(SS) Vang v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 LA VANG, Case No. 1:21-cv-01058-CDB (SS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON STIPULATION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO THE 13 v. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Doc. 23) 15 Defendant.

16 17 18 Pending before the Court is the stipulated request of Plaintiff La Vang (“Plaintiff”) for the 19 award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 20 2412(d), in the amount of $7,500.00 to counsel for Plaintiff, Jonathan O. Peña.1 (Doc. 23). 21 The parties agree that an award of attorney’s fees to counsel for Plaintiff should be made 22 payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe 23 a federal debt, then the Commissioner shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be 24 made directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Jonathan O. Peña. Id. at 2. 25 On August 30, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 26 remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner for 27

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all 1 further proceedings. (Doc. 21). Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 22). On November 2 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed the pending stipulation for attorney fees as a prevailing party. (Doc. 23). 3 See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (concluding that a party who wins a 4 sentence-four remand order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party). Plaintiff’s filing is 5 timely. Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner does not oppose 6 the requested relief. (Doc. 23). 7 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in 8 civil actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees. 28 9 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing 10 party unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special 11 circumstances make such an award unjust.” Id. Here, the government did not show its position 12 was substantially justified and the Court finds there are not special circumstances that would 13 make an award unjust. Moreover, the government does not oppose Plaintiff’s stipulated request. 14 See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-01081-SKO, 2018 WL 509817, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 15 2018) (finding position of the government was not substantially justified in view of the 16 Commissioner’s assent to remand); Knyazhina v. Colvin, No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD, 2014 WL 17 5324302, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) (same). 18 Plaintiff requests an award of $7,500.00 in EAJA fees. (Doc. 23). The Ninth Circuit 19 maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by the EAJA, adjusted for 20 increases in the cost of living, on its website. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876- 21 77 (9th Cir. 2005). Even assuming Plaintiff’s counsel seeks the median of the published 22 maximum rate associated with the years (2021, 2022) during which he engaged in services in this 23 case (which the Court computes as $226.25),2 the requested award would amount to 24 approximately 33 hours of attorney time (not accounting for any paralegal time expended). The 25 Court finds this reasonable and commensurate with the number of hours an attorney would need 26 to have spent reviewing the certified administrative record in this case (approximately 737 pages;

27 2 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited November 27, 1 | Doc. 8) and preparing a motion for summary judgment that includes eight pages of argument. 2 | (Doc. 16 at 8-17). With respect to the results obtained, Plaintiff's counsel obtained a favorable 3 | judgment remanding the case for further proceedings. (Docs. 21, 22). 4 EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset 5 | Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If the Commissioner 6 | determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff's EAJA fees are not subject to any offset 7 | allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise transmitted to Plaintiffs counsel. 8 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 9 1. Plaintiff's stipulated request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA (Doc. 23) is 10 GRANTED; and 11 2. The Commissioner is directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney’s fees in 12 the amount of $7,500.00, pursuant to the terms set forth in the parties’ stipulation. (Doc. 13 23). Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury 14 determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the 15 payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiff's counsel, as set forth 16 in the stipulation. 17 [T IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ November 27, 2024 | br Pr 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28