(SS) Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00144
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROSA DELPHINE SMITH, No. 2:24-cv-00144-SCR 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 14 LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title 20 II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401-34, and supplemental security income (“SSI”) 21 under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. The issue 22 raised is whether Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work. For the reasons that follow, the 23 Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANT the Commissioner’s 24 cross-motion for summary judgment. The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security in February 2025, and 28 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) is substituted as the defendant herein. 1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in February 2021, alleging disability beginning August 3 7, 2020. Administrative Record (“AR”) 278-292.2 The application was disapproved initially, and 4 on reconsideration. On February 7, 2023, administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Lawrence Duran 5 presided over a hearing on Plaintiff’s challenge to the disapprovals. AR 37-66 (transcript). 6 Plaintiff participated in the telephonic hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational 7 expert also testified. 8 On February 23, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding plaintiff “not 9 disabled” as defined in the Act. AR 15-29 (decision). On November 21, 2023, the Appeals 10 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of 11 the Commissioner of Social Security. AR 1-3 (decision). 12 Plaintiff filed this action in the Eastern District of California on January 11, 2024. ECF 13 No. 1. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, based upon the Administrative Record 14 filed by the Commissioner, have been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 12 (Plaintiff’s summary judgment 15 motion), 14 (Commissioner’s summary judgment motion), and 15 (Plaintiff’s reply). 16 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3 17 Plaintiff was born in 1959, and was 61 years old when she filed her application. AR 278. 18 Plaintiff had a high school education. AR 44. Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work due 19 to back pain and asthma attacks. AR 53. However, she also testified that her asthma was well 20 controlled with medication. AR 56-57. During the 15 years prior to stopping work in 2020, 21 Plaintiff testified that she had worked as a “warehouse worker” and a “home health aide.” AR 58. 22 When asked about the home health aide position, Plaintiff initially testified that the most 23 she had to lift and carry was “probably 10 pounds.” AR 58. She testified she was on her feet half 24 the day and sitting half the day. AR 58-59. When asked to describe her tasks in this position, she 25 2 The AR is electronically filed at ECF No. 9-2. Page references to the AR are to the number in 26 the lower right corner of the page. For briefs, page references are to the CM/ECF generated header in the upper right corner. 27 3 The Court will not set forth the factual background/medical evidence in detail as there is no challenge to the assessment of medical opinions or evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 28 testimony. 1 stated she would “get the patient in an out of bed, clean up her place, and keep her company, feed 2 her, give her insulin.” AR 59. The ALJ then asked if Plaintiff had to physically help the person 3 get up to which Plaintiff responded “No.” AR 59. And then added, “sometime,” she had to 4 physically help. AR 59. The ALJ then inquired if that required lifting more than 10 pounds, and 5 Plaintiff responded: “Well, I’m pushing her up, so I’m not really going to lift her up. I push her 6 up out of the bed.” AR 59. The ALJ then asked, well would that be “maybe anywhere from a 25 7 to 50-pound push” and Plaintiff responded affirmatively. AR 59. 8 In her work history report, Plaintiff listed that she had worked as a home health aide from 9 January 2017 to August 2020. AR 332. She indicated that she worked 42 hours per week. AR 10 333. Plaintiff’s description of the tasks was consistent with her testimony. AR 353. She wrote 11 that she helped “get patient out of bed to wheelchair, sponge bath, clothing” and that she also 12 prepared meals and did cleaning. AR 353. She wrote on the form that the heaviest weight she 13 lifted was less than 10 pounds. AR 353. 14 Mark Kelman, a vocational expert (“VE”), testified and described Plaintiff’s past relevant 15 work as falling under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) descriptions for warehouse 16 worker (DOT # 922.687-058) and companion (DOT # 309.677-010). AR 62. The VE explained 17 that the “closest job title that would match” considering “what [Plaintiff] did and how she did it” 18 was companion. AR 62. The VE testified the job was done at the light exertion level. AR 62-63. 19 The VE testified that the companion job offered “flexibility with the sitting, standing, and 20 walking.” AR 64. The VE testified he was describing the job “both as performed and as it would 21 typically be performed,” and that his testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR 64. 22 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 23 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 24 supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 25 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘The findings of the 26 Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .’” Andrews 27 v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 28 /// 1 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but “may be less than a 2 preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence 3 “means—and means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 4 to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal quotation and 5 citation omitted). “While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only 6 those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 7 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 8 Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner, it must 9 review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that 10 detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 11 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The court must 12 consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion; it may 13 not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”). 14 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 15 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 16 Cir. 2001). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of 17 which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 18 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the 19 ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn 20 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 21 2003) (“It was error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on 22 evidence that the ALJ did not discuss”). 23 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 24 which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the 25 ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 26 2006) (quoting Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. 27 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 28 1 IV. RELEVANT LAW 2 A claimant is “disabled” if she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 3 reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 4 result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 5 than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 6 (1987). 7 The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an 8 applicant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 9 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation 10 process to determine disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the 11 sequential evaluation: 12 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 13 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). 14 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 15 proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 16 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). 17 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, 18 Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 19 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). 20 Step four: Does the claimant’s residual functional capacity make her 21 capable of performing her past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 22 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f); 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). 23 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 24 perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 25 Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). 26 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 27 process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are 28 1 blind or disabled”); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential 2 analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled 3 and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v. 4 Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. 5 V. THE ALJ’s DECISION 6 The ALJ made the following findings: 7 1. [Step 1] The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 7, 2020, the alleged onset date (AR 21). 8 2. [Step 2] The claimant has the following severe impairments: 9 lumbar disc disease with radiculopathy, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, asthma, chronic sinusitis with nasal polyposis, 10 and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (AR 21). 11 3. [Step 3] The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 12 the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (AR 26). 13 4. [Preparation for Step 4] The claimant has the residual functional capacity to 14 perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except as 15 follows: the claimant can stand and walk for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday. The claimant requires a sit/stand option at will with a maximum of 30 minutes 16 continuously on her feet. The claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She is unable to crouch or crawl. She can occasionally climb ramps or 17 stairs. She can occasionally stoop to knee level and kneel. She must avoid exposure to work hazards, such as dangerous, moving machinery and unprotected 18 heights. She must avoid concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, odors, poor 19 ventilation, etc. (AR 22-23).

20 5. [Step 4] The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a companion (DOT: 309.677-010, light, SVP 3). This work does not require the 21 performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual 22 functional capacity. (AR 26). 23 6. [Step 5] The ALJ did not make a step 5 determination because the ALJ found Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work at Step 4. 24 7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 25 Social Security Act, from August 7, 2020 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 28). 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 VI. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiff raises only one issue on summary judgment: Plaintiff contends that at Step 4 of 3 the sequential evaluation, the ALJ relied on a misclassification of Plaintiff’s past work, and 4 ignored Plaintiff’s testimony as to how the job was actually performed. ECF No. 12 at 3. 5 Specifically, Plaintiff contends her past work required the ability to push and pull more than 6 twenty pounds, which she could not do given her exertional limitations. Id. Defendant contends 7 that Plaintiff’s past work was not misclassified by the VE, and that the ALJ relied on the VE’s 8 testimony which constitutes substantial evidence. ECF No. 14 at 2-4. Plaintiff’s opening brief 9 appears to argue that the ALJ ignored how the job was actually performed, particularly with 10 regard to the lifting requirement. ECF No. 12 at 8 (Framing the issue on appeal as: “The ALJ 11 relied on a misclassification of Plaintiff’s past work and in so doing ignored Plaintiff’s testimony 12 that her past work required the ability to push and pull more than twenty pounds of weight, a 13 function that she was no longer capable of due to her exertional limitations of no more than 14 twenty pounds.”). However, in the reply brief, Plaintiff’s argument appears to change somewhat, 15 and Plaintiff relies heavily on Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2001), a case that was 16 not cited in the opening brief. ECF No. 15 at 3-5. Plaintiff in reply contends she is “not arguing 17 that the ALJ relied on a finding that she can return to past work ‘as performed’ versus ‘as 18 generally performed,’” but rather that she never performed the job of companion. ECF No. 15 at 19 2. Although the initial argument appeared to be that Plaintiff’s work as a companion was actually 20 performed at the medium exertional level, and Plaintiff’s reply brief argument is that she never 21 worked as a companion, both are variations on the Step 4 challenge and thus the Court finds 22 Plaintiff has not inappropriately raised a new issue/argument in reply. 23 “At Step Four, claimants have the burden of showing that they can no longer perform their 24 past relevant work.” Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845. “To determine whether a claimant has the [RFC] to 25 perform h[er] past relevant work, the [ALJ] must ascertain the demands of the claimant’s former 26 work and then compare the demands with h[er] present capacity.” Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 27 798 (9th Cir. 1986). “The claimant has the burden of proving an inability to return to his former 28 type of work and not just to his former job.” Id.; see also Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 1 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claimant must be able to perform her past relevant work either as actually 2 performed or as generally performed in the national economy.”). 3 The VE in this case reviewed the file concerning Plaintiff’s vocational background (AR 4 61) and heard Plaintiff’s testimony. Based on this, the VE explained that the “closest job title that 5 would match” considering “what [Plaintiff] did and how she did it” was “companion” (DOT # 6 309.677-010). AR 62. The VE testified the job was done at the light exertion level. AR 62-63. 7 The VE testified that someone with Plaintiff’s limitations could perform the job. AR 63-64. The 8 VE testified that the companion job offered “flexibility with the sitting, standing, and walking.” 9 AR 64. The VE testified he was describing the job “both as performed and as it would typically 10 be performed,” and that his testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR 64. 11 Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing and counsel questioned 12 the VE about the difference between Plaintiff’s description of the job as “home health aide” and 13 the VE’s description of the job as “companion.” AR 64-65. The VE testified that the jobs 14 “parallel each other” and that one is more “hands-on.” AR 65. The VE described how 15 transferring or tilting a patient is not “lifting” the weight of the person and as typically performed 16 involves 10 to 20 pounds. AR 65. Plaintiff’s counsel responded to the VE by saying, in part: 17 “Right. And I’m not dispute the – any of the lifting.” AR 65. Plaintiff then asked if 18 “companion” duties could include “sponge bathing and clothing the person,” and the VE 19 responded that it would and would constitute light work. AR 65. 20 Thus, when given the opportunity to cross-examine the VE, Plaintiff’s counsel disclaimed 21 that there was a dispute concerning the exertional limitation on lifting. By contrast, the issue as 22 framed before this Court includes whether the ALJ “ignored Plaintiff’s testimony that her past 23 work required the ability to push and pull more than twenty pounds of weight.” ECF No. 12 at 8. 24 A party can forfeit an issue by not presenting it before the administrative agency. See Meanel v. 25 Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (“at least when claimants are represented by counsel, 26 they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them 27 on appeal.”). In this case, the Court does not find the issue waived. Plaintiff sought to further 28 pursue the issue through a brief to the Appeals Council. AR 492. In that brief, Plaintiff argued 1 that the “push/pull requirements of [Plaintiff’s] past work as actually performed would exceed the 2 demands of light work and be best characterized at the medium exertional level.” AR 492 3 (emphasis in original). 4 Plaintiff also sought to submit evidence to the ALJ after the hearing, which the ALJ 5 characterized as “rebuttal evidence as to the vocational expert testimony given at the hearing.” 6 AR 19. Plaintiff obtained the opinion of a different vocational consultant, Karen Starr, after the 7 hearing. AR 35-36. Ms. Starr stated that the VE had incorrectly classified Plaintiff’s prior work 8 as “companion” when it should be ‘home attendant,” also referred to as “home health aide” (DOT 9 # 354.377-014). The ALJ declined to admit the evidence, noting that Plaintiff was represented at 10 the hearing, had the opportunity to cross-examine the VE, and did not raise an objection or 11 request to submit further evidence. AR 19. The ALJ explained that even if considered, the 12 additional evidence would not change the conclusion. AR 27-28. 13 Plaintiff argues that the classification of “home attendant” was a better match than 14 “companion.” ECF No. 12 at 9-13. There is significant overlap in the two job descriptions. 15 “Companion” is described as:

16 Cares for elderly, handicapped, or convalescent persons: Attends to employer’s personal 17 needs [PERSONAL ATTENDANT (domestic ser.)]. Transacts social or business affairs [SOCIAL SECRETARY (clerical)]. Reads aloud, plays cards, or other games to entertain 18 employer. Accompanies employer on trips and outings. May prepare and serve meals to 19 employer.

20 DOT # 309.677-010; 1991 WL 672667. 21 The job of “home attendant” is described as:

22 Cares for elderly, convalescent, or handicapped persons in patient's home, performing any 23 combination of following tasks: Changes bed linens, washes and irons patient’s laundry, and cleans patient's quarters. Purchases, prepares, and serves food for patient and other 24 members of family, following special prescribed diets. Assists patients into and out of 25 bed, automobile, or wheelchair, to lavatory, and up and down stairs. Assists patient to dress, bathe, and groom self. Massages patient and applies preparations and treatments, 26 such as liniment or alcohol rubs and heat-lamp stimulation. Administers prescribed oral 27 medications under written direction of physician or as directed by home care nurse. Accompanies ambulatory patients outside home, serving as guide, companion, and aide. 28 1 Entertains patient, reads aloud, and plays cards or other games with patient. Performs variety of miscellaneous duties as requested, such as obtaining household supplies and 2 running errands. May maintain records of services performed and of apparent condition 3 of patient. May visit several households to provide daily health care to patients. 4 DICOT 354.377-014; 1991 WL 672933. 5 Both occupational descriptions involve care for the elderly, convalescent, and 6 handicapped. Both involve food preparation. Both involve reading aloud, playing cards, or other 7 games. Both involve attending to personal needs, and both involve sometimes attending to the 8 person’s needs on outings. At least one court has previously recognized that the “home 9 attendant” and “companion” jobs are quite similar. See Tucker v. Barnhart, 130 F. App’x 67, 68 10 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Finally, the only differences in the characteristics of the home-attendant and 11 companion jobs are that the first is medium work and requires a language development of two, 12 whereas the second is light work and requires a language development of three.”). 13 Plaintiff contends that “[n]otably missing from this [companion] description is any account of 14 hygiene tasks, like dressing or sponge baths.” ECF No. 12 at 10. Plaintiff also contends that 15 “home attendant” is more appropriate because it includes laundry, medication administration, and 16 transfers out of bed or wheelchair. ECF No. 12 at 11. However, the VE’s testimony already 17 accounted for these alleged distinctions. Plaintiff asked the VE on cross-examination whether a 18 “companion” position could also do things like sponge bathing, clothing, and cleaning and the VE 19 responded “right” and that those tasks would be light work. AR 65. The testimony of a VE is 20 “regarded as inherently reliable,” although of course “not incontestable.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 21 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017). “The SSA contracts with VEs to provide impartial vocational 22 testimony in hearings before ALJs.” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2022). A 23 VE’s testimony is often sufficient by itself to support an ALJ’s finding, unless it is “so feeble, or 24 contradicted, that it would fail to clear the substantial evidence bar.” Id. at 835. Thus, the 25 substantial evidence inquiry for VE testimony “must proceed on a case-by-case basis, taking into 26 account all features of a vocational expert’s testimony, as well as the rest of the administrative 27 record.” Id. 28 1 The ALJ’s step four finding is supported by substantial evidence. There was no challenge 2 to the VE’s qualifications, and he has a master’s degree, is a certified rehabilitation counselor and 3 vocational evaluator, and has been working in the field since 1978.4 AR 483. As set forth above, 4 the VE described Plaintiff’s past relevant work as falling under the DOT description for 5 companion (DOT # 309.677-010). AR 62. The VE explained that the “closest job title that 6 would match” considering “what [Plaintiff] did and how she did it” was companion. AR 62. The 7 VE testified the job was done at the light exertion level. AR 62-63. The VE testified that the 8 companion job offered “flexibility with the sitting, standing, and walking.” AR 64. The VE 9 testified he was describing the job “both as performed and as it would typically be performed,” 10 and that his testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR 64. 11 The ALJ set forth his analysis that Plaintiff could perform the job both as actually 12 performed and as generally performed. AR 27. As to Plaintiff’s argument that the “ALJ ignored 13 how the job was actually performed, particularly with regard to the lifting requirement.” (ECF 14 No. 12 at 8), the Court does not find the argument convincing. Plaintiff’s work history report 15 stated that the heaviest weight she lifted in that job was less than 10 pounds. AR 353. Plaintiff 16 testified the most she lifted was “probably 10 pounds.” AR 58. Plaintiff initially testified “no,” 17 when asked if she had to physically help the person get up, and then added sometimes. AR 59. 18 Plaintiff then responded affirmatively to the ALJ’s question that if she was helping to push 19 someone up, she may be using 25 to 50 pounds of force. AR 59. The VE explained that 20 transferring someone was not equivalent to lifting them. AR 62-63. The ALJ did not ignore 21 lifting requirements. To the contrary, Plaintiff indicated in writing and via testimony that she 22 never lifted more than 10 pounds in her prior home health aide position, it was only in response to 23 thorough questioning by the ALJ that the suggestion was made that she perhaps lifted more. 24 Plaintiff’s testimony at the time of trial was that she could lift 20 pounds. AR 59. 25 /// 26

27 4 “While there are no specific educational or certification requirements for VEs, a majority of VEs have a master’s degree and are nationally certified rehabilitation counselors.” White, 44 28 F.4th at 834. 1 The ALJ also considered the untimely post-hearing submission from Ms. Starr and found 2 it would not change the disability determination. AR 27-28. Ms. Starr offers an alternate 3 interpretation of the record. However, the Court defers to the ALJ’s reasonable interpretation of 4 the evidence. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 5 rational interpretation, one of which supports the decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 6 upheld.”); see also Dunn v. Colvin, 2014 WL 2159275, *7 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (“even if 7 Plaintiff’s belated [vocational] data is considered, because the evidence is susceptible to a 8 reasonable interpretation that supports the ALJ’s decision, his conclusions must be upheld . . . the 9 court will not second guess the ALJ’s reliance on vocational expert testimony.”). 10 VII. CONCLUSION 11 Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at Step 4 of demonstrating that she cannot return to her 12 past work either as actually or generally performed. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844. Plaintiff did not 13 meet that burden, and the ALJ determined that she could return to her past work. The ALJ’s 14 decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the VE testimony and Plaintiff’s 15 description of the work performed, both in her oral testimony and the work history report. 16 “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary 17 sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Substantial evidence 18 “means—and means only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 19 to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, for the 20 reasons set forth above, 21 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 22 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) is DENIED; 23 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is 24 GRANTED; and 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 3. The Clerk shall enter Judgment in favor of the Commissioner and close this file. 2 | SOORDERED. 3 || DATED: March 27, 2025 4 md SEAN C. RIORDAN 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13