(SS) Nichols v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 21, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00217
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 JAELYN NICOLE NICHOLS, Case No. 1:24-cv-00217-SKO

10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR 11 v. ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPENSES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS 12 TO JUSTICE ACT LELAND DUDEK, 13 Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 (Doc. 26) 14 Defendant. _____________________________________/ 15

16 17 On March 20, 2025, after entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff, (Doc. 25), Plaintiff filed a 18 motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the 19 amount of $8,310.72. (See Doc. 26.) On March 21, 2025, the Court ordered Defendant’s opposition, 20 if any, to be filed by no later than March 31, 2025. (Doc. 27). Because Defendant timely filed a 21 notice of non-opposition, (Doc. 28), the motion is deemed unopposed. For the reasons set forth 22 below, Plaintiff’s application for EAJA fees is GRANTED. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff filed this action on February 17, 2024, seeking judicial review of a final 25 administrative decision denying her application for Social Security disability benefits. (Doc. 1.) On 26

27 1 Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 19, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn Colvin should be substituted for Leland Dudek as the defendant in this 28 suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social 1 December 20, 2024, the Court ordered judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and the case 2 remanded “to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Order.” (Doc. 24.) 3 On March 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for EAJA fees, seeking an award of $8,310.72. 4 (Doc. 26). Defendant filed a notice of non-opposition on March 31, 2025. (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff’s 5 motion for attorney fees under the EAJA is currently pending before the Court. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses 8 . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless 9 the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special 10 circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 11 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially 12 justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 13 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 15 exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The term 16 “fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). “The 17 statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the prevailing 18 party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final resolution of the 19 case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir.1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(C) & 20 2412(d)(2)(D)). 21 A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes of 22 the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has ever 23 denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four 24 of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff”). “An applicant for 25 disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her 26 benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.” 27 Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257. 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 There is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation. The Court finds Plaintiff 3 did not unduly delay this litigation, and Plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed two million dollars when 4 this action was filed. The Court further finds, in view of the Commissioner’s representation that the 5 Defendant has “found no basis to object.” 6 Plaintiff seeks a total award of $8,310.72, comprised of 33 hours in attorney time. (See Doc. 7 26 at 3). Defendant does not oppose this request. (See Doc. 18.) The EAJA provides for an award 8 of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). By statute, hourly rates for attorney fees 9 under EAJA are capped at $125 per hour, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to 10 compensate for increases in the cost of living.2 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 11 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2001); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. Determining a reasonable fee “requires 12 more inquiry by a district court than finding the ‘product of reasonable hours times a reasonable 13 rate.’” Atkins, 154 F.3d 988 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The district 14 court must consider “the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results 15 obtained.” Id. at 989. 16 Here, Plaintiff’s attorney obtained an order remanding the action for further administrative 17 action, which is a good outcome for Plaintiff. (Docs. 24 & 25.) There is no indication that a 18 reduction of the award is warranted due to any substandard performance by Plaintiff’s counsel as 19 counsel secured a successful result for Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel 20 engaged in any dilatory conduct resulting in delay. 21 The claimed total of 33 hours in attorney time represents a reasonable amount of time for an 22 attorney to expend on this particular matter, see, e.g., Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-3088 KJN, 2011 23 WL 4383636, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (declining to “conduct a line-by-line analysis” of 24 billing entries to determine all 62.6 hours of attorney time spent on the litigation were justified), and 25 are well within the limit of what would be considered a reasonable amount of time spent on this 26 2 Pursuant to Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 876-77, and the Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, the Ninth Circuit maintains a list of 27 the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized under the EAJA, as adjusted annually to incorporate increases in the cost of living. The rates are found on that court’s website: https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum- 28 rates/. Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $251.84 for attorney work performed in 2024. This rate is consistent with the 1 action when compared to the time devoted to similar tasks by counsel in like Social Security appeals 2 before this court, Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting 3 “[m]any district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and 4 granted in social security cases”) (citing Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 n.2 (C.D. 5 Cal. 2000) (collecting district court cases)); see also Thompson v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-01850-AC, 6 2015 WL 1767733, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (finding 63.4 hours to be reasonable); Boulanger 7 v. Astrue, 2:07-cv-0849-DAD, 2011 WL 4971890, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (finding 58 hours 8 to be a reasonable amount of time); Valleyjo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-03088 KJN, 2011 WL 4383636, 9 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding 62.1 hours to be reasonable). 10 Plaintiff will be awarded EAJA fees for 33 hours in attorney time for a total EAJA award in 11 the amount of $8,310.72. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s unopposed 14 motion for EAJA fees is GRANTED in the amount of $8,310.72. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16

17 Dated: April 18, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18

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