St John v. Commissioner of Social Security

W.D. Washington

St John v. Commissioner of Social Security

DecidedMay 25, 2022

Docket3:21-cv-05559

StatusUnknown

This text of St John v. Commissioner of Social Security (St John v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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St John v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2022).

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 MICHAEL S., 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5559-SKV 10 v. MINUTE ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13

14 The following Minute Order is made at the direction of the Court, the Hon. S. Kate 15 Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge: 16 At the upcoming oral argument on June 1, 2022, counsel should come prepared to discuss 17 the following questions: 18 Questions for Plaintiff 19 1. Does Plaintiff dispute that dually entitled beneficiaries are not 20 eligible for a Parisi adjustment, under POMS GN 023603.050? In other words: 21 Even if Plaintiff is correct that Plaintiff’s mother’s entitlement to benefits on 22 Plaintiff’s father’s record was merely theoretical or technical, does Plaintiff’s 23 1 status as dually entitled preclude an increase in his benefit amount by operation of 2 the POMS? 3 2. Plaintiff emphasizes that if his mother had not applied for spousal benefits or if he 4 had not applied for DIB, his payment would be higher. Dkt. 28 at 4. Does this

5 pertain to whether the overpayment was assessed correctly, or whether the 6 overpayment should have been waived? 7 3. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have looked to his current financial 8 position when considering whether he had sufficient income to cover his 9 expenses. Dkt. 28 at 5. What evidence is in the record regarding Plaintiff’s 10 current financial position? Should the ALJ look to Plaintiff’s financial position 11 during the period he was overpaid, the period when the overpayments were 12 recovered, or the period of the ALJ decision, or some other time period, for 13 purposes of determining whether recovery of an overpayment would defeat the 14 purposes of the Act?

15 4. It is undisputed that the overpayment was not Plaintiff’s fault and was instead 16 based on erroneous calculations by the agency. What facts indicate that 17 recovering the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience, 18 distinct from the agency’s fault in creating the overpayment? 19 Plaintiff’s opening brief on this issue emphasizes his lack of fault in causing the 20 overpayment (Dkt. 23 at 15-16), but how does this connect to whether recovering 21 the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience? 22 23 1 Questions for the Commissioner 2 5. What is the legal significance, if any, of the agency’s March 2020 waiver of a 3 $8,049 overpayment? Does this notice purport to waive part of the 2009-13 4 overpayment, or is it referring to a different overpayment? Why does this waiver

5 not undermine the ALJ’s decision denying waiver? 6 6. If the Court agrees with the Commissioner that Plaintiff was not eligible for an 7 increase because he is dually entitled, does it matter whether Plaintiff’s mother’s 8 entitlement to spousal benefits was merely theoretical or technical? Did the ALJ 9 make any finding regarding whether Plaintiff’s mother was theoretically or 10 technically entitled to spousal benefits? 11 7. The Commissioner’s response cites POMS SM 00820.300 (Dkt. 27 at 3) as 12 defining technically entitled beneficiaries, but there is no “SM” section of the 13 POMS available on the public website. Where can the Court find the definition of 14 technical entitlement?

15 8. If Plaintiff’s mother was entitled to spousal benefits, but not being paid them, in 16 what way is her entitlement to those benefits more than theoretical/technical? 17 9. Why are dually entitled beneficiaries excluded from a Parisi increase, as a policy 18 matter? 19 10. Should the ALJ look to Plaintiff’s financial position during the period he was 20 overpaid, the period when the overpayments were recovered, or the period of the 21 ALJ decision, or some other time period, for purposes of determining whether 22 recovery of an overpayment would defeat the purposes of the Act? 23 1 11. The Ninth Circuit has held that the definition of the “against equity or good 2 conscience” in 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a) is unduly narrow and that this term should 3 be interpreted to account for the totality of the circumstances and broad concepts 4 of fairness. Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990). The agency

5 subsequently issued an acquiescence ruling regarding Quinlivan. AR 92-5(9), 6 available at https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/09/AR92-05-ar-09.html. 7 The Commissioner’s response does not discuss either Quinlivan or AR 92-5(9). 8 Did the ALJ here comply with Quinlivan? 9 Dated this 25th day of May, 2022. 10 Ravi Subramanian Clerk of Court 11 By: Stefanie Prather 12 Deputy Clerk 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 MICHAEL S., 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C21-5559-SKV 10 v. MINUTE ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13

14 The following Minute Order is made at the direction of the Court, the Hon. S. Kate 15 Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge: 16 At the upcoming oral argument on June 1, 2022, counsel should come prepared to discuss 17 the following questions: 18 Questions for Plaintiff 19 1. Does Plaintiff dispute that dually entitled beneficiaries are not 20 eligible for a Parisi adjustment, under POMS GN 023603.050? In other words: 21 Even if Plaintiff is correct that Plaintiff’s mother’s entitlement to benefits on 22 Plaintiff’s father’s record was merely theoretical or technical, does Plaintiff’s 23 1 status as dually entitled preclude an increase in his benefit amount by operation of 2 the POMS? 3 2. Plaintiff emphasizes that if his mother had not applied for spousal benefits or if he 4 had not applied for DIB, his payment would be higher. Dkt. 28 at 4. Does this

5 pertain to whether the overpayment was assessed correctly, or whether the 6 overpayment should have been waived? 7 3. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have looked to his current financial 8 position when considering whether he had sufficient income to cover his 9 expenses. Dkt. 28 at 5. What evidence is in the record regarding Plaintiff’s 10 current financial position? Should the ALJ look to Plaintiff’s financial position 11 during the period he was overpaid, the period when the overpayments were 12 recovered, or the period of the ALJ decision, or some other time period, for 13 purposes of determining whether recovery of an overpayment would defeat the 14 purposes of the Act?

15 4. It is undisputed that the overpayment was not Plaintiff’s fault and was instead 16 based on erroneous calculations by the agency. What facts indicate that 17 recovering the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience, 18 distinct from the agency’s fault in creating the overpayment? 19 Plaintiff’s opening brief on this issue emphasizes his lack of fault in causing the 20 overpayment (Dkt. 23 at 15-16), but how does this connect to whether recovering 21 the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience? 22 23 1 Questions for the Commissioner 2 5. What is the legal significance, if any, of the agency’s March 2020 waiver of a 3 $8,049 overpayment? Does this notice purport to waive part of the 2009-13 4 overpayment, or is it referring to a different overpayment? Why does this waiver

5 not undermine the ALJ’s decision denying waiver? 6 6. If the Court agrees with the Commissioner that Plaintiff was not eligible for an 7 increase because he is dually entitled, does it matter whether Plaintiff’s mother’s 8 entitlement to spousal benefits was merely theoretical or technical? Did the ALJ 9 make any finding regarding whether Plaintiff’s mother was theoretically or 10 technically entitled to spousal benefits? 11 7. The Commissioner’s response cites POMS SM 00820.300 (Dkt. 27 at 3) as 12 defining technically entitled beneficiaries, but there is no “SM” section of the 13 POMS available on the public website. Where can the Court find the definition of 14 technical entitlement?

15 8. If Plaintiff’s mother was entitled to spousal benefits, but not being paid them, in 16 what way is her entitlement to those benefits more than theoretical/technical? 17 9. Why are dually entitled beneficiaries excluded from a Parisi increase, as a policy 18 matter? 19 10. Should the ALJ look to Plaintiff’s financial position during the period he was 20 overpaid, the period when the overpayments were recovered, or the period of the 21 ALJ decision, or some other time period, for purposes of determining whether 22 recovery of an overpayment would defeat the purposes of the Act? 23 1 11. The Ninth Circuit has held that the definition of the “against equity or good 2 conscience” in 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a) is unduly narrow and that this term should 3 be interpreted to account for the totality of the circumstances and broad concepts 4 of fairness. Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990). The agency

5 subsequently issued an acquiescence ruling regarding Quinlivan. AR 92-5(9), 6 available at https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/09/AR92-05-ar-09.html. 7 The Commissioner’s response does not discuss either Quinlivan or AR 92-5(9). 8 Did the ALJ here comply with Quinlivan? 9 Dated this 25th day of May, 2022. 10 Ravi Subramanian Clerk of Court 11 By: Stefanie Prather 12 Deputy Clerk 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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