1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALICE MARIE SUPONCH, No. 2:23-cv-0073-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 In this action, Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 19 Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for benefits under the Social Security 20 Act. On August 2, 2023, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes 21 remanded this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings. ECF Nos. 15-17. On remand, 22 Plaintiff was awarded past benefits of $105,481.70.1 ECF No. 20-1 at 4. 23 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s December 5, 2024 Motion for an award of 24 attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 20. Pursuant to this Court’s order, 25 Plaintiff’s counsel submitted additional evidence regarding one of their attorneys’ credentials. 26 ECF Nos. 24-25. The Commissioner filed a statement that he “neither supports nor opposes 27 1 The Notice of Award states that $26,370.43 of the past-due benefits was being withheld “to pay 28 your representative.” ECF No. 20-1 at 4. 1 counsel’s request for attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 23 at 2. The Commissioner requests that the 2 order direct Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Plaintiff any fees previously received under the Equal 3 Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted 4 and will also incorporate the Commissioner’s request. 5 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 6 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 7 agreement for 25% of past due benefits awarded. ECF No. 20-3. Pursuant to that agreement, 8 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $19,150, which represents less than 9 25% of the $105,481.70 in retroactive disability benefits awarded to Plaintiff on remand. ECF 10 No. 20 at 3; ECF No. 20-3. 11 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 12 security claimants: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 14 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 15 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 16 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 17 18 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 19 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 20 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 22 § 406(b) is “to protect claimants against inordinately large fees and also to ensure that attorneys 23 representing successful claimants would not risk nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” Parrish v. 24 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 25 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 26 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 27 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 28 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 1 boundary…the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 2 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 3 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 4 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 5 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 6 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 7 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d 8 at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 9 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 10 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 11 Id. Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 12 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 13 535 U.S. at 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers 14 “the time and labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether 15 the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 16 Here, two experienced attorneys secured a successful result for Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s 17 counsel represents that one attorney has been practicing Social Security law for 14.5 years, and 18 the other for over 15 years. ECF No. 20 at 6; ECF No. 25-1 at ¶¶ 3-4.2 Those attorneys billed for 19 a combined 36.2 hours, plus 2.9 hours a legal assistant spent on this matter. ECF No. 20 at 6; 20 ECF No. 20-4; ECF No. 25-1 at ¶ 8. Counsel has submitted a billing statement in support of the 21 requested fee. ECF No. 20-4. The court finds that the amount of time expended (36.2 hours) is 22 reasonable. The court notes that the effective hourly rate of $19,150 ÷ 36.2 = $529.01/hour for 23 both attorneys is akin to that approved by other courts. In Crawford, the Ninth Circuit found the 24 fee awards in the three consolidated cases, ranging from $11,500 to $24,000, to be reasonable 25 when dividing them by the hours expended would have resulted in effective rates in the range of 26 $500 to $900/hour. 586 F.3d at 1145-1147. The effective rate is also less than a sampling of 27 2 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 28 system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 1 recent rates approved in this District. See Garcia v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4121872 (E.D. Cal. 2 September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); Guzman Paz v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 3 4029592 (E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner, 4 2024 WL 3968083 (E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $864). 5 There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 6 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 7 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $19,150 fee, which does 8 not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits to Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to 9 the benefits awarded.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALICE MARIE SUPONCH, No. 2:23-cv-0073-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 In this action, Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 19 Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for benefits under the Social Security 20 Act. On August 2, 2023, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes 21 remanded this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings. ECF Nos. 15-17. On remand, 22 Plaintiff was awarded past benefits of $105,481.70.1 ECF No. 20-1 at 4. 23 Now pending before the court is Plaintiff’s December 5, 2024 Motion for an award of 24 attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 20. Pursuant to this Court’s order, 25 Plaintiff’s counsel submitted additional evidence regarding one of their attorneys’ credentials. 26 ECF Nos. 24-25. The Commissioner filed a statement that he “neither supports nor opposes 27 1 The Notice of Award states that $26,370.43 of the past-due benefits was being withheld “to pay 28 your representative.” ECF No. 20-1 at 4. 1 counsel’s request for attorney’s fees.” ECF No. 23 at 2. The Commissioner requests that the 2 order direct Plaintiff’s counsel to reimburse Plaintiff any fees previously received under the Equal 3 Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted 4 and will also incorporate the Commissioner’s request. 5 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 6 At the outset of the representation, Plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 7 agreement for 25% of past due benefits awarded. ECF No. 20-3. Pursuant to that agreement, 8 Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $19,150, which represents less than 9 25% of the $105,481.70 in retroactive disability benefits awarded to Plaintiff on remand. ECF 10 No. 20 at 3; ECF No. 20-3. 11 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 12 security claimants: 13 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 14 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 15 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 16 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 17 18 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 19 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 20 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 21 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 22 § 406(b) is “to protect claimants against inordinately large fees and also to ensure that attorneys 23 representing successful claimants would not risk nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.” Parrish v. 24 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 25 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 26 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 27 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 28 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 1 boundary…the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 2 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 3 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 4 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 5 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 6 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 7 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d 8 at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is 9 warranted, the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or 10 delayed the case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 11 Id. Finally, the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 12 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 13 535 U.S. at 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers 14 “the time and labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether 15 the fee requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 16 Here, two experienced attorneys secured a successful result for Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s 17 counsel represents that one attorney has been practicing Social Security law for 14.5 years, and 18 the other for over 15 years. ECF No. 20 at 6; ECF No. 25-1 at ¶¶ 3-4.2 Those attorneys billed for 19 a combined 36.2 hours, plus 2.9 hours a legal assistant spent on this matter. ECF No. 20 at 6; 20 ECF No. 20-4; ECF No. 25-1 at ¶ 8. Counsel has submitted a billing statement in support of the 21 requested fee. ECF No. 20-4. The court finds that the amount of time expended (36.2 hours) is 22 reasonable. The court notes that the effective hourly rate of $19,150 ÷ 36.2 = $529.01/hour for 23 both attorneys is akin to that approved by other courts. In Crawford, the Ninth Circuit found the 24 fee awards in the three consolidated cases, ranging from $11,500 to $24,000, to be reasonable 25 when dividing them by the hours expended would have resulted in effective rates in the range of 26 $500 to $900/hour. 586 F.3d at 1145-1147. The effective rate is also less than a sampling of 27 2 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 28 system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 1 recent rates approved in this District. See Garcia v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4121872 (E.D. Cal. 2 September 9, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $685); Guzman Paz v. Commissioner, 2024 WL 3 4029592 (E.D. Cal. September 3, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $883); Garcia v. Commissioner, 4 2024 WL 3968083 (E.D. Cal. August 28, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $864). 5 There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 6 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 7 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $19,150 fee, which does 8 not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits to Plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to 9 the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee 10 nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to 11 represent Plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed 12 significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or 13 that there would be a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). 14 For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by counsel pursuant 15 to § 406(b) are reasonable. 16 II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 17 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 18 under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, Plaintiff’s attorney was 19 previously awarded $8,300.00 in EAJA fees pursuant to parties’ stipulation. See ECF Nos. 18-19. 20 Counsel therefore must remit that amount to Plaintiff. 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 23 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 20), is 24 GRANTED; 25 2. Counsel for Plaintiff is awarded $19,150 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 26 Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 27 for the payment of such fees; 28 3. The Commissioner shall pay to Plaintiff the remaining amount of past-due benefits 1 | after payment of attorney’s fees from the $26,370.43 in funds previously withheld; and 2 4. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to remit to Plaintiff the amount of $8,300 for EAJA 3 || fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 4 | SOORDERED 5 || DATE: February 18, 2025 ‘ .
7 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28