1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JENNIE R. SUSKE, No. 2:19-CV-0959-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brought this action for judicial 19 review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 Final judgement has been entered. See ECF No. 24. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s 21 counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $12,784.48 under the 22 Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), representing fees of $12,267.56 plus costs of $516.92. See 23 ECF No. 26. Counsel has filed a supporting declaration. See ECF No. 27. Defendant has filed 24 an opposition. See ECF No. 28. Plaintiff’s counsel has filed a reply. See ECF No. 29. In 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff’s counsel’s reply, counsel seeks an additional award of $2,181.13.1 The total award 2 sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is $14,448.69 in fees plus costs of $516.92. 3 4 I. STANDARDS FOR EAJA MOTION 5 Because this Court issued a remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 6 § 405(g), plaintiff is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Flores v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 562 7 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the EAJA, an award of reasonable attorney’s fees is appropriate unless the 8 Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified” on law and fact with respect to the issue(s) 9 on which the court based its remand. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Flores, 42 F.3d at 10 569. No presumption arises that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified 11 simply because the Commissioner did not prevail. See Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 12 1988). The Commissioner’s position is substantially justified if there is a genuine dispute. See 13 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). The burden of establishing substantial justification is 14 on the government. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 In determining substantial justification, the Court reviews both the underlying 16 governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government 17 in the litigation itself. See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on 18 other grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). For the government’s position to be 19 considered substantially justified, however, it must establish substantial justification for both the 20 position it took at the agency level as well as the position it took in the district court. See Kali v. 21 Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1998). Where, however, the underlying government action 22 was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s litigation 23 position was substantially justified. See Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1988). 24 “The nature and scope of the ALJ’s legal errors are material in determining whether the
25 1 Plaintiff’s counsel does not set forth in his declaration the claimed amounts. Based on the timesheets provided, it appears this amount represents 10.3 hours of attorney time at 26 varying rates which are not challenged by the Commissioner. Of the total hours claimed in 27 association with the EAJA fees motion, 6.3 were billed at a rate of $207.78 per hour, for a total of $1,309.01. The remaining 4 hours were billed at a rate of $217.54 per hour, for a total of 28 $871.12. 1 Commissioner’s decision to defend them was substantially justified.” Sampson v. Chater, 103 2 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Flores, 49 F.3d at 570). If there is no reasonable basis in law 3 and fact for the government’s position with respect to the issues on which the court based its 4 determination, the government’s position is not “substantially justified” and an award of EAJA 5 fees is warranted. See Flores, 42 F.3d at 569-71. A strong indication the government’s position 6 was not substantially justified is a court’s “holding that the agency’s decision . . . was 7 unsupported by substantial evidence. . . .” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 8 Under the EAJA, the Court may award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” which are set 9 at the market rate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The party seeking an award under the EAJA 10 bears the burden of establishing the fees requested are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 11 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 12 2412(d)(1)(B) (“A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall . . . submit to the court 13 an application for fees and other expenses which shows . . . the amount sought, including an 14 itemized statement from any attorney . . . stating the actual time expended”). The Court has an 15 independent duty to review the evidence and determine the reasonableness of the fees requested. 16 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 436-47. The “court can impose a reduction of up to 10 percent – a 17 ‘haircut’ – based purely on the exercise of its discretion and without more specific explanation.” 18 Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting 19 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008)). A reduction of more than 20 10% requires specific findings regarding the unreasonableness of the amount reduced. See id. 21 Finally, in most cases fees awarded under the EAJA are payable directly to the 22 client, not counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Commissioner has filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for fees and 3 expenses under the EAJA. See ECF No. 28. 4 The Commissioner raises five specific arguments related to fees. First, the 5 Commissioner contends the hours spent for Plaintiff’s opening brief are duplicative. See id. at 4- 6 5. Second, the Commissioner argues 0.8 paralegal hours and 1.1 attorney hours are not 7 compensable because they represent clerical work. See id. at 5-6. Third, the Commissioner 8 asserts the Court should disallow 0.9 attorney hours incurred as a result of counsel’s own delay. 9 See id. at 7. Fourth, the Court should not allow any time associated with a reply to the 10 Commissioner’s opposition to the instant fee motion. Fifth, paralegal work may not be 11 compensated at the requested rate of $130.00 per hour. Id. 12 The Commissioner does not argue that the government’s position was substantially 13 justified.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JENNIE R. SUSKE, No. 2:19-CV-0959-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brought this action for judicial 19 review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 Final judgement has been entered. See ECF No. 24. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s 21 counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $12,784.48 under the 22 Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), representing fees of $12,267.56 plus costs of $516.92. See 23 ECF No. 26. Counsel has filed a supporting declaration. See ECF No. 27. Defendant has filed 24 an opposition. See ECF No. 28. Plaintiff’s counsel has filed a reply. See ECF No. 29. In 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff’s counsel’s reply, counsel seeks an additional award of $2,181.13.1 The total award 2 sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is $14,448.69 in fees plus costs of $516.92. 3 4 I. STANDARDS FOR EAJA MOTION 5 Because this Court issued a remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 6 § 405(g), plaintiff is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Flores v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 562 7 (9th Cir. 1995). Under the EAJA, an award of reasonable attorney’s fees is appropriate unless the 8 Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified” on law and fact with respect to the issue(s) 9 on which the court based its remand. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Flores, 42 F.3d at 10 569. No presumption arises that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified 11 simply because the Commissioner did not prevail. See Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 12 1988). The Commissioner’s position is substantially justified if there is a genuine dispute. See 13 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). The burden of establishing substantial justification is 14 on the government. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 In determining substantial justification, the Court reviews both the underlying 16 governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government 17 in the litigation itself. See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on 18 other grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). For the government’s position to be 19 considered substantially justified, however, it must establish substantial justification for both the 20 position it took at the agency level as well as the position it took in the district court. See Kali v. 21 Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1998). Where, however, the underlying government action 22 was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s litigation 23 position was substantially justified. See Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1988). 24 “The nature and scope of the ALJ’s legal errors are material in determining whether the
25 1 Plaintiff’s counsel does not set forth in his declaration the claimed amounts. Based on the timesheets provided, it appears this amount represents 10.3 hours of attorney time at 26 varying rates which are not challenged by the Commissioner. Of the total hours claimed in 27 association with the EAJA fees motion, 6.3 were billed at a rate of $207.78 per hour, for a total of $1,309.01. The remaining 4 hours were billed at a rate of $217.54 per hour, for a total of 28 $871.12. 1 Commissioner’s decision to defend them was substantially justified.” Sampson v. Chater, 103 2 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Flores, 49 F.3d at 570). If there is no reasonable basis in law 3 and fact for the government’s position with respect to the issues on which the court based its 4 determination, the government’s position is not “substantially justified” and an award of EAJA 5 fees is warranted. See Flores, 42 F.3d at 569-71. A strong indication the government’s position 6 was not substantially justified is a court’s “holding that the agency’s decision . . . was 7 unsupported by substantial evidence. . . .” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 8 Under the EAJA, the Court may award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” which are set 9 at the market rate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The party seeking an award under the EAJA 10 bears the burden of establishing the fees requested are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 11 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 12 2412(d)(1)(B) (“A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall . . . submit to the court 13 an application for fees and other expenses which shows . . . the amount sought, including an 14 itemized statement from any attorney . . . stating the actual time expended”). The Court has an 15 independent duty to review the evidence and determine the reasonableness of the fees requested. 16 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 436-47. The “court can impose a reduction of up to 10 percent – a 17 ‘haircut’ – based purely on the exercise of its discretion and without more specific explanation.” 18 Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting 19 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008)). A reduction of more than 20 10% requires specific findings regarding the unreasonableness of the amount reduced. See id. 21 Finally, in most cases fees awarded under the EAJA are payable directly to the 22 client, not counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Commissioner has filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for fees and 3 expenses under the EAJA. See ECF No. 28. 4 The Commissioner raises five specific arguments related to fees. First, the 5 Commissioner contends the hours spent for Plaintiff’s opening brief are duplicative. See id. at 4- 6 5. Second, the Commissioner argues 0.8 paralegal hours and 1.1 attorney hours are not 7 compensable because they represent clerical work. See id. at 5-6. Third, the Commissioner 8 asserts the Court should disallow 0.9 attorney hours incurred as a result of counsel’s own delay. 9 See id. at 7. Fourth, the Court should not allow any time associated with a reply to the 10 Commissioner’s opposition to the instant fee motion. Fifth, paralegal work may not be 11 compensated at the requested rate of $130.00 per hour. Id. 12 The Commissioner does not argue that the government’s position was substantially 13 justified. Nor does the Commissioner challenge the amount sought for costs. 14 A. Paralegal Rate 15 The Commissioner argues:
16 Plaintiff requests that Mr. Ragnes’s time be compensated at the rate of $130 per hour. This Court has repeatedly held that “that the 17 prevailing market rate for work performed by paralegals in this district is $100 per hour.” Lara v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-cv-0034 DB, 2017 WL 18 4679989, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2017); see also Hay, 2018 WL 6700969, at *4; Dittmar v. Berryhill, No. 2:15-cv-1630 DB, 2017 WL 19 4277590, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017) (same).
20 ECF No. 28, pg. 7. 21 As Plaintiff acknowledges, the presumptive rate in this district for paralegals is 22 $100.00 per hour. See ECF No. 26, pg. 17, n.8. As Plaintiff also acknowledges, Plaintiff’s 23 counsel’s paralegal, Mr. Ragnes, has been approved at this rate in social security cases in this 24 district as recently as 2020. See Viera v. Saul, No. 2:18-CV-0955-DB (E. D. Cal. 2020); see also 25 Lara v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-CV-0034-DB (E.D. Cal. 2017)). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that 26 a case-by-case approach is appropriate to consider Mr. Ragnes’s education and experience and 27 finds that such an approach warrants a rate of $130.00 per hour. The Court has also considered 28 that Mr. Ragnes earned a law degree in 2003, is a registered Social Security non-attorney 1 representative, and has over 17 years of experience in Social Security matters. See ECF No. 26, 2 pg. 18, n.8. 3 According to counsel’s billing statement, Mr. Ragnes expended a total of 19.3 4 hours on the case at a rate of $130.00/hour. See ECF No. 26-2. Of these hours, 1.9 hours were 5 not charged. See id. The total billed for Mr. Ragnes was $2,262.00. See id. The Court finds this 6 reasonable. 7 B. Counsel’s Delay 8 The Commissioner challenges three time entries, totaling 0.9 hours, arguing that 9 the Court should not compensate Plaintiff’s counsel for counsel’s own delay. See ECF No. 28, 10 pg. 7. 11 The Commissioner references the following entries:
12 Time Date Description
13 0.1 7-18-2019 Review court notice re filing order to show cause within 30 days re: failure to deliver summons and 14 complaint on Marshall; follow-up with Mr. Ragnes concerning same. 15 0.7 2-3-2020 Review case status and Lucia violation issue 16 memorandum from Mr. Ragnes; follow-up with Mr. Ragnes concerning same and [redacted] instruction 17 to seek further extension of time in light of case status. Monitor communications opposing counsel extension 18 request.
19 ECF No. 26-2, pgs. 2-3. 20 The Commissioner does not explain how the February 3, 2020, entry, which 21 mainly relates to Plaintiff’s counsel’s time on a substantive legal issue, is the result of counsel’s 22 own delay or is otherwise unreasonable. The time will be allowed. 23 The Commissioner’s argument concerning the July 18, 2019, entry is not well- 24 taken. Plaintiff’s counsel billed 0.1 hours of time (or 6 minutes) to review the Court’s order to 25 show cause why the matter should not be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to submit service 26 documents to the United States Marshal is neither unduly lengthy or unnecessary . This time was 27 the result of counsel’s own delay and will not be disallowed. 28 1 Counsel’s time entries reflect additional time billed related to the Court’s order to 2 show cause:
3 Time Date Description
4 0.1 8-14-2019 Review court notice re filing of discharge of order to show cause. 5 ECF No. 26-2, pg. 2. 6 7 This time reflects activity that any responsible counsel would have dedicated to keeping apprised 8 of notices from the Court. No deduction of fees is appropriate here. . 9 10 C. Clerical Work 11 The Commissioner argues that, regardless of who performed the task, Plaintiff 12 cannot be compensated under the EAJA for clerical work. See ECF No. 28, pgs. 5-6. 13 Specifically, the Commissioner challenges entries from May 27, 2019, May 29, 2019, November 14 20, 2019, March 30, 2020, and April 19, 2020. See ECF No. 28, pg. 6. The specific entries at 15 issue are as follows:
16 Time Date Description
17 0.5 5-27-2019 Receive and review Ms. Suske’s signed papers, including in forma pauperis application. Prepare 18 complaint, civil cover sheet; forward complaint and supporting papers to Mr. Weems for approval; 19 receive approval to file. (Ragnes).
20 0.1 5-29-2019 Review scheduling order for material changes from prior district standing order in Social Security 21 appeals. (Weems).
22 / / / 0.3 11-20-2019 Conference with Mr. Weems re magistrate judge 23 accept/decline, draft consent to Magistrate. (Ragnes).
24 0.5 3-30-2020 Review court notice re filing of cross motion; retrieve and skim argument. (Weems). 25 0.5 4-19-2020 Prepare reply memorandum for filing, efiling 26 activities, upload and receipt of confirmation. (Weems).
27 ECF No. 26-2, pgs. 1-2, 5.
28 1 Filing and document organization time is generally considered clerical. See 2 Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the time described is not properly 3 characterized as clerical activities, and is not subject to deduction here 4 D. Opening Brief 5 The Commissioner argues that the time billed by Plaintiff’s counsel for preparation 6 of the opening brief in this case was unreasonable. See ECF No. 28, pgs. 4-5. According to the 7 Commissioner:
8 . . . Here, Mr. Ragnes spent 15 hours reviewing the record, performing legal research, and writing a memorandum. ECF No. 26-2, 9 Ragnes entries for 1/15/2020 (1.5 hours); 2/1/2020 (5 hours); 2/2/2020 (1.5 hours); 2/4/2020 (2 hours); 2/16/2020 (4 hours); and 2/18/2020 (1 10 hour). Mr. Weems then spent 19.8 hours reviewing Mr. Ragnes’s memorandum, reviewing the record, and drafting the opening brief. ECF 11 No. 26-2, Weems entries for 2/19/2020 (4 hours); 2/20/2020 (4.1 hours); 2/21/20 (1.1 hours); 2/22/20 (2 hours); 2/25/2020 (4.6 hours); 2/26/2020 12 (4 hours). Mr. Weems then spent 14.3 hours revising his opening brief. ECF No. 26-2, Weems entries for 2/27/2020 (3 hours); 2/28/2020 (2.3 13 hours); 2/29/20 (4 hours); 3/1/2020 (5 hours). Mr. Weem’s business practice creates inefficiencies that should not 14 be passed on to the Government. . . . Based on the duplication of work, the 19.8 hours spent by Mr. 15 Weems drafting should be reduced by the 15 hours sought for Mr. Ranges’s time. In addition, the 14.3 hours spent revising should be 16 reduced to 5 hours. Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request should be reduced by 24.3 attorney hours. . . . 17 ECF No. 28, pgs. 4-5. 18 The Commissioner challenges a total of 49.1 attorney hours in three groups: (1) 15 19 hours for record review, research, and preparation of the opening brief; (2) 19.8 hours record 20 review, review of a memorandum prepared by counsel’s paralegal, and further preparation of the 21 opening brief; and (3) 14.3 hours to revise the opening brief. The Commissioner does not raise 22 any argument concerning the 15 hours in group 1. The Commissioner contends that some of the 23 19.8 hours in group 2 are duplicative of 15 hours claimed for counsel’s paralegal to conduct legal 24 research and prepare a memorandum and should be reduced by all the time spent by the paralegal 25 – 15 hours. The Commissioner also contends the 14.3 hours billed in group 3 for final revisions 26 to the opening brief should be reduced to 5 hours. Overall, the Commissioner seeks a reduction in 27 time spent by counsel on record review and preparation of the opening brief by almost 50%. 28 1 The Court agrees that a reduction is warranted with respect to preparation of the 2 opening brief. The inefficiency created by two professionals performing the same work over 3 substantial periods of time supports the Commissioner’s argument. Here, Mr. Ragnes started by 4 conducting legal research and drafting a brief over 15 hours. Mr. Weems then spent 19.8 hours 5 performing the same tasks. Finally, Mr. Weems spent an additional 14.3 hours with revisions the 6 brief. Presumably, the draft prepared by Mr. Ragnes would be the basis of the brief prepared and 7 then revised by Mr. Weems. It is not reasonable that Mr. Weems expended just over 34 hours 8 completing a brief based on 15 hours of preparation by an experienced and skilled paralegal. 9 The invoice strongly indicates duplication of effort, at least as to the 14.3 hours 10 Mr. Weems spent in revision of the opening brief over the 19.8 hours he spent reviewing Mr. 11 Ragnes’s extensive efforts over 15 hours. Given this apparent duplication, the Court will reduce 12 Mr. Weems’ time for preparation of the opening brief by the amount of time spent by Mr. Ragnes 13 This will result in a reduction of the total EAJA fees award in the amount of $3,078.75 (15 hours 14 attorney time at a rate of $205.25 per hour). 15 E. Reply Brief 16 According to the Commissioner:
17 The Commissioner anticipates that counsel will submit an EAJA reply brief. If and when she files such a brief, she must demonstrate that 18 the time spent preparing that brief was reasonable. If this Court agrees with the Commissioner’s arguments in this Opposition, the Court should 19 disallow fees for time spent on any reply brief. See INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 160, 163 n.10 (1990) (“fees for fee litigation should be excluded to the 20 extent that the applicant ultimately fails to prevail in such litigation”). Indeed, billing for a potentially lengthy and unreasonable EAJA reply 21 would simply afford Plaintiff’s counsel the chance to increase the total hours and fees in this case, when an increase is unwarranted. In addition, 22 Plaintiff has not justified the rate of 266.77 per hour she seeks for any reply time. 23 ECF No. 28, pg. 7. 24 25 The Commissioner’s argument that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees associated with 26 the pending EAJA motion is unpersuasive. The Commissioner contends fees associated with 27 litigation over fees should not be allowed if a claimant is ultimately unsuccessful in such 28 litigation. As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to most of the 1 fees requested. The Commissioner concedes as much by acknowledging in opposition to 2 Plaintiff’s fee motion that Plaintiff should prevail, at least in part, on the request for EAJA fees. 3 See ECF No. 28, pgs. 7-8 (arguing that a reasonable fee for this case would be $6,627.05). While 4 the Court has not accepted such a radical reduction, in light of the findings above, Plaintiff’s 5 counsel is not ultimately unsuccessful on the pending motion. The Court will allow the requested 6 fees of $2,181.13 associated with the pending EAJA fees motion. 7 III. CONCLUSION 8 As discussed above, the Court finds that an award of EAJA fees is warranted. 9 Plaintiff’s counsel requests that payment be made directly to him. Counsel is not normally 10 entitled to direct receipt of fees under the EAJA, so that the government may offset the payment 11 with the plaintiff’s debt. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 598 (2010). Since the decision in 12 Ratliff, many courts in this district have authorized payment of fees under the EAJA directly to 13 Plaintiff’s counsel. See e.g., Nobles v. Berryhill, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172075 (E.D. Cal. 14 2017), Alvarado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118354 (E.D. Cal. 2018), 15 Blackwell v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. 35744 (E.D. Cal 2011). These payments directly to counsel are 16 based upon the government’s discretionary ability to reject assignment of any claims against it to 17 third parties under the Anti-Assignment Act. See United States v. Kim, 806 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 18 (9th Cir. 2015). This discretionary ability to reject assignment of claims “applies to an 19 assignment of EAJA fees in a social security appeal.” Yesipovich v. Colvin, 166 F.Supp.3d 1000, 20 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Mr. Weems has furnished his agreement with Plaintiff providing that he 21 be paid any EAJA fees directly, minus any offset due to any potential outstanding debt by 22 Plaintiff. Because the government has not challenged this assignment, may still offset any of 23 Plaintiff’s debt, and may discretionarily reject the assignment, EAJA fees will be made payable to 24 counsel. 25 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of $14,448.69 in fees plus costs of $516.92. 26 The Commissioner does not challenge the amount sought for costs, and this amount will be 27 allowed. As discussed above, the total award will be reduced by $3,078.75 for duplication of 28 effort. The resulting in a total fee award of $11,886.86. 1 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 3 1. Plaintiff's motion for an award of fees under the EAJA, ECF No. 26, is 4 | GRANTED in part. 5 2. Plaintiff is awarded $11,886.86, inclusive of fees and costs as described 6 || above, payable to Plaintiff's counsel subject to any offset of debts. 7 8 | Dated: February 1, 2024 Svc ? DENNIS M. COTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10