FILED JULY 30, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
SSHI, LLC, ) ) No. 41328-4-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES, ) ) Respondent. ) ) ) In re: SSHI, LLC, ) ) Docket No. 23 W0003 ) Citation & Notice No. 317969114 )
COONEY, A.C.J. — The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) cited
SSHI, LLC, for a serious violation of WAC 296-155-477(1)(f)(i), requiring the
completion of a “stairway to a second or higher floor before studs are raised to support
the next higher floor.” SSHI appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
(Board). Following a hearing, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) issued a proposed
decision and order affirming the citation. SSHI petitioned for review, and the Board No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
adopted the IAJ’s proposed decision and order. SSHI then appealed to the superior court,
which also affirmed.
SSHI appeals to this court, arguing that a different standard for knowledge of a
violative condition should apply to general contractors than that applied to
subcontractors. SSHI also argues that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s
findings that SSHI had constructive knowledge of the violation. We disagree with
SSHI’s arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
SSHI was the general contractor for Windhaven, a large housing development
project in Spokane, Washington. SSHI subcontracted the construction work for
Windhaven to John 316, among others. John 316, in turn, subcontracted the framing of
the homes to SVK Builders. SSHI typically had three superintendents and two assistants
supervising safety and production at the Windhaven project. The superintendents and
assistants each typically drove or walked by homes being constructed 10 or more times
per day.
On June 8, 2022, Douglas Thoet, a Department inspector, inspected the
Windhaven project. During his inspection, Mr. Thoet noticed that the second floor walls
of a home were being erected with an extension ladder providing the only means of
accessing the second floor. SSHI was cited for a serious violation of WAC 296-155-
477(1)(f)(i) that mandates that stairs be installed to a second floor, or higher floor, before
2 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
studs are constructed to support the next floor. The violation was considered serious
because a fall from the second floor of a structure could cause someone to “lose their life
if they sustain an injury or a serious injury from a fall from that distance.”
Administrative Record (AR) at 863.
SSHI appealed the citation to the Board, arguing that “it took reasonable steps to
ensure its subcontractors complied with safety rules.” AR at 41. An evidentiary hearing
was held before an IAJ. Numerous witnesses testified at the hearing and exhibits,
including photographs of the alleged violations, were admitted.
Prior to the hearing, SSHI moved for admission of the CR 30(b)(6) deposition
transcript of Terry Walley. SSHI argued Mr. Walley’s deposition “provides the history
and policy basis for the [Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH)] Directive
27.00 which the Department expects its compliance staff to follow.” AR at 212. The IAJ
did not consider Mr. Walley’s deposition testimony in making its decision, but DOSH
Directive 27.00 was admitted. DOSH Directive 27.00 establishes guidelines for “DOSH
compliance and consultation staff when assessing an upper-tier contractor’s compliance
with the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA).” AR at 1885. DOSH
Directive 27.00 provides “interpretation of appropriate application of [WISHA]” to
“general contractor[s]” and “upper-tier subcontractor[s].” AR at 1885.
At the hearing, Mr. Thoet testified that he inspected the Windhaven project on
June 8, 2022, and noticed a person not wearing fall protection while on the second level
3 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
of a home being constructed. Mr. Thoet photographed the person from the street. Mr.
Thoet then took a series of photographs from a different area of the construction zone.
Mr. Thoet testified that “during a review, while the inspection was still going on,” his
supervisor noticed no staircase was in place before the second floor walls of a home were
constructed. AR at 856. Mr. Thoet testified workers were “using an extension ladder to
access the second level” of the home. AR at 857. A close examination of the
photographs revealed that the “left side rail of that extension ladder” was visible “through
th[e] main entrance doorway.” AR at 858. The photographs were admitted at the
hearing.
Mr. Thoet also testified that this was a “repeat” citation because SSHI had been
cited for violating WAC 296-155-477(1)(c) 1 within the last three years. AR at 867. An
exhibit was admitted showing SSHI had been cited for a violation of WAC 296-155-
477(1)(c) on August 5, 2021. Mr. Thoet determines whether a prior violation is a
“repeat” violation by looking at whether the prior violation is “similar in nature” to the
current violation. AR at 867. Specifically, Mr. Thoet testified he looks at whether “it’s
within the same section for the same WAC, just different subsections.” AR at 867.
Sean Potter, a superintendent for SSHI, testified that he saw that “the second floor
walls” of the home at issue were up on June 8, 2022. AR at 792. When asked whether
1 “In all buildings or structures two or more stories or 24 feet or more in height or depth, you must install suitable permanent or temporary stairways.”
4 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
he remembered what time employees were done installing floors in the home, Mr. Potter
testified, “I don’t look that close. It’s just the generic idea that people are on site and
getting things done.” AR at 791. Mr. Potter stated he “either drove by” or “walked by”
the home but he “didn’t really stop and go into anything unless there was a need to,
whether [he saw] big schedule complication[s] or a safety violation.” AR at 791-92. Mr.
Potter further testified that he was aware stairs needed to be installed before the second
floor walls could be erected. However, he recognized that “it’s not always obvious” if
stairs have been installed, especially in certain floor plans like the one at issue. AR at
797. Mr. Potter testified, “This particular [floor] plan makes it difficult as you’re driving
or walking by to know if [stairs are] in or not” because the stairs are located behind the
powder room. AR at 798.
Zach Cody, the area construction manager for SSHI, testified that he drove by the
home at issue “maybe 10 to 12 times a day,” and the superintendents collectively drove
by the home “30 to 40 times throughout the day” on June 22, 2022. AR at 704. When
asked if he was aware that stairs needed to be installed before the second floor walls were
erected, Mr. Cody responded that he knew “that that was the case” but “that morning [the
construction crew] had started the subfloor and by the end of the day they had their walls
up so without actually walking into the house and checking on the stairs, we just assumed
that they had thrown in the stairs as they were going.” AR at 721.
5 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the IAJ issued a “Proposed Decision and
Order” affirming the citation. AR at 41-48 (some capitalization omitted). The IAJ
found, “SSHI had constructive knowledge of the lack of stairs. The violation was visible
from the street and in plain view. SSHI, LLC could have known about the violations
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” AR at 47. Relatedly, the IAJ noted it was
not persuaded by SSHI’s argument that the violation was not in plain view because the
“lack of a staircase was at this site visible from the street,” and if “an individual was close
to the powder room window or the garage entrance, he or she would notice the lack of
stairs.” AR at 45. The IAJ was also unpersuaded by SSHI’s argument regarding the
absence of supervisory personnel on the jobsite. The IAJ noted that the Board concluded
in a prior appeal that “if the absence of supervisory personnel on a job site was enough to
avoid the consequences of a safety violation, employers merely would begin to follow a
practice of not having a supervisor or other managerial representatives present at its
worksite.” AR at 44-45. The IAJ also found the base penalty was $6,600 but was
multiplied by two, for a total of $13,200, because SSHI “had one prior final citation for
fall protection violations dated within three years of this violation.” AR at 48.
SSHI petitioned for review of the IAJ’s decision. The Board denied the petition
and adopted the IAJ’s proposed decision. SSHI appealed to the superior court, which
affirmed the Board’s order.
SSHI appeals.
6 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
ANALYSIS
STANDARD FOR PROVING KNOWLEDGE OF VIOLATIVE CONDITION
SSHI argues a different standard for proving knowledge of a violative condition
should apply to general contractors than that applied to subcontractors. We disagree.
General contractors in the Evergreen State have a specific, nondelegable duty to
ensure compliance with WISHA regulations. Stute v. P.B.M.C. Inc., 114 Wn.2d 454,
463-64, 788 P.2d 545 (1990); RCW 49.17.060(2). As a matter of policy, per se liability
is imposed on general contractors for WISHA violations because of general contractors’
“per se control over the workplace.” Stute, 114 Wn.2d at 464. A WISHA violation by a
subcontractor is chargeable to both the subcontractor and the general contractor because
the general contractor is “the primary employer” whose supervisory authority puts it “in
the best position to ensure compliance with safety regulations.” Id. at 463; see also
Millican v. N.A. Degerstrom, Inc., 177 Wn. App. 881, 893, 313 P.3d 1215 (2013).
SSHI argues that, as general contractor, it had a lower level of responsibility and
less control over the day-to-day activities of employees than the subcontractor, SVK
Builders. It contends the test for constructive knowledge should be different for general
contractors. 2 We disagree and hold that the standard for knowledge of a violative
condition is the same for general contractors as it is for subcontractors.
2 As discussed below, to prove SSHI committed a serious WISHA violation, the Department had to prove the employer knew or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the violative condition. Wash. Cedar & Supply Co. v. Dep’t of
7 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
SSHI argues that, as the general contractor, it “was placed in the same shoes of
its subcontractor even though it did not directly control the work.” Opening Br. of
Appellant at 59. SSHI urges this court to look to federal cases interpreting the
Occupation Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) and determine that “the duty of care
for the general contractor is less than the duty of care a subcontractor owes to its own
employees.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 36. We decline SSHI’s invitation to consider
federal precedent.
Our Supreme Court has explained that a general contractor owes a “‘specific
duty’” to all employees on a job site to “‘comply with the rules, regulations, and orders
promulgated under [WISHA].’” Vargas v. Inland Wash., LLC, 194 Wn.2d 720, 735-36,
452 P.3d 1205 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RCW 49.17.060(2));
Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wn.2d 114, 122-23, 52 P.3d 472 (2002)). “A general
contractor always owes this duty under WISHA—no analysis of whether the general
contractor retained control is necessary.” Vargas, 194 Wn.2d at 736. SSHI’s arguments
to the contrary and its request that we look to federal OSHA case law 3 and determine
general contractors are subject to a lesser duty of care are unavailing. The law is well
Lab. & Indus., 119 Wn. App. 906, 914, 83 P.3d 1012 (2003); RCW 49.17.180(6). 3 Shimmick Constr. Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 12 Wn. App. 2d 770, 778, 460 P.3d 192 (2020) (“In interpreting WISHA, we may look to federal decisions that interpret WISHA’s federal analogue, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), but we will not resort to federal case law when Washington law provides controlling precedent.” (footnote omitted)).
8 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
settled; general contractors have a nondelegable duty to ensure compliance with all
WISHA regulations, and they have per se liability for WISHA violations.
SSHI contends the Board did not address “whether the supervision conducted by
[SSHI] superintendents met its non-delegable duty as the general contractor” or “the
differences between subcontractors and general contractors.” Opening Br. of Appellant
at 63. SSHI misunderstands the issues in this WISHA appeal. There is not a requisite
number of safety inspections that would satisfy SSHI’s nondelegable duty to ensure
compliance with WISHA regulations. Indeed, SSHI could conduct a multitude of safety
inspections per day, but the number of inspections is irrelevant if SSHI does not meet its
duty to ensure compliance with safety regulations. Moreover, “the differences between
subcontractors and general contractors” are immaterial to whether SSHI met its
nondelegable duty. Opening Br. of Appellant at 63.
SSHI also argues that the proposed decision and order “constitutes the application
of strict liability as no explanation is provided to support the conclusion that [SSHI’s]
safety plan failed.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 57-58. This argument fails because, as
the Department points out, it only needed to prove SSHI knew or should have known of
the violative conditions through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Potelco, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 191 Wn. App. 9, 34, 361 P.3d 767 (2015).
As the general contractor, SSHI is subject to the same test for constructive
knowledge as the subcontractor.
9 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
CR 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT
SSHI claims the IAJ erred in denying its motion to admit the CR 30(b)(6)
deposition transcript of Mr. Walley. We disagree with SSHI.
We review a presiding officer’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Univ.
of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health, 164 Wn.2d 95, 104, 187 P.3d 243 (2008).
Here, the IAJ did not consider Mr. Walley’s deposition testimony that SSHI
moved to admit. The IAJ did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Mr.
Walley’s deposition testimony. Under ER 401, the testimony regarding the history and
development of DOSH Directive 27.00 was not relevant because the directive is not a
legal statement or formal regulation regarding the requirements expected of general
contractors. See In re Exxel Pacific, No. 96 W182, 1998 WL 718040, at *6 (Wash. Bd.
Indus. Ins. Appeals July 6, 1998) (“[W]e cannot adopt [policy] as a definitive legal
statement of the requirements of general contractors.”); J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus., 139 Wn. App. 35, 52, 156 P.3d 250 (2007) (“Policy statements are
‘advisory only.’”). Indeed, why and how DOSH Directive 27.00 4 was developed has no
legal relevance as it is not a regulation having any force of law.
The IAJ did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to consider Mr. Walley’s
CR 30(b)(6) deposition testimony.
4 DOSH Directive 27.00 was admitted as exhibit 8.
10 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
KNOWLEDGE OF A VIOLATIVE CONDITION
Turning to the merits, SSHI argues it did not have actual or constructive notice of
the safety violation. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings
that SSHI had constructive knowledge of the violation which, in turn, supports its
conclusion that SSHI committed a serious safety violation.
SSHI was cited for violating WAC 296-155-477(1)(f)(i), which states, “You must
complete the stairway to a second or higher floor before studs are raised to support the
next higher floor.”
To prove SSHI committed a serious violation, the Department was required to
show: (1) “the cited standard applies;” (2) the employer failed to meet the standard;
(3) “employees were exposed to, or had access to, the violative condition;” (4) the
employer knew or should have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
the violative condition; and (5) there is a substantial probability that serious bodily injury
or death could result from the violative condition. Wash. Cedar & Supply Co. v. Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus., 119 Wn. App. 906, 914, 83 P.3d 1012 (2003); RCW 49.17.180(6).
“We construe WISHA statutes and regulations liberally to achieve their purpose of
providing safe working conditions for workers in Washington.” Frank Coluccio Constr.
Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 181 Wn. App. 25, 36, 329 P.3d 91 (2014); see also RCW
49.17.010. We give substantial weight to an agency’s interpretation of regulations within
its area of expertise. Wash. Cedar & Supply Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 137 Wn.
11 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
App. 592, 598, 154 P.3d 287 (2007). Thus, we will uphold the agency’s interpretation of
a regulation “if it reflects a plausible construction of the statutory language and is not
contrary to the legislature’s intent and purpose.” Id.
When analyzing a WISHA appeal, we review the Board’s decision based on the
record before it. Erection Co. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 160 Wn. App. 194, 201, 248
P.3d 1085 (2011). If the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are
conclusive. Id. at 202; RCW 49.17.150(1). “Evidence is substantial if it is enough to
convince a fair-minded person of the truth of the stated premise.” Shimmick Constr. Co.,
12 Wn. App. 2d at 778. We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Potelco, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 194 Wn. App. 428, 434, 377 P.3d 251 (2016). We construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed at the administrative
hearing, here, the Department. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 181 Wn. App. at 35.
The knowledge element may be proved by evidence of actual or constructive
knowledge. See RCW 49.17.180(7). An employer has constructive knowledge of a
violation if it is “readily observable or in a conspicuous location in the area of the
employer’s crews.” Pro-Active Home Builders, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 7 Wn.
App. 2d 10, 18, 465 P.3d 375 (2018). The Department may show constructive
knowledge “through evidence that a violation was in plain view.” Potelco, 194 Wn. App.
at 439.
12 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
SSHI argues substantial evidence does not support the Board’s findings that
(1) “SSHI had constructive knowledge of the lack of stairs,” (2) the “violation was visible
from the street and in plain view,” and (3) SSHI “could have known about the violations
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” AR at 47. The Board’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
The photographs of the violation admitted at the hearing show that an individual
was able to view that stairs were not installed from the street. Mr. Thoet testified that a
close examination of the photographs revealed the presence of an extension ladder and
that the ladder appeared to be the only means of accessing the second floor of the home.
Moreover, Mr. Potter testified that he saw “[t]he second floor walls were up” on
the day of the violation. AR at 792. When asked if he remembered what time employees
were done installing floors in the home at issue, Mr. Potter stated, “I don’t look that
close. It’s just the generic idea that people are on site and getting things done.” AR at
791. Mr. Potter further testified that he was aware that stairs needed to be installed
before the second floor walls could be erected. However, Mr. Potter claimed that “[i]t’s
not always obvious” if stairs have been installed or not, especially in certain floor plans
like this one. AR at 797. Finally, when asked if he was aware that stairs needed to be
installed before second floor walls could be erected, Mr. Cody responded, “[T]hat
morning they had started the subfloor and by the end of the day they had their walls up so
13 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
without actually walking into the house and checking on the stairs, we just assumed that
they had thrown in the stairs as they were going.” AR at 721.
Mr. Cody and Mr. Potter essentially testified that they did not look very closely to
determine whether stairs had been installed prior to the construction of walls on the
second floor. Further, the photographs demonstrated that the lack of stairs was readily
observable from the street. Based on the evidence before it, the IAJ and the Board could
find that SSHI had constructive knowledge of the violation. SSHI could have discovered
the violation had it exercised reasonable diligence.
In passing, SSHI also claims that findings of fact 8 and 9 are unsupported by the
evidence. 5 SSHI argues, “The Board further erred by concluding that the prior citations
that occurred at other projects with different subcontractors should have put [SSHI] on
notice that SVK [Builders] would not install the stairs.” SSHI claims, “This was the first
time that SVK [Builders] failed to put in the stairs at Windhaven, and the duration of
exposure was for a very limited period of time.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 64. The
Board found the base penalty was $6,600 and that it should be multiplied by two because
SSHI “had one prior final citation for fall protection violations dated within three years of
this violation.” AR at 48.
5 SSHI assigned error to findings of fact 8 and 9. This is the only argument that is arguably related to those findings.
14 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
WISHA authorizes the Department to assess civil penalties when an employer
repeatedly violates the WISHA. RCW 49.17.270, .180. RCW 49.17.180(1) states,
“[A]ny employer who willfully or repeatedly violates . . . any safety or health standard
adopted under the authority of this chapter, of any existing rule or regulation governing
the conditions of employment adopted by the department . . . may be assessed a civil
penalty not to exceed seventy thousand dollars for each violation.” WAC 296-900-14020
states one repeat violation multiplies the base penalty by two and that “[h]istory is based
on the prior three years.” Moreover, WAC 296-800-099 (“Repeat violation”) clarifies,
“A violation is a repeat violation if the employer has been cited one or more times
previously for a substantially similar hazard.”
SSHI does not argue that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s findings.
Instead, it argues the Board should not have concluded the prior citation put SSHI on
notice that SVK Builders would not install stairs in accordance with the WAC. The
Board did not, however, make a finding to this effect. The Board concluded that this was
a “repeat” violation based on the evidence before it. The Board’s finding is supported
and SSHI’s argument fails.
SSHI also points to the Board’s recent decision in In re Acropolis Construction in
support of its argument that it was “not reasonable, nor required, for upper tier general
contractors to constantly observe subcontractor employees.” Opening Br. of Appellant at
15 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
68; In re Acropolis Constr., No. 23 W1214, 2024 WL 5336676 (Wash. Bd. Indus. Ins.
Appeals Dec. 16, 2024). Acropolis is materially distinguishable.
In Acropolis, the Board vacated citations issued to Acropolis, a subcontractor,
because the safety violations occurred on a Saturday, which was not a scheduled
workday, by an employee who was suspended. 2024 WL 5336676, at *3-5. Thus, the
Board determined that Acropolis did not have knowledge of the violations because it
“had no reason to inspect the work area, to anticipate hazards” on a non-workday. Id. *2.
Though the violations were in plain view, “employers can’t be expected to exercise
reasonable diligence to make sure safety rules are being followed on non-work days.” Id.
In stark contrast to the facts in Acropolis, here, the safety violation occurred on a
scheduled workday during which SSHI was expected to exercise reasonable diligence to
ensure compliance with all WISHA regulations. The Board’s reasoning in Acropolis is
inapplicable to these facts.
SSHI next argues this court should not adopt the Board’s statement that “if the
absence of supervisory personnel on a job site was enough to avoid the consequences of a
safety violation, employers merely would begin to follow a practice of not having a
supervisor or other managerial representatives present at its worksite.” AR at 44-45.
SSHI argues that, because violations can be proved through constructive knowledge, “if
the employer had taken reasonable steps and exercised due diligence in supervising the
job such that the violations would have been discovered, the knowledge element is
16 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
established even if no supervisor was present at the time of the violation” so there is no
incentive for an employer not to supervise its employees. Opening Br. of Appellant at
62-63. Even if we disagree with the Board’s statement, the context of it is important.
The challenged statement was made in the context of summarizing a prior Board decision
and was a correct summary of the Board’s holding from a prior decision. In re America
1st Roofing & Builders Inc., No. 16 W0351, 2018 WL 3413602, at *2 (Wash. Bd. Indus.
Ins. Appeals April 9, 2018). 6
Additionally, SSHI alleges the Board needed to address “whether the frequency of
safety inspections required of SVK [Construction] is the same for [SSHI]” and “how
frequently [SSHI] superintendents were required to supervise its subcontractors.”
Opening Br. of Appellant at 63. As discussed above, SSHI had a nondelegable duty to
ensure compliance with all WISHA regulations. There is not a specific number of safety
checks that will satisfy this requirement. Instead, general contractors like SSHI need to
conduct as many safety checks as necessary to discover and correct safety violations
within their work sites.
6 “America 1st contended that standing alone, the fact that it did not have any manager, lead worker, or supervisor at the worksite sufficed to prove that it could not have been aware of the violation. That circumstance is not determinative of whether America 1st should have had knowledge of the fall protection violation. Were it so, employers would be free to avoid the consequences of a safety violation by merely following a practice of not having a supervisor or other managerial representative present at its worksite. Employers cannot evade responsibility for a safety violation by such a tactic.”
17 No. 41328-4-III SSHI v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
Finally, SSHI contends the Board incorrectly concluded the violation was in plain
view because the violation was not easily observable or obvious. The IAJ found SSHI’s
argument, that the violation was not in plain view, to be unpersuasive based on the
photographic evidence and because the lack of stairs would have been obviously
observable had an individual approached the “powder bathroom window or the garage
entrance.” AR at 45. The testimony and photographs admitted at the hearing support the
Board’s finding that the violation was in plain view.
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that SSHI had constructive
knowledge of the violations.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Cooney, A.C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Murphy, J.
Hill, J.