RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2146-24
S.S.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
V.S.,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Argued April 16, 2026 – Decided May 19, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FV-09-0610-25.
Stephanie Palo Solop argued the cause for appellant (Solop Bondarowicz & Gargulinski, LLC, attorneys; Stephanie Palo Solop, on the briefs).
Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for respondent (Einhorn Barbarito Frost Botwinick Nunn & Musmanno PC, attorneys; Ryan Magee and Scott Weingart, on the brief).
1 We use initials to protect the identities of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM
Defendant V.S. appeals from the Family Part's February 12, 2025 final
restraining order (FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff S.S. under
the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.
Following our review of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
The parties were married in 2023 and have one son, born in March 2024.
They resided together in Harrison, but defendant also maintained an apartment
in Texas due to his work. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)
in August 2024, alleging harassment. In February 2025, the court conducted a
two-day trial. We derive the following facts from the record.
Plaintiff testified regarding a history of domestic violence incidents that
occurred in December 2023 and March 2024. She recounted that on December
23, 2023, when she was six months pregnant, after an argument over defendant's
text messages with his mother, defendant became "aggressive," grabbing her by
the neck and pushing her from the living room into the bedroom, where he struck
her multiple times in the chest, arm, and "upper part of [her] body." Defendant
left the bedroom only to return shortly thereafter and struck plaintiff again.
Plaintiff stated defendant "just kept standing in front of [her] . . . asserting
A-2146-24 2 himself and threatening" her. Defendant conceded he put his hand around her
neck and struck her but claimed he had acted in self-defense after plaintiff
pushed him. Video footage of the incident was offered and admitted into
evidence without objection.
On March 4, 2024—the day before plaintiff's scheduled induced labor—
the parties got into another argument in their apartment. Plaintiff testified
defendant kicked a ceramic mug toward her, pushed her onto a couch, and struck
her several times. Video footage of the incident corroborated plaintiff's
testimony defendant hit her numerous times. Moreover, defendant admitted to
striking plaintiff "multiple times," but he contended his actions were in response
to plaintiff's provocations and threats of self-harm.
The parties' son was born a few days later. On March 17, three days after
plaintiff returned home from the hospital, the parties had an argument
concerning the child's middle name. According to plaintiff, while she was
holding her son, defendant twisted her arm behind her back and threatened to
kill her. During the altercation, plaintiff's father intervened to prevent the child
from being dropped. Defendant denied twisting plaintiff's arm, claiming he only
held plaintiff's hand after she approached him in a threatening manner.
A-2146-24 3 Defendant returned to Texas for work on April 9, 2024, and did not see
plaintiff or his son again until his return to New Jersey in July. On July 12, the
parties and their parents met in the lounge of a hotel near plaintiff's apartment
so defendant and his family could see the baby. Plaintiff wanted the meeting in
a public place because it felt safer. She testified defendant's mother "rushed"
toward her during the gathering, while she was holding her baby. Defendant
then followed her around while she was holding the baby, who had started to
cry, causing plaintiff to fear for her safety. Plaintiff asserted defendant became
"aggressive" and "intimidating," walking toward her, pushing her, and
"asserting" himself. She stated he tried to snatch the infant from her. Defendant
denied he was aggressive or tried to seize the child, testifying he simply wanted
to hold his son.
Defendant filed for divorce on July 9, 2024, and served plaintiff with the
complaint and summons on July 18, 2024. He testified he decided to file for
divorce after the contentious family meeting with plaintiff on July 12, 2024. On
cross-examination, defendant maintained although the divorce was filed before
the July 12 event, he believed the process was not initiated until after the
meeting.
A-2146-24 4 On August 19, 2024, plaintiff received a text message from defendant
regarding gifts from defendant's family for their son. Plaintiff testified the
message made her feel threatened and fearful because of the parties' history and
defendant's lack of prior contact. She was "scared that [defendant] would just
randomly show up at [her] door, out of nowhere." She stated that she did not
view the message as a good faith communication, but rather, as "scary," and that
fear caused her to seek a restraining order. Defendant testified his contact with
plaintiff was not intended to harass her but was motivated by his desire to see
his child and to extend well wishes related to an Indian holiday.
Following the trial, the court rendered an oral opinion. It found plaintiff
credible, explaining her "recitation and testimony . . . fulfill[ed] the
preponderance of the evidence" and emphasizing the "two very . . . strong, . . .
very emotional videos that were shown several times in th[e] [c]ourtroom."
Conversely, the court determined defendant's testimony was not credible. It
found he displayed a "pattern of behavior on the stand . . . of aggression," and
"it didn't seem as if . . . [he] could remain under control." The court further
found defendant gave "very little testimony related to any acknowledgment of
. . . striking . . . plaintiff," gave "hesitant admission that there was any striking,"
A-2146-24 5 and made statements that were inconsistent with both the testimony and the
objective evidence.
Applying the two-prong standard outlined in Silver v. Silver,2 the court
emphasized the alleged predicate acts "must be evaluated in light of the previous
history of violence between the parties." It found plaintiff established defendant
committed predicate acts of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (b), and (c)
on July 12, 2024, and August 19, 2024. The court specified, "[a]lthough [the
August 19, 2024 act] was just . . . a text, it d[id] satisfy [the preponderance
standard] because it's . . . construed in conjunction with [the July 12, 2024 act],
and in light of the prior alleged history of domestic violence." It determined
defendant's "purpose [was] to harass," specifically finding his "purpose was not
self-defense," and an FRO was necessary, citing plaintiff's "very credible"
testimony, her "genuine[] fear[] for her safety," the "immediate danger to . . .
plaintiff," and the seriousness and pattern of defendant's conduct, including his
prior acts of aggression and use of physical force. Accordingly, the court
entered an FRO against defendant on February 12, 2025.
2 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). A-2146-24 6 II.
Before us, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding he committed
an act of domestic violence, specifically harassment. He maintains the court
abused its discretion in determining plaintiff needed an FRO. He also contends
it erred in concluding plaintiff's testimony was credible, considering her
repeated refusal to directly answer questions and the contradictions in her
testimony. Defendant further asserts the court did not adequately maintain the
record, inhibiting a fair and complete review and warranting reversal.
Our scope of review is limited when considering an FRO issued by the
Family Part. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). That
is because "we grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and
the legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super.
592, 596 (App. Div. 2013). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court
are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible
evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Deference is
particularly appropriate where the evidence is largely testimonial and hinges on
a court's ability to make credibility assessments. Id. at 412. We review de novo
the court's conclusions of law. S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 430 (App.
Div. 2010).
A-2146-24 7 The entry of an FRO requires the trial court to make certain findings
pursuant to a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. Initially,
the court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance
of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125 (citation reformatted). The trial
court should make this determination "in light of the previous history of violence
between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Secondly, the court must determine "whether a restraining
order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 -
29(a)(1) to -29(a)([7]),[3] to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to
3 The seven factors are:
(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment[,] and physical abuse;
(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property;
(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant;
(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;
(5) In determining custody and parenting time[,] the protection of the victim's safety;
A-2146-24 8 prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citations reformatted); see also N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29(b) ("In proceedings in which complaints for restraining orders have
been filed, the court shall grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse.");
J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011).
When harassment is the alleged predicate act, the court must find not only
that the underlying conduct occurred but also that the defendant acted with the
"purpose to harass." See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478; State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564,
576-77 (1997). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, harassment occurs when a person, with
purpose to harass another:
(a) Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
(b) Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or
(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and
(7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(7).]
A-2146-24 9 (c) Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.
Mere awareness or knowledge that one's conduct might annoy is not sufficient.
See Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 580-81 (explaining "annoyance" under subsection (a)
"means to disturb, irritate, or bother," and "serious annoyance [or alarm] under
subsection (c) means to weary, worry, trouble, or offend"); J.D., 207 N.J. at 477-
78. This "purpose" may be inferred from the defendant's actions and the context
of the parties' relationship, including prior abuse. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 405; State
v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App. Div. 2006).
Here, the court found defendant committed predicate acts of harassment
under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), (b), and (c) based on his aggressive behavior, his
attempt to seize the child at the July 12, 2024 family meeting, and his August
19, 2024 text message in the context of his prior abuse.
A.
Defendant argues the trial court gave undue weight to his prior conduct
depicted in plaintiff's video evidence, rather than analyzing the actual facts of
the alleged predicate acts. He asserts, when viewed in isolation, neither the July
12 nor August 19, 2024 acts amount to harassment because his intent to harass
plaintiff was not established. Defendant contends the law requires proof of both
A-2146-24 10 harassing conduct and an actual "conscious objective" to harass, not merely prior
abuse or subjective annoyance. Defendant maintains the August 19 text was
benign and sent with well wishes, emphasizing plaintiff had contacted him over
twenty times in an attempt to salvage their relationship after she was served with
the divorce complaint on July 18. Regarding the July 12 incident, defendant
asserts neither plaintiff nor the child were harmed and the court misapplied
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b).
We confine our discussion to the July 12, 2024 incident because we
conclude the court did not err in finding plaintiff proved defendant committed
the predicate act of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b).4 Although defendant
is correct in asserting a purpose to harass—not mere knowledge of annoyance—
is essential to finding a defendant liable for harassment, the trial court
appropriately determined he acted with a purpose to harass.
The court found an actual predicate act and not just subjective fear or past
abuse. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 487; State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App.
Div. 1989). It expressly credited plaintiff's testimony and supporting video
evidence as establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant's
4 Because we determine the court did not err in finding defendant harassed plaintiff during the July 12, 2024 incident, we need not address whether the August 19, 2024 text message from defendant constituted harassment. A-2146-24 11 conduct constituted either an actual or threatened offensive touching under
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b) and was intended to alarm or seriously annoy plaintiff
under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c). Purpose to harass may be inferred from
context and prior acts even when the predicate incident appears minor in
isolation. See Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577. Consistent with Cesare and Hoffman,
the court properly drew on the parties' history and inferred defendant's harassing
intent, finding no legitimate justification for his behavior. See 154 N.J. at 405;
149 N.J. at 576-77.
The court considered defendant's July 12, 2024 actions in the hotel
lobby—which it found included being aggressive, following plaintiff, pushing
her, and trying to "snatch" the infant from plaintiff's hands—in the context of
the recent "compelling" video evidence showing defendant repeatedly striking a
pregnant plaintiff on two separate occasions, which it characterized as "very
violent." The court, as permitted, did not view the evidence of harassment in a
vacuum. So too, it did not base its findings solely on the prior acts of domestic
violence. As our Supreme Court noted, "[a] history of domestic violence may
serve to give content to otherwise ambiguous behavior and support entry of a
restraining order." J.D., 207 N.J. at 483. We conclude there was ample evidence
A-2146-24 12 in the record to support the court's conclusion defendant acted with the requisite
purpose to harass plaintiff.
B.
Defendant argues there was no basis for the court's entry of an FRO
against him. He contends the video evidence "show[ed] only a portion of the
disputes" between the parties, plaintiff did not require medical attention, and her
delay in seeking a TRO demonstrated she did not fear him. He claims there was
no credible evidence showing an ongoing or immediate danger to plaintiff,
emphasizing the parties were physically separated as he had moved to another
state and filed for divorce. He also challenges the court's credibility findings,
citing plaintiff's contradictory explanations for why she did not contact the
police about his alleged threats and noting the court had to admonish her for
evading questions. Defendant further asserts the court failed to find an FRO
was necessary because of an immediate danger to plaintiff under N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29(a)(2) and did not address the financial circumstances of the parties,
the best interests of the child, or the existence of any out-of-state orders of
protection.
We affirm the trial court's decision under prong two of Silver substantially
for the reasons set forth in its comprehensive oral opinion and add the following.
A-2146-24 13 Contrary to defendant's argument the court did not address the immediate danger
to plaintiff, we note the trial court stated: "[The court] do[es] find . . . plaintiff's
testimony [was] very credible, that she genuinely fears for her safety. I[t] find[s]
. . . under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) there is an immediate danger to . . . plaintiff."
In finding plaintiff's need for an FRO, it emphasized: (1) defendant's repeated
and severe physical abuse, including grabbing plaintiff's neck and making
threats, which the video evidence corroborated; (2) defendant's ongoing pattern
of coercive control and alarming behavior; (3) plaintiff's credible, genuine fear
for her safety; and (4) any delay in seeking relief or distance between the parties
did not undermine plaintiff's need for protection. The court did not rely on
plaintiff's subjective fear alone. Rather, after evaluating the evidence—
including objective corroboration and a pattern of escalating behavior—it found
the risk to plaintiff to be objectively real and ongoing. 5 See Cesare, 154 N.J. at
411-12.
Thus, there was substantial credible evidence in the record establishing
the issuance of an FRO was necessary "to protect . . . [plaintiff] from an
5 We also observe the court did address parenting time with the parties' son. The financial circumstances of the parties would have no bearing on the entry of the FRO, and there was no evidence for the court to consider regarding any out-of-state orders of protection. A-2146-24 14 immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at
127. We discern no basis to disturb the court's conclusion regarding the second
prong of Silver. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12.
We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant's arguments we should reject
the trial court's credibility findings. The court acknowledged "there w[ere] some
rough edge[s]" to plaintiff's testimony and she required some "guidance" to
respond to questions. However, it found those issues "d[id] not take away from
her credibility and her recitation of the facts, especially in light of the two
videos" depicting defendant striking plaintiff. In short, the court concluded
plaintiff's testimony was, nonetheless, "very credible." Therefore, any minor
contradictions or moments of non-responsiveness during her testimony did not
undermine the court's credibility findings.
C.
Finally, defendant asserts the appellate record is incomplete, citing the
omission of the divorce complaint despite its admission into evidence and the
presence of page annotations on certain admitted exhibits, suggesting these
irregularities interfere with our review of the record.
Generally, appellate review is confined to the trial court record, which
includes admitted pleadings, orders, transcripts, and evidence. R. 2:5-4(a);
A-2146-24 15 Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 475 (2020). A record is deemed deficient
only when missing or inadequate material so impairs meaningful review that this
court cannot perform its function, and reconstruction or supplementation cannot
cure the defect. Kent v. Cnty. of Hudson, 97 N.J. Super. 90, 98 (App. Div.
1967); see also In re State & Sch. Emps. Health Benefits Cmm'ns'
Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).
To warrant reversal or remand, a party must demonstrate: (1) an exercise
of due diligence in attempting to cure the omission or supplement the record ;
and (2) actual, articulable prejudice from the incompleteness or defect. State v.
Bishop, 350 N.J. Super. 335, 347 (App. Div. 2002); Kent, 97 N.J. Super. at 98.
Generalized complaints or speculative assertions of deficiency or prejudice do
not meet this standard. See In re Yucht, 233 N.J. at 280; Bishop, 350 N.J. Super.
at 347.
Here, defendant did not raise any objection regarding the completeness of
the record before the trial court, and he did not seek to supplement, reconstruct,
or correct the record as required by Rule 2:5-5(a). Further, defendant fails to
identify any specific, material prejudice to him based on the record before us.
Because the record is sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, there is
no basis for reversal or remand. See Kent, 97 N.J. Super. at 98; Scullion v. State
A-2146-24 16 Farm Ins. Co., 345 N.J. Super. 431, 439 (App. Div. 2001) (noting only where a
critical omission precludes meaningful review does remand become necessary).
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's other arguments,
we are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2146-24 17