1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD LEE MANSFIELD, No. 2:20-cv-1540 DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the 19 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).2 (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff brought this action seeking 20 judicial review of a final administrative decision denying plaintiff’s applications for Disability 21 Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and for Supplemental Security 22 Income under Title XVI. On September 2, 2022, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for 23 summary judgment and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (ECF No. 28.) 24
25 1 After the filing of this action Kilolo Kijakazi was appointed Acting Commissioner of Social Security and has, therefore, been substituted as the defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring 26 to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”). 27 2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 28 1 On December 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of 2 $13,299.03, pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. (ECF No. 30.) On March 21, 2023, 3 defendant filed a response stating that defendant “found no basis to object” to plaintiff’s fee 4 request.3 (ECF No. 33 at 1.) 5 STANDARDS 6 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other 7 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . 8 . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 9 special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. 10 Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 11 substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. 12 Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 14 exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The 15 term “fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 16 “The statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the 17 prevailing party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final 18 resolution of the case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 19 2412(d)(1)(C) & 2412(d)(2)(D)). 20 A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes 21 of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has 22 ever denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence 23 four of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff.”). “An 24 applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the 25 //// 26 3 Therein, counsel for defendant apologized for filing a delayed response, noting the delay was 27 caused by a change in assigned counsel as well as an associated email address. That explanation is certainly understandable. Moreover, the Court appreciates counsel taking the time to file a 28 1 denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits 2 ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257. 3 ANALYSIS 4 Here, the Court finds that plaintiff is the prevailing party, that plaintiff did not unduly 5 delay this litigation, and that plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed two million dollars when this 6 action was filed. (ECF No. 2.) With respect to substantial justification, “[s]ubstantial 7 justification means ‘justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could 8 satisfy a reasonable person.’” Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 9 Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Put differently, the government’s position 10 must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (quoting Pierce v. 11 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). “‘[T]he position of the United States includes both the 12 government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action.’” Campbell v. Astrue, 736 13 F.3d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Meier, 727 F.3d at 870); see also Shafer v. Astrue, 518 14 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the relevant question is whether the government’s decision to 15 defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified”). “In 16 determining whether a party is eligible for fees under EAJA, the district court must determine 17 whether the government’s position regarding the specific issue on which the district court based 18 its remand was ‘substantially justified’—not whether the ALJ would ultimately deny disability 19 benefits.” Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2017). 20 As noted above, “[i]t is the government’s burden to show that its position was 21 substantially justified.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. Here, there is no basis for the Court to find that 22 the government’s position was substantially justified. 23 The EAJA expressly provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 24 2412(d)(2)A). Under the EAJA, hourly rates for attorney fees have been capped at $125.00 since 25 1996, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for an increase in the cost 26 of living.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 27 4 In accordance with the decision in Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 28 1 2001); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. Determining a reasonable fee “‘requires more inquiry by a 2 district court than finding the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Atkins, 154 3 F.3d at 988 (quoting Hensley v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD LEE MANSFIELD, No. 2:20-cv-1540 DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the 19 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).2 (ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff brought this action seeking 20 judicial review of a final administrative decision denying plaintiff’s applications for Disability 21 Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and for Supplemental Security 22 Income under Title XVI. On September 2, 2022, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for 23 summary judgment and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (ECF No. 28.) 24
25 1 After the filing of this action Kilolo Kijakazi was appointed Acting Commissioner of Social Security and has, therefore, been substituted as the defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (referring 26 to the “Commissioner’s Answer”); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (“the person holding the Office of the Commissioner shall, in his official capacity, be the proper defendant”). 27 2 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction over this action 28 1 On December 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of 2 $13,299.03, pursuant to a contingency fee agreement. (ECF No. 30.) On March 21, 2023, 3 defendant filed a response stating that defendant “found no basis to object” to plaintiff’s fee 4 request.3 (ECF No. 33 at 1.) 5 STANDARDS 6 The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other 7 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . 8 . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 9 special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. 10 Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 11 substantially justified or that special circumstances exist to make an award unjust.” Gutierrez v. 12 Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 A “party” under the EAJA is defined as including “an individual whose net worth did not 14 exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i). The 15 term “fees and other expenses” includes “reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 16 “The statute explicitly permits the court, in its discretion, to reduce the amount awarded to the 17 prevailing party to the extent that the party ‘unduly and unreasonably protracted’ the final 18 resolution of the case.” Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 19 2412(d)(1)(C) & 2412(d)(2)(D)). 20 A party who obtains a remand in a Social Security case is a prevailing party for purposes 21 of the EAJA. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“No holding of this Court has 22 ever denied prevailing-party status . . . to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence 23 four of § 405(g) . . . , which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff.”). “An 24 applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the 25 //// 26 3 Therein, counsel for defendant apologized for filing a delayed response, noting the delay was 27 caused by a change in assigned counsel as well as an associated email address. That explanation is certainly understandable. Moreover, the Court appreciates counsel taking the time to file a 28 1 denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits 2 ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257. 3 ANALYSIS 4 Here, the Court finds that plaintiff is the prevailing party, that plaintiff did not unduly 5 delay this litigation, and that plaintiff’s net worth did not exceed two million dollars when this 6 action was filed. (ECF No. 2.) With respect to substantial justification, “[s]ubstantial 7 justification means ‘justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that could 8 satisfy a reasonable person.’” Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 9 Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013)). “Put differently, the government’s position 10 must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (quoting Pierce v. 11 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). “‘[T]he position of the United States includes both the 12 government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action.’” Campbell v. Astrue, 736 13 F.3d 867, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Meier, 727 F.3d at 870); see also Shafer v. Astrue, 518 14 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the relevant question is whether the government’s decision to 15 defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ was substantially justified”). “In 16 determining whether a party is eligible for fees under EAJA, the district court must determine 17 whether the government’s position regarding the specific issue on which the district court based 18 its remand was ‘substantially justified’—not whether the ALJ would ultimately deny disability 19 benefits.” Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 2017). 20 As noted above, “[i]t is the government’s burden to show that its position was 21 substantially justified.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. Here, there is no basis for the Court to find that 22 the government’s position was substantially justified. 23 The EAJA expressly provides for an award of “reasonable” attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 24 2412(d)(2)A). Under the EAJA, hourly rates for attorney fees have been capped at $125.00 since 25 1996, but district courts are permitted to adjust the rate to compensate for an increase in the cost 26 of living.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 27 4 In accordance with the decision in Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 28 1 2001); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 987. Determining a reasonable fee “‘requires more inquiry by a 2 district court than finding the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Atkins, 154 3 F.3d at 988 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (internal citations omitted)). 4 The district court must consider “‘the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the 5 results obtained.’” Id. at 989 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). 6 Here, plaintiff’s fee motion seeks compensation for 63.9 hours of attorney time and 6.5 7 hours of paralegal time for a total award of $13,299.03. (Pl.’s Mot. (ECF No. 30-2) at 5.) The 8 Court finds the hours expended to be reasonable when compared to the time devoted to similar 9 tasks by counsel in like social security appeals coming before this court. See Clark v. Colvin, No. 10 2:14-CV-0851 DB, 2016 WL 4179803, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (finding 67.25 hours to be 11 a reasonable amount of time); Boulanger v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0849 DAD, 2011 WL 12 4971890, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2011) (finding 58 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); 13 Watkins v. Astrue, No. CIV S-06-1895 DAD, 2011 WL 4889190, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 14 (finding 62 hours to be a reasonable amount of time); Vallejo v. Astrue, No. 2:09-cv-03088 KJN, 15 2011 WL 4383636, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding 62.1 hours to be a reasonable 16 amount of time); see also Costa v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1137 17 (9th Cir. 2012) (“District courts may not apply de facto caps limiting the number of hours 18 attorneys can reasonably expend on ‘routine’ social security cases.”). See generally Moreno v. 19 City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (“By and large, the court should defer to 20 the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the 21 case; after all, he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.”). 22 Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the record and the pending motion, the Court 23 declines to conduct a line-by-line analysis of counsel’s billing entries. See, e.g., Commissioner, 24 I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990) (“the EAJA—like other fee-shifting statutes—favors 25 treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items”); Stewart v. Sullivan, 26 statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by the EAJA, as adjusted annually. The rates may be 27 found on the Court’s website. See http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov. Here, plaintiff’s requested attorney rates are equal to or lower than the statutory maximum rates established by the Ninth 28 1 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993); Duran v. Colvin, No. 2:11-cv-2978 DAD, 2013 WL 2 | 5673415, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013). 3 However, an attorney fee award under the EAJA is payable to the litigant and is therefore 4 | subject to a government offset to satisfy any pre-existing debt owed to the United States by the 5 | claimant. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592-93 (2010). Subsequent to the decision in Ratliff, 6 || some courts have ordered payment of the award of EAJA fees directly to plaintiff's counsel 7 | pursuant to plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees, provided that the plaintiff has no debt that 8 | requires offset. See Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08-1454 EFB, 2011 WL 1077765, at *5 (E.D. 9 | Cal. Mar. 21, 2011); Dorrell v. Astrue, No. CIV 09-0112 EFB, 2011 WL 976484, at *2-3 (E.D. 10 | Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Calderon vy. Astrue, No. 1:08-cv-01015 GSA, 2010 WL 4295583, at *8 (E.D. 11 | Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); Castaneda v. Astrue, No. EDCV 09-1850-OP, 2010 WL 2850778, at *3 12 | (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). The Court will incorporate such a provision in this order. 13 CONCLUSION 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (ECF No. 30) 16 | is granted; 17 2. Plaintiff is awarded $13,299.03 in attorney fees and cost under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); 18 | and 19 3. Defendant shall determine whether plaintiff's EAJA attorney’s fees are subject to any 20 | offset permitted under the United States Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program and, if the 21 | fees are not subject to an offset, shall honor plaintiff's assignment of EAJA fees and shall cause 22 | the payment of fees to be made directly to plaintiff's counsel pursuant to the assignment executed 23 || by plaintiff. 24 | Dated: March 30, 2023
26 -BORAH BARNES DLB:6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28 || DB\orders\orders.soc sec\mansfield1540.eaja.ord