interested in obtaining grant money, but they have no legally
protectable interest in the receipt of discretionary grant money. At most, the
superintendent, as the grant applicant, has an interest in a non-arbitrary consideration of
the grant application. Counts I and II, however, assert only that that section 57.278 is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and that the MoSMART board was
appointed improperly and has no authority to act. Nothing in either count would
vindicate that interest.
The alleged interest stemming from collecting and remitting the $10 service fee to
the fund to file the instant lawsuit is also insufficient to confer standing. Plaintiffs allege
4 no grounds challenging the validity of the $10 fee collected as part of the filing fees for
initiating this lawsuit. Even if Plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that section 57.278 is
unconstitutional, the $10 fee mandated by section 650.350 still would be collected and
remitted to the fund. As such, no Plaintiff has alleged any legally protectable interest that
can be vindicated by a declaration that section 57.278 is unconstitutional as alleged in
Counts I and II. The circuit court properly dismissed Counts I and II for lack of standing.
II. Count III
In Count III, Plaintiffs alleged that the criteria for assessing grant applications
have not been promulgated properly as a rule. Plaintiffs requested that the circuit court
enjoin the state from expending money from the fund and to declare that the criteria it
uses absent a rule are invalid. Assuming for the sake of argument that the grant criteria
are rules that were not promulgated properly, a declaration that the criteria should be
promulgated as rules would do nothing to remedy either the denial of the grant
application or remitting the $10 fee to initiate the underlying lawsuit. As with Counts I
and II, the allegations in Count III do not redress the alleged injury from denial of the
grant application or from remitting the $10 fee. The circuit court did not err in
dismissing Count III for lack of standing. 2
2 Having determined that the circuit court properly dismissed Counts I, II and III, there is no need to discuss the circuit court’s sovereign immunity analysis with respect to these claims.
5 III. Count IV
In Count IV, Plaintiffs alleged that MoSMART’s rejection of the grant application
was unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. The superintendent is
the only Plaintiff who could have standing to challenge MoSMART’s rejection of the
grant application under Count IV. The police and sheriff deputies, the transportation
officer, and the county sheriff did not apply for the grant and do not allege that they will
apply or could apply. Accordingly, the circuit court determined correctly that these
Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the denial of the grant application. The
superintendent, however, does allege a legally protectable interest that confers standing to
challenge denial of the grant application under Count IV. Under the facts of this case, the
superintendent has a legal interest in obtaining judicial review of whether he is a county
sheriff who is eligible to file a grant application. If the superintendent is in fact a
“sheriff” eligible to file a grant application, an issue on which this Court takes no
position, then the trial court could remand the matter back to MoSMART for further
consideration of the grant application. The circuit court erred in dismissing Count IV
with respect to the superintendent. 3
3 Section 536.150, which authorizes administrative review in this case, operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity because the statute permits judicial review and reversal of state administrative decisions involving entitlement to state funds.
6 The judgment is reversed only to the extent that it holds that the superintendent
has no standing under Count IV and that his claim is barred by sovereign immunity. In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The case is remanded.
______________________________________ Richard B. Teitelman, Judge
All concur.