(SS) Laflora v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 18, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-00780
StatusUnknown

This text of (SS) Laflora v. Commissioner of Social Security ((SS) Laflora v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(SS) Laflora v. Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIKA LYNN LAFLORA, Case No. 1:24-cv-00780-EPG 12 Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 13 v. SECURITY COMPLAINT

14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL (ECF Nos. 12, 14) 15 SECURITY, 16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an 19 unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding her 20 application for social security disability benefits. The parties have consented to entry of final 21 judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with 22 any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 3, 9). 23 Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2024. (ECF NO. 12). 24 Defendant filed its oppositional brief on October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 14). On November 11, 25 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice that she would not file a reply. (ECF No. 15). 26 Plaintiff raises the following issue: “The ALJ failed to provide clear and legitimate 27 reasons in rejecting [her] testimony.” (ECF No. 12 at 5). Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court 28 1 reversing the final decision of the Commissioner and ordering the payment of benefits. (Id. at 2 11). In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to remand for further administrative proceedings. 3 (Id.). 4 Having reviewed the record, administrative transcript, parties’ briefs, and the applicable 5 law, the Court finds as follows. 6 I. ANALYSIS 7 Plaintiff challenges the following RFC assessed by the ALJ: [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as 8 defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a),1 except she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds; occasionally stoop, balance, kneel, 9 and crouch; never crawl; occasional push/pull with the bilaterally lower extremities; 10 occasional exposure to concentrated fumes odor or other pulmonary irritants; never work at unprotected heights; frequent handling and fingering with the bilateral upper 11 extremities; and she requires the use of a cane for ambulation during the workday.

12 (A.R. 84). 13 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting her 14 allegations that she is unable to maintain work due to her bilateral carpal tunnel, herniated disc, 15 stenosis, degenerative disc disease, and sacroiliitis. (ECF No. at 5). Plaintiff specifically argues 16 that the ALJ did not properly consider her testimony that she uses a walker and that her hands 17 lock up. (Id. at 6, 7). Plaintiff testified that “she has a seated walker and a cane that was prescribed[,] . . . [and] 18 she uses the walker when she goes to doctor’s appointments; and uses the cane around the house.” 19 (Id.) (citing A.R. 186). Similarly, Plaintiff also testified at the hearing that “her hands lock on her 20 and she is unsure if it is because of her hands or because of her cervical spine,” “[she] cannot 21 write more than a paragraph before a sharp pain occurs requiring her to take a break,” “[she] can 22 lift with both hands no more than three pounds,” “[she] cannot manage her personal needs such as 23 showering, dressing, or grooming herself,” and “[t]he most she can do is brush her teeth and wash 24 her face.” (Id.) (citing, generally, A.R. 181-182, 184). 25 Defendant responds that the “ALJ’s reasoning was sufficiently specific and substantial 26 evidence supports [the decision].” (ECF No. 14 at 2). Defendant states that the “ALJ found 27 contradictions between Plaintiff’s allegations and the evidence in the medical record.” (Id.). 28 1 Similarly, Defendant states that the ALJ found contradictions between Plaintiff’s allegations and 2 the evidence in the medical record. (Id. (citing A.R. 84-89)). Defendant points out that “ALJ 3 also found that Plaintiff’s allegations conflicted with the prior administrative medical findings.” 4 (Id. at 3 (citing A.R. 88-89)). Defendant further argues that “Plaintiff offers her own selection of other evidence that, in her view, supported her statements about her limitations” but she “ignores 5 the extremely deferential ‘substantial evidence’ standard of review provided in 42 U.S.C. § 6 405(g).” (Id. (citing ECF No. 12 at 6-9). Defendant concludes by stating that “[t]he ALJ 7 reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 8 Act” and asking the Court to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (Id. at 4). 9 A. Legal Standards 10 As to a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Ninth Circuit has concluded as follows: 11 Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the 12 Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence. Bunnell v. 13 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (“it is improper as a matter of law to 14 discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully 15 corroborated by objective medical findings”). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting 16 the claimant’s testimony must be “clear and convincing.” Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ 17 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints. 18 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 19 However, “[t]he standard isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the 20 ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 21 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). An ALJ’s reasoning as to subjective testimony “must be supported by 22 substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 23 1995); see Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) 24 (“Accordingly, our next task is to determine whether the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding of 25 [plaintiff’s] testimony is supported by substantial evidence under the clear-and-convincing 26 standard.”). 27 As the ALJ’s RFC assessment is ultimately at issue here, the Court notes that a claimant’s 28 1 RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 2 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as 3 the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of 4 the physical-mental requirements of jobs”).

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(SS) Laflora v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ss-laflora-v-commissioner-of-social-security-caed-2025.