(SS) Sarishamshajian v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERVARGEZ SARISHAMSHAJIAN, Case No. 1:22-cv-00499-SKO Plaintiff,

v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, (Doc. 1) _____________________________________/ Plaintiff Gervargez Sarishamshajian (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Acting Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). (Doc. 1.) The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI payments on November 27, 2019, alleging disability beginning March 22, 2017, due to neck pain, lower back pain, hearing loss, knee pain, anxiety, right hand nerve damage (unable to grasp), depression, sleep disorder, and acid reflux. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 15, 33, 51–52, 67–68, 72, 90–91, 165, 175.) Plaintiff was born on January 3, 1967, has at least a high school education, and has no past relevant work. (AR 23, 51, 67, 79, 165, 175.) A. Relevant Evidence of Record2 1. Medical Evidence In September 2019, Plaintiff attended an office visit at Golden Valley Health Center to establish care as a new patient. (AR 307.) He was seen by Family Nurse Practitioner Jennings Lee (“FNP Lee”), and he reported a history of lower back pain and arthritis in the right elbow and bilateral knee. (AR 307.) Plaintiff explained that his lower back pain was aggravated by bending, flexion, standing, and twisting, he could not stand and sit for long hours, and he was unable to get a job due to the pain. (AR 307.) A physical examination revealed that Plaintiff’s left-hand strength was at a four out of five, and tremors were present at the left upper and lower extremities. (AR 310.) FNP Lee ordered further diagnostic evaluations, including a MRI of the thoracic spine, the lumbar spine, and cervical spine. (AR 310–11.) The treatment notes from the visit listed FNP Lee as Plaintiff’s primary care provider. (See AR 312.) The MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine revealed severe central stenosis at C5-C6, and the MRI of his lumbar spine indicated multiple degenerative disc disease. (AR 302.) At a follow up visit, Plaintiff reported being unable to perform heavy lifting involving the lower back. (AR 302.) FNP Lee noted that Plaintiff likely had osteoarthritis and discussed treatment options with Plaintiff, including chronic pain medication, physical therapy, and surgery if his condition worsened. (AR 302, 304.) Over the next few months, Plaintiff saw other providers at Golden Valley Health Center, though his treatment notes still listed FNP Lee as his primary care provider. (See AR 296–98, 300– 01.) Plaintiff saw FNP Lee again in January 2020 and reported that his impairments affected his

2 Because the parties are familiar with the medical evidence, it is summarized here only to the extent relevant to the daily activities and he was still unable to work. (AR 383.) Plaintiff also indicated that he was denied physical therapy due to lack of improvement for previous sessions, and his pain was at an eight out of ten. (AR 383.) FNP Lee reviewed side effects of his medication regimen to treat pain related to cervical stenosis of the spinal canal. (AR 386.) Plaintiff was also screened for depression and anxiety. (AR 383.) Based on the screenings, FNP Lee listed Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety as severe. (AR 383.) FNP Lee referred Plaintiff to behavioral health services for further evaluation as soon as possible. (AR 386.) In February 2020, Plaintiff continued to report a pain of eight out of ten. (AR 377.) He also described feeling depressed because he was unable to work due to his chronic pain, and he requested medication to help control his depression. (AR 377.) FNP Lee conducted a physical examination, which revealed limited range of motion as to Plaintiff’s cervical spine due to pain. (AR 379.) FNP Lee advised Plaintiff to perform range of motion exercises and stretch to help support the affected area, and the provider refilled his pain medication. (AR 379–80.) FNP Lee also provided Plaintiff with guidance and medication to treat his depression. (AR 380.) Over the following few months, Plaintiff continued reporting chronic pain and he requested refills of his pain medication. (AR 363, 365, 373.) 2. Opinion Evidence On January 23, 2020, FNP Lee completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff’s diagnoses of cervical stenosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (AR 345.) Although FNP Lee deemed Plaintiff’s prognosis as stable, the provider also listed the expected duration of the conditions as permanent. (AR 345.) FNP Lee opined that Plaintiff was unable to work full-time or part-time, and he could not participate in agricultural work. (AR 345.) FNP Lee checked “Yes” in the box asking whether Plaintiff had a disability that would restrict his ability to perform certain tasks. (AR 345.) FNP Lee noted that Plaintiff’s limitations were his inability to lift and his right- hand weakness, and opined that the types of tasks Plaintiff could not perform were lifting, sitting, or standing for prolonged hours. (AR 345.) B. Administrative Proceedings The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on April 7, 2020, and again on reconsideration on May 8, 2020. (AR 65–66, 79–81, 90–91, 99–100.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 105.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on March 1, 2021. (AR 30–50.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel and testified. (AR 34–46.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. (AR 46–48.) C. The ALJ’s Decision In a decision dated April 12, 2021, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined by the Act. (AR 15–25.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. (AR 17–25.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 27, 2019, the application date (step one). (AR 17.) At step two, the ALJ found the impairment of degenerative disc disease to be severe. (AR 17.) Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”) (step three). (AR 20.) The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and applied the RFC assessment at steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (“Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity . . . . We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.”). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC: to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§] 416.967(b) except occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and frequently bilaterally finger. (AR 20.) Although the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[,]” the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective testimony as “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (AR 21.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work (step four) and that, given his RFC, he could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, specifically cashier and cleaner (step five). (AR 23–24.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled since the application date of November 27, 2019. (AR 24–25.) Plaintiff sought review of this decision before the Appeals Council, which denied review on March 24, 2022. (AR 1–6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481. A. Applicable Law An individual is considered “disabled” for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). However, “[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [their] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [they are] not only unable to do [their] previous work but cannot, considering [their] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). “The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). The Ninth Circuit has provided the following description of the sequential evaluation analysis: In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ proceeds to step three and considers whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, [a]pp. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing [their] past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step five and examines whether the claimant has the [RFC] . . . to perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (providing the “five-step sequential evaluation process” for SSI claimants). “If a claimant is found to be ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). “The claimant carries the initial burden of proving a disability in steps one through four of the analysis.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). “However, if a claimant establishes an inability to continue [their] past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work.” Id. (citing Swenson, 876 F.2d at 687). B. Scope of Review “This court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of [social security] benefits [only] when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098). “Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “This is a highly deferential standard of review . . . .” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “The ALJ’s findings will be upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Id.; see, e.g., Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156 (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.” (citations omitted)). Nonetheless, “the Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). Finally, courts “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006)). Harmless error “exists when it is clear from the record that ‘the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (citations omitted). Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence, specifically that given by FNP Lee. (Doc. 11 at 15–18.) The Acting Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s treatment of the medical opinion evidence was correct. (Doc. 14 at 14–18.) As discussed below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. A. The ALJ Erred in their Evaluation of FNP Lee’s Medical Opinion 1. Legal Standard Plaintiff’s claim for SSI is governed by the agency’s “new” regulations concerning how ALJs must evaluate medical opinions for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. The regulations set “supportability” and “consistency” as “the most important factors” when determining the opinions’ persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). Although the regulations eliminate the “physician hierarchy,” deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning “weight” to a medical opinion, ALJs must still “articulate how [they] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(b). Under the new regulations, “an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). In conjunction with this requirement, “[t]he agency must ‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ it finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source, . . . and ‘explain how [it] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Id. at 792 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)); see also id. § 416.920c(b). With these principles in mind, the Court reviews the weight given to FNP Lee’s opinion. 2. Analysis Here, the record reflects that FNP Lee was Plaintiff’s primary care provider beginning in September 2019. (AR 312.) In January 2020, FNP Lee completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff’s diagnoses of cervical stenosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. (AR 345.) FNP Lee deemed Plaintiff’s prognosis as stable and permanent. (AR 345.) FNP Lee opined that Plaintiff was unable to work full-time or part-time, and he had a disability that would restrict his ability to perform certain tasks. (AR 345.) In particular, FNP Lee opined that Plaintiff’s limitations were his inability to lift and his right-hand weakness, and the types of tasks Plaintiff could not perform were lifting, sitting, or standing for prolonged hours. (AR 345.) In weighing FNP Lee’s opinion related to Plaintiff’s functioning, the ALJ reasoned as follows: The undersigned finds the opinion of Dr. Lee dated January 23, 2020 to be unpersuasive (Ex. 7F). Dr. Lee stated [Plaintiff] was unable to work. The undersigned finds this opinion inconsistent with and unsupported by the record, as detailed above, that showed normal strengthen and sensation, normal gait, and the abilities to drive, handle his money, and go out alone. Therefore, based on the claimant’s record as a whole, the undersigned finds the range of light residual functional capacity herein to properly account for [Plaintiff’s] abilities and limitations. (AR 23.) The foregoing is the ALJ’s entire discussion as to FNP Lee’s medical opinion which is insufficient. Aside from noting that FNP Lee opined that Plaintiff was unable to work,3 the ALJ did not discuss or evaluate the functional limitations opined by the provider in any meaningful way. “[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)). The ALJ was required to consider the functional limitations identified by FNP Lee in the provider’s medical opinion—specifically, Plaintiff’s inability to lift, sit, or stand for prolonged hours and right-hand weakness (AR 345)—and to explain, if any, weight

3 The Court also finds that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the supportability of FNP Lee’s medical opinion. See they assigned these limitations in determining Plaintiff’s RFC along with reasons in support of that conclusion. See Kenneth C. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-06627-JST, 2021 WL 4927413, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2021) (quoting Means v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-0327-KJM-CKD, 2016 WL 366358, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (finding reversible error because the ALJ failed to address medical opinion evidence)); see also Kelly v. Astrue, 471 F. App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the ALJ erred in silently disregarding the medical opinions of the treating psychiatrist). FNP Lee’s findings as to Plaintiff’s physical impairments “are relevant to the ALJ’s assessment of [P]laintiff’s ability to work and directly bear on the formulation of [his] RFC.” Charmayne G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:21-cv-00294-JR, 2022 WL 6702621, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2022). For example, FNP Lee opined that Plaintiff had weakness in his right hand (AR 345), while the ALJ’s RFC provides that Plaintiff may frequently bilaterally finger (AR 20). The ALJ’s omission of a discussion of the functional limitations opined by FNP Lee, which constituted probative evidence of Plaintiff’s physical impairments, was error. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (the ALJ “must explain why ‘significant probative evidence has been rejected.’”); see, e.g., Embrey v. Brown, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding the ALJ erred where the ALJ did not give any reason for rejecting a doctor’s assessment of the plaintiff’s capacity for standing, lifting, carrying, and sitting). The Acting Commissioner contends that the ALJ relied on substantial evidence in evaluating FNP Lee’s medical opinion and finding it to be unpersuasive. (Doc. 14 at 15–18.) In particular, the Acting Commissioner points to earlier portions of the ALJ’s decision that cite to FNP Lee’s treatment notes and asserts that the ALJ properly evaluated the provider’s medical opinion in light of the findings contained in those treatment notes. (Id.) However, neither the Court, nor the Acting Commissioner, may post-hoc “comb the administrative record” to find support for the ALJ’s finding as to the persuasiveness of FNP Lee’s opinion. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014); see Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”). In the absence of any explanation by the ALJ, the Court is unable to determine whether they properly considered all of the limitations identified by FNP Lee in rejecting the provider’s opinion. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012–13. The Acting Commissioner also contends that the ALJ was justified in rejecting FNP Lee’s opinion because the functional limitations opined by the provider were “extreme” and “[i]n sharp contrast with the findings of every other doctor in the record.” (Doc. 14 at 16.) The Court rejects this argument, primarily because the ALJ did not actually invoke such rationale in discounting FNP Lee’s medical opinion. While the ALJ briefly discussed finding the medical opinions of a consultive examiner and state agency medical consultants to be persuasive, the ALJ did not invoke the persuasiveness of these opinions as reasons to discount FNP Lee’s opinion. (See AR 23.) Instead, as discussed above, in rejecting FNP Lee’s opinion, the ALJ reasoned that it was “inconsistent with and unsupported by the record.” (AR 23.) As noted above, because this Court’s review is limited to the rationale provided by the ALJ, post-hoc rationalizations and inferences advanced by the Acting Commissioner cannot justify the ALJ’s inadequate explanation for discounting FNP Lee’s opinion. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require [the Court] to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”); Ceguerra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A reviewing court can evaluate an agency’s decision only on the grounds articulated by the agency.”). Moreover, courts within this Circuit have routinely held that reversal is warranted under analogous circumstances. See, e.g., B-P v. Saul, No. 20-cv-02088-JCS, 2021 WL 2207336, at *8– 9 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2021) (finding the ALJ erred by silently accepting the less restrictive opinion of the non-examining physician and rejecting the more restrictive of the examining physician without providing any reason for doing so); Mason v. Barnhart, 63 F. App’x 284, 287 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the ALJ's decision where the ALJ seemed to reject, without comment, the physician’s assessment of the plaintiff’s ability to work, “making it difficult for [the] court to engage in meaningful review”); Parsons v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:12–CV–01693– MA, 2013 WL 6145118, *7–8 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2013) (finding the treating nurse practitioner’s “observations about plaintiff's impairments and his functional limitations constitute[d] significant probative evidence that the ALJ could not reject without comment,” and rebuffing the Commissioner's arguments that the error was harmless as “specious”); see also Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (“Even under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor's opinion . . . without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting FNP Lee’s medical opinion. Furthermore, the Court cannot conclude that the error below was harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (citing Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054). If the ALJ were to have accepted any part of the rejected opinion, such as Plaintiff’s inability to lift, sit, or stand for prolonged hours and right-hand weakness (AR 345), the ALJ likely would have reached an RFC determination with greater limitations than those assessed. (Compare AR 345 with AR 20.) A substantial likelihood exists that the ALJ’s improper rejection of the opinion evidence affected the result and therefore was not “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,” so the error was not harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1121–22. B. Remand for Further Proceedings is Appropriate Where the ALJ commits an error and that error is not harmless, the “ordinary . . . rule” is “to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit recognized a limited exception to this typical course where courts “remand[] for an award of benefits instead of further proceedings.” Id. at 1100–01 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1100 (noting that this exception is “sometimes referred to as the ‘credit-as-true’ rule”). In determining whether to apply this exception to the “ordinary remand rule,” the court must determine, in part, whether (1) “the record has been fully developed;” (2) “there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made;” and (3) “further administrative proceedings would be useful.” Id. at 1101 (citations omitted). As to the last inquiry, additional “[a]dministrative proceedings are generally useful where the record has not been fully developed, there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities, or the presentation of further evidence . . . may well prove enlightening in light of the passage of time.” Id. (citations omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence or simply to award benefits is in [the court’s] discretion.” Swenson, 876 F.2d at 689 (citation omitted). Having found that the ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient reasons for rejecting opinion evidence, the Court finds that the “credit-as-true” exception to the “ordinary remand rule” is inapplicable because additional administrative proceedings will be useful. In particular, the ALJ’s RFC determination conflicted with such opinion evidence, and can be remedied with further proceedings to accord an opportunity to the ALJ to resolve this conflict. Cf. Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 408–09 (9th Cir. 2016); Lule v. Berryhill, Case No.: 1:15-cv-01631-JLT, 2017 WL 541096, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) (“When there is conflicting medical evidence, ‘it is the ALJ’s role to determine credibility and to resolve the conflict.’”) (quoting Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Court will, therefore, remand this matter for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ should address this error by properly evaluating the medical evidence and re-assessing Plaintiff’s functional limitations considering that evaluation and the other medical evidence of record. C. The Court Declines to Determine Plaintiff’s Remaining Assertions of Error As the Court finds that remand is appropriate for the ALJ to reconsider the medical opinion evidence and reassess Plaintiff’s RFC, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s other allegations of error (see, e.g., Doc. 11 at 10–15, 19–21). See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Newton v. Colvin, No. 2:13–cv–2458– GEB–EFB, 2015 WL 1136477, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2015) (“As the matter must be remanded for further consideration of the medical evidence, the court declines to address plaintiff’s remaining arguments.”); Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is, therefore, VACATED and the case REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Gervargez Sarishamshajian and against Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2023 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE