(SS)Davidson v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. California·Decided December 19, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-01288·Unknown

Opinion

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HEIDI LYNN DAVIDSON, Case No. 1:22-cv-01288-EPG 12 Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 13 v. SECURITY COMPLAINT

14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL (ECF Nos. 1, 12). 15 SECURITY, 16 Defendants. 17

18 19 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an 20 unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding her 21 application for social security benefits. The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by 22 the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with any appeal to 23 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 11). 24 Plaintiff presents the following issues: 1. The ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination is not supported by 25 substantial evidence. 26 2. The ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record regarding the Plaintiff’s functional limitations. 27 (ECF No. 18, p. 3). 28 1 Having reviewed the record, administrative transcript, parties’ briefs, and the applicable 2 law, the Court finds as follows. 3 I. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff challenges the following RFC formulated by the ALJ: After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 5 claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant can occasionally lift and/or 6 carry about 20 pounds, can frequently lift and/or carry about 10 pounds. She can 7 stand and/or walk for about 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday. She can sit for more than 6 hours out of an 8- hour workday. She can frequently climb stairs and ramps, 8 but should avoid work on ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, at unprotected heights, or work in close proximity to dangerous moving machinery. She is able to work in an 9 environment with loud noise. She is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple routine tasks requiring little to no judgment, that can be learned in a short 10 period, typically in about 30 days. She can sustain concentration, persistence, and 11 pace for these simple routine tasks over a typical workday and workweek. She is able to interact on an occasional basis with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. 12 She is able to make work decisions and can tolerate task changes. She is able to travel, plus can recognize and avoid work hazards. 13 (A.R. 23). 14 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial 15 evidence. (ECF No. 18, pp. 12-16). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ completely rejected the 16 opinions of two state agency medical consultants, Dr. Khong and Dr. Bugg, finding them to be 17 “not persuasive.” (Id., p. 14) (citing A.R. 27, 750, 777, 1375, 1377-78). As these medical 18 opinions were the only ones to provide a “function-by-function analysis of Plaintiff’s physical 19 capabilities,” Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly “interpreted the raw medical data and 20 improperly substituted her judgment for that of a medical expert.” (ECF No. 18, p. 14) (internal 21 citations omitted). Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ made the same error when formulating 22 Plaintiff’s mental RFC after the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Card, a state agency psychological 23 consultant, to be only “minimally persuasive because they only rated the level of the Plaintiff’s 24 limitations rather than providing a statement of the most the Plaintiff can do.” (Id., p. 15) (citing 25 A.R. 28). Plaintiff further challenges the ALJ’s decision on the ground that the ALJ failed to 26 develop the record. (Id., pp. 16-17). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record was 27 triggered once “the ALJ determined that the State Agency medical opinions concerning the 28 1 Plaintiff’s physical and mental capabilities were unpersuasive or less persuasive” because “[t]here 2 were no other medical opinions addressing the Plaintiff’s functional capabilities.” (Id., p. 17). 3 A. Legal Standards 4 A claimant’s RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 5 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the 6 capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). “In 7 determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 8 including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, 9 that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 10 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And 11 “because it is the ALJ’s responsibility to formulate an RFC that is based on the record as a whole, 12 . . . the RFC need not exactly match the opinion or findings of any particular medical source.” 13 Mills v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-CV-0899-KJN, 2014 WL 4195012, at *4 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 14 Aug. 22, 2014). 15 “An ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous 16 evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes 17 v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). However, because it is the claimant's 18 responsibility to prove that she is disabled, the claimant must offer some evidence to trigger the 19 duty. Id. (“Mayes did not provide the ALJ with any medical evidence indicating that she had 20 herniated discs until after the ALJ Hearing. The ALJ had no duty to develop the record by 21 diagnosing Mayes’ herniated discs.”). 22 In reviewing findings of fact with respect to RFC assessments, this Court determines 23 whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), 24 but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 25 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 26 conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal citation omitted). 27 // 28 1 B. Analysis 2 The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 3 Here, the ALJ, as required, considered the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical 4 impairments, including Plaintiff’s own reports and the findings of medical professionals who 5 examined Plaintiff: The record shows the claimant is obese with a Body Mass Index (“BMI”) of 46.9 6 (10F/2) recently down to 42.53 (12F/114). The undersigned has considered Social 7 Security Ruling 19- 2p, which discusses the effect of obesity on work activities. The undersigned finds that, in this instance, the claimant's obesity is severe in 8 combination with her other impairments, and likely exacerbates her symptoms.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Robbins v. Social Security Administration
466 F.3d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Stephens v. Weldon
25 A. 28 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1892)