(SS) Shelton v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 30, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-02379
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEYLA LEANN SHELTON, No. 2:21-cv-02379 CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 20 XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge 21 jurisdiction to conduct all proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment. For the 22 reasons discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant 23 the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff, born in 1976, applied on March 28, 2017 for SSI, alleging disability beginning 26 January 1, 2014. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 11, 29. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to 27 work due to anatomical issues of the back, spinal stenosis, Sjogren syndrome, depression, 28 anxiety, and fibromyalgia. AT 106-107. In a decision dated April 27, 2021, the ALJ determined 1 that plaintiff was not disabled.1 AT 11-31. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 2 C.F.R. omitted): 3 1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 28, 2017, the application date. 4 2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative 5 disc disease of the cervical spine; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine; mild 6 degenerative joint disease of the hips; mild degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder; fibromyalgia; headaches; peripheral neuropathy; 7 Sjogren’s syndrome; atrial fibrillation; Wolf Parkinson White syndrome; ulcerative colitis; obesity; chronic pain disorder; bipolar 8 disorder; anxiety; depression; and personality disorder. 9 3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 10 1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 11 Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 12 disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 13 determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 14 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 15 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 16 activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 17 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If 18 so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. 19 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 20 of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 21 disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 22 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 23 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 24 capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 25

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 26

27 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 28 burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 1 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 2 4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 3 lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand and/or walk for six hours 4 in an eight-hour workday; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs but no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequent balancing; 5 occasional stooping, kneeling, and crouching; no crawling; frequent forward, lateral and overhead reaching; frequent handling and 6 fingering;2 . . . permitted one bathroom break not to exceed five minutes both before and after the meal break; able to understand, 7 remember, and carry out simple tasks while maintaining attention and concentration for two hours at a time before requiring a regular 8 scheduled break; no fast-paced production; low stress work defined as only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in 9 the work setting; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; no interaction except incidental with the public; and jobs 10 that do not require excellent articulation or fast speech. 11 5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 12 6. The claimant was born on XX/XX/1976 and was 40 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the 13 application was filed. 14 7. The claimant has at least a high-school education. 15 8. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 16 framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 17 9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 18 residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.3 19 10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 20 Social Security Act, since March 28, 2017, the date the application was filed. 21

22 AT 13-30. 23 ISSUES PRESENTED 24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not

25 2 The ALJ also included limitations on plaintiff’s work environment as to noise, light, and pulmonary irritants. AT 20. 26

27 3 Relying on vocational expert (VE) testimony, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the requirements of representative jobs such as checker, router, and routing clerk, all classified as 28 light unskilled work. AT 30. 1 disabled: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of plaintiff’s therapist, Tanya Roberts; 2 and (2) the ALJ’s assessed residual functional capacity (RFC) for light unskilled work is not 3 supported by substantial evidence. 4 LEGAL STANDARDS 5 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 6 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 7 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 8 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 9 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 10 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 11 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 12 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 13 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 14 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 15 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 17 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 18 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 19 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 20 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 21 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 22 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 23 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 24 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 ANALYSIS 26 A. Therapist Opinions 27 Plaintiff’s claim as to health care provider Tanya Roberts, a licensed social worker and 28 therapist, concerns the assessed mental RFC for light unskilled work. Plaintiff asserts that the 1 ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Ms. Roberts, which, if credited, would have required 2 a finding of mental disability. 3 1. Therapist’s Assessments 4 The record contains several of Ms. Roberts’ statements regarding plaintiff’s condition 5 over a four-year period. In a May 2017 letter to “whom it may concern,” Ms. Roberts noted that 6 she had been seeing plaintiff for therapy at least every other week since August 2016. AT 929. 7 In the letter, written close to the alleged onset date of March 28, 2017, Ms. Roberts noted 8 plaintiff’s diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder, Severe, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 9 AT 929. She wrote that plaintiff 10 most of the day, every day, feels depressed hopeless, and has episodic uncontrollable crying episodes, . . . and frequently has 11 suicidal ideation . . . [She] has made multiple attempts to cut on herself and talks of killing herself. The family and I work together 12 to decrease self-harming behavior/risk. Ms. Shelton will often lock herself in the bathroom for hours crying until her family is able to 13 talk her down. [She] spends an increased amount of time in bed. When [she] leaves the home, it is primarily for therapy and doctor 14 appointments. 15 [She] also experiences anxiety, panic attacks, becomes agitated or angry and can be difficult to take into the community. . . . 16 Ms. Shelton is dependent on her family for care. I suggested Ms. 17 Shelton apply for disability . . . as she is unable to return to the work force in any capacity. 18 19 AT 929. Also in May 2017, Ms. Roberts wrote a letter stating that plaintiff could not attend jury 20 duty “due to frequent panic attacks, episodic crying episodes, and multiple health problems that 21 affect her memory, concentration, and ability to discern data. Ms. Shelton generally does not 22 leave her home unless it is to attend medical and mental health appointments.” AT 926. 23 In January 2020, Ms. Roberts wrote another letter, stating that she had treated plaintiff 24 since August 2016, noting a “decline in [plaintiff’s] physical health,” and opining that plaintiff “is 25 clearly unable to meet the demands of returning to work.” AT 928. 26 On September 21, 2020, Ms. Roberts filled out a Mental Disorder Questionnaire Form, 27 noting that she continued to see plaintiff weekly to monthly. AT 2252, 2256. Ms. Roberts noted 28 1 that plaintiff had numerous mental health issues, including depression, suicidal ideation, panic 2 attacks, and obsessive-compulsive thoughts. AT 2254. Ms. Roberts wrote that plaintiff was 3 “easily overwhelmed,” had poor short-term memory, and that her communication was 4 “tangential” and, at times, consisted of “nonsensical statements.” AT 2253, 2255. Ms. Roberts 5 opined that plaintiff was “unable to adapt to work” and that her prognosis was “poor” and 6 “unlikely to improve.” AT 2255, 2256. 7 In February 2021, Ms. Roberts filled out a Mental RFC Questionnaire in which she opined 8 that plaintiff’s physical and mental health “prevent her from being able to concentrate, follow 9 directions, or sustain any physical efforts for more than a few minutes at a time.” AT 3741. Ms. 10 Roberts noted that plaintiff had short term memory issues, episodes of emotional dysregulation, 11 difficulty in public or social settings, and “inadequate” intellectual functioning. AT 3740-3472. 12 She opined that plaintiff would be absent from work five days or more per week. AT 3742. 13 2. ALJ’s Evaluation 14 The ALJ discussed Ms. Roberts’ statements at various points in his decision. First, he 15 summarized her letters of May 17, 2017 and January 17, 2020, noting that “Ms. Roberts did not 16 provide any treating records or mental status examinations of the claimant.” AT 26. 17 Later in the decision, the ALJ wrote: 18 The undersigned has considered the multiple opinions from Tanya Roberts, LCSW, wherein she opined performance of work-related 19 (mental) tasks were precluded for performance of 15% or more in an eight-hour workday and the claimant would miss multiple days of 20 work per month. The opinions are not persuasive because they are inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence of record 21 including the consultative psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Wakefield and mental status exams from Dr. Wakefield and Dr. 22 Nichols. Appearance, speech, behavior, memory, attention and concentration were all within normal limits. She has no history of 23 inpatient mental heath treatment or any voluntary or involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations, which would be expected given the 24 extreme degree of limitations found by Ms. Roberts. Moreover, Ms. Roberts did not provide any treating notes or mental status exams 25 that would support her extreme opinions. 26 AT 28; see AT 26 (summarizing March 2015 consultative evaluation by Dr. James Wakefield and 27 2020 treatment notes from psychiatrist Dr. Monica Nichols, including normal and borderline 28 mental status findings); AT 448-451 (Wakefield evaluation); AT 3873-3888 (Nichols treatment 1 notes). 2 Still discussing the mental opinion evidence, the ALJ wrote: 3 The undersigned also notes that the record includes two letters from Tanya Roberts, LCSW that are not persuasive, as they are not 4 supported by or consistent with the medical evidence of record. The observations and limitations noted within these letters are 5 inconsistent with the objective psychiatric evidence including treating note and generally normal mental status examination 6 findings. Moreover, Ms. Roberts is not an acceptable medical source. 7 8 AT 28. 9 In formulating the mental RFC, the ALJ credited the 2015 opinion of consultative 10 examiner Dr. Wakefield, who opined that plaintiff could perform simple repetitive tasks, interact 11 with co-workers, supervisors, and the public at a minimally acceptable level, show appropriate 12 social behavior, and apply adequate concentration, persistence. AT 28, citing AT 451. The ALJ 13 also credited the opinions of two State agency psychological consultants, who reviewed plaintiff’s 14 medical history in 2017 and opined that she could perform and sustain simple tasks, have limited 15 contact with others, and could adapt to the demands of a simple work setting. AT 27, citing AT 16 116-118 (Dr. Patrice Solomon July 2017 mental RFC assessment), AT 133-135 (Dr. N. Haroun, 17 December 2017 mental RFC assessment). 18 3. Legal Standard 19 “The ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct 20 RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). In doing so, 21 the ALJ must articulate a “substantive basis” for rejecting a medical opinion or crediting one 22 medical opinion over another. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014); see also 23 Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ALJ cannot in its decision totally 24 ignore a treating doctor and his or her notes, without even mentioning them”). 25 The Ninth Circuit previously has required that, in order to reject an uncontradicted 26 opinion of a treating or examining physician, the ALJ must provide “clear and convincing reasons 27 that are supported by substantial evidence.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 28 1 2017); Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2014). Alternatively, “[i]f a treating 2 or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only 3 reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” 4 Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 675. 5 However, for disability applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner 6 revised the rules for the evaluation of medical evidence at the administrative level. See Revisions 7 to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017). 8 Because Plaintiff filed her SSI application on March 28, 2017, it is subject to the new rules for the 9 evaluation of medical evidence. 10 The revised rules provide that adjudicators for the Social Security Administration, 11 including ALJs, evaluate medical opinions according to the following factors: supportability; 12 consistency; relationship with the claimant; specialization; and other factors such as the medical 13 source's familiarity with other evidence in the record or with disability program requirements. 20 14 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). The most important of these factors are supportability and 15 consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability is the extent to which an opinion or 16 finding is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the medical source’s supporting 17 explanations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency is the extent to which an opinion or 18 finding is consistent with evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources, 19 including the claimants themselves. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(2), 416.902(j)(1). The ALJ will 20 articulate how she considered the most important factors of supportability and consistency, but an 21 explanation for the remaining factors is not required except when deciding among differing yet 22 equally persuasive opinions or findings on the same issue. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b). When a 23 single medical source provides multiple opinions and findings, the ALJ must articulate how they 24 were considered in a single analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(1). 25 4. Analysis 26 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Ms. Roberts’ opinions because she was 27 “not an acceptable medical source.” See AT 28. Under the pre-March 2017 regulations for 28 assessing medical opinions, therapists and social workers do not qualify as acceptable medical 1 sources, and thus are considered “other sources.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(1); Stephens v. 2 Colvin, No. 13-cv-05156-RS, 2014 WL 6982680, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (holding that 3 testimony from a treating therapist constituted an “other source”). Under the new regulations, 4 “[t]he agency must articulate . . . how persuasive it finds all of the medical opinions from each 5 doctor or other source, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b), and explain how [it] considered the 6 supportability and consistency factors in reaching these findings, id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).” Woods 7 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see § 8 404.1420c(d) (“We are not required to articulate how we considered evidence from nonmedical 9 sources using the requirements in paragraphs (a)-(c) in this section.”). 10 Assuming arguendo that the ALJ was required to discuss the supportability and 11 consistency factors with respect to Ms. Roberts’ opinions, he did so here. The ALJ noted that Ms. 12 Roberts’ opinions were not supported by any accompanying treating records or mental status 13 evaluations, and that the extreme limitations she opined were contradicted by numerous mental 14 status examinations in the record. Specifically, the ALJ cited the mental status examinations 15 performed by Dr. Wakefield in 2015 and Dr. Nichols in 2020. Insofar as Ms. Roberts opined that 16 plaintiff was unable to work, the ALJ was not required to discuss her opinion on this legal issue. 17 Plaintiff also argues that, because “Dr. Wakefield’s opinion was more than six years old at the 18 time the ALJ rendered his decision,” the ALJ had a duty to develop the record as to plaintiff’s 19 mental functional abilities by arranging for a new consultative exam or a testifying medical 20 expert. However, in addition to Dr. Wakefield’s opinion, the ALJ considered the 2017 opinions 21 of the State agency consultants, both of whom reviewed plaintiff’s mental health history after the 22 alleged onset date, and the 2020 treating notes of psychiatrist Dr. Nichols. 23 The ALJ’s duty to further develop the record is triggered where the evidence is ambiguous 24 or inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th 25 Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A specific finding of 26 ambiguity or inadequacy in the record is not required to trigger the necessity to further develop 27 the record where the record itself establishes the ambiguity or inadequacy. McLeod v. Astrue, 28 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). In this case, Ms. Roberts’ statements concerning plaintiff’s 1 functional abilities do not suffice to establish that the record is ambiguous or inadequate, 2 triggering a duty to obtain another psychological evaluation. Plaintiff has not shown harmful 3 error as to the duty to develop or the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Roberts’ opinions. 4 B. Residual Functional Capacity 5 Plaintiff argues that the RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence. Specifically, 6 plaintiff asserts that, because the ALJ found her to have more physical limitations than those 7 opined by the State agency medical consultants, fewer limitations than those opined by Ms. 8 Roberts, and fewer limitations than plaintiff herself alleged, he impermissibly “relied upon [his] 9 own lay interpretation of the evidence.” ECF No. 16 at 17-18. Defendant counters that the ALJ 10 was merely fulfilling his “basic function [of] resolving conflicting evidence.” ECF No. 17 at 7. 11 Social Security Ruling 96-8p sets forth the policy interpretation of the Commissioner for 12 assessing residual functional capacity. SSR 96-8p. Residual functional capacity is what a person 13 “can still do despite [the individual’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a) (2003); 14 see also Valencia v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (residual functional capacity 15 reflects current “physical and mental capabilities”). RFC is assessed based on the relevant 16 evidence in the case record, including the medical history, medical source statements, and 17 subjective descriptions and observations made by the claimant, family, neighbors, friends, or 18 other persons. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1545(a)(3). When assessing RFC, the ALJ must 19 consider the claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of 20 work[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(4). 21 In June 2017, State agency medical consultant Dr. Y. Ruo reviewed plaintiff’s medical 22 record and concluded that she could perform a range of light work. AT 115-116. Six months 23 later, a second Agency consultant, Dr. S. Garcia, reviewed plaintiff’s record and concluded the 24 same. AT 131-133. The ALJ found these opinions 25 persuasive with respect to light exertion and speech limitations because they are supported by and consistent with the medical 26 evidence of record including predominantly mild imaging; generally normal cardiac tendon reflexes, and sensation. Exams indicate 27 normal motor strength, muscle tone, deep tendon reflexes, and sensation. Straight leg raise testing is negative. Gait, at worst, is 28 with a slight limp but otherwise steady with normal station, pace, and 1 stride. 4 However, additional and more limited findings were found by the undersigned with respect to postural, reaching, manipulating, 2 environmental, and other area. It is noted that the consultants did not have the opportunity to review all of the medical evidence submitted 3 at the hearing level. 4 AT 27 (emphasis added). 5 Plaintiff does not take issue with the ALJ’s finding her more physically limited than the 6 State medical consultants did, based on evidence post-dating their review. She argues, however, 7 that the ALJ was obliged to develop the record rather than reach this conclusion on his own. Not 8 so. See, e..g., Corwin v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00394 GSA, 2021 WL 5771658, *6 (E.D. Cal. 9 Dec. 6, 2021) (“If the mere passage of time and presence of additional medical evidence in the 10 record established ambiguity, a consultative examination would be required in every case. Yet 11 the regulations provide that the agency may obtain a consultative examination to resolve 12 evidentiary ambiguity or insufficiency, not that an ALJ must do so in every case.”); see also 13 Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not 14 the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity”). As above, plaintiff has not 15 shown that the ALJ was required to further develop the record rather than resolving the 16 conflicting evidence in the record into an RFC. 17 Insofar as plaintiff argues that the RFC does not incorporate plaintiff’s subjective 18 symptom testimony, the ALJ found plaintiff less than fully credible in an unchallenged finding. 19 AT 21 (“As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 20 ... her symptoms, they are inconsistent because they are not supported by or consistent with 21 diagnostic imaging and testing, improvement with treatment as documented by treating 22 practitioners, findings on exams both physical and mental.”). Thus plaintiff fails to show error on 23 this basis. Similarly, plaintiff’s argument that the mental RFC should have incorporated Ms. 24 Roberts’ opined limitations fails for the reasons set forth above. 25 Plaintiff’s remaining arguments against the RFC essentially reweigh the evidence in a 26 manner more favorable to plaintiff. The fact remains that the ALJ carefully reviewed the 27 4 See AT 22 (finding that plaintiff’s “disabling pain complaints are not supported by her physical 28 examinations, which generally show intact findings”). 1 | evidence of mental and physical impairment, resulting in an unusually detailed RFC, and plaintiff 2 || has not shown, based on the evidence, that she has greater limitations than set forth in the 3 || assessed RFC. AT 21-29. The court finds that the ALJ met his burden to consider the claimant’s 4 | “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 5 || 404.1545(a)(4), and that plaintiff's assessed RFC was adequately explained and grounded in 6 || substantial evidence. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 9 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied; 10 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is granted; 11 | and 12 3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner. 13 | Dated: March 29, 2023 / ae □□ / a Ly a 4 CAROLYN K DELANEY 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 || 2/shelton2379.ssi.ckd 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12