(SS) Grider v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 13, 2023
• Docket: 1:22-cv-00781
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 JESSICA JANE GRIDER, Case No. 1:22-cv-00781-EPG 13 Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 14 v. SECURITY COMPLAINT 15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 1, 15).

16 Defendant. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an 19 unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding her 20 application for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to entry of 21 final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 22 with any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 10). 23 Plaintiff argues a single issue: “The ALJ failed to include work-related limitations in the 24 RFC consistent with the nature and intensity of Plaintiff’s limitations, and failed to offer 25 legitimate reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” (ECF No. 15, p. 11) 26 (capitalization altered). 27 Having reviewed the record, administrative transcript, parties’ briefs, and the applicable 28 law, the Court finds as follows: 2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give legitimate reasons to reject her subjective 3 complaints and failed to include all work-related limitations in the RFC. 4 As to a plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Ninth Circuit has concluded as follows: 5 Once the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective 6 symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Cotton v. 7 Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (“it is improper as a matter of law to 8 discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical findings”). Unless there is affirmative evidence 9 showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting 10 the claimant’s testimony must be “clear and convincing.” Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ 11 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints. 12 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 13 However, “[t]he standard isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the 14 ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 15 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). An ALJ’s reasoning as to subjective testimony “must be supported by 16 substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 17 1995); see Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) 18 (“Accordingly, our next task is to determine whether the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding of 19 Carmickle’s testimony is supported by substantial evidence under the clear-and-convincing 20 standard.”). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 21 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 22 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 23 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal citation omitted). 24 As the ALJ’s RFC assessment is ultimately at issue here, the Court notes that a claimant’s 25 RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 26 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as 27 the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of 28 2 consider all relevant evidence in the record, including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, 3 and the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically 4 determinable impairment.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) 5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing findings of fact with respect to RFC 6 assessments, this Court determines whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 7 U.S.C. § 405(g). 8 Here, the ALJ formulated the following RFC: 9 After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 10 CFR 416.967(b) except [she] could only occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; could only occasionally climb stairs or ramps; could occasionally stoop, 11 kneel, crouch and crawl; limited to the performance of simple, routine and 12 repetitive tasks; limited to work in a low stress environment defined as requiring only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in work setting; and 13 limited to only occasional interaction with the public and with co-workers. 14 (A.R. 27).1 15 Beginning with Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s 16 “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 17 symptoms.” (A.R. 31-32). Accordingly, because there is no affirmative evidence showing that 18 Plaintiff was malingering, the Court looks to the ALJ’s decision for clear and convincing reasons, 19 supported by substantial evidence, for not giving full weight to Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 20 Here, the ALJ provided the following recitation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints: 21 Further, the claimant has daily mood and anxiety symptoms (Hearing Testimony). While she takes psychotropic medications, her providers are “still playing with the 22 cocktail” (Hearing Testimony). Panic attacks continues, which she discusses with 23 her therapist (Hearing Testimony). She noted that not being able to see her therapist in person (due to the pandemic) has been really hard (Hearing 24 Testimony). Moreover, she described her panic attacks as “just awful, just horrible” (Hearing Testimony). Additionally, she experiences auditory 25 hallucinations almost every night (Hearing Testimony). However, she was unable 26 to identify a trigger (Hearing Testimony). She described the voices as ‘constant whispering” (Hearing Testimony) 27 1 Only Plaintiff’s mental limitations are at issue here; accordingly, the Court will not discuss the evidence 28 relating to Plaintiff’s physical limitations. 2 Following this recitation, the ALJ discussed the relevant evidence regarding Plaintiff’s 3 mental impairments, generally noting that, while Plaintiff experienced symptoms to varying 4 degrees, the severity of her complaints could not be fully credited due to evidence indicating that 5 Plaintiff’s symptoms were mild or moderate, she had experienced improvement, she generally 6 had normal findings on exam, she faced situational stressors that appeared responsible for some 7 of her symptoms, and she was not always compliant with her recommended treatment. (A.R. 28- 8 30). After this discussion, the ALJ concluded as follows: 9 Overall, the claimant has mood (bipolar and major depressive), anxiety, panic and post-traumatic stress disorders. Yet, while symptoms wax and wane, she has 10 admitted some good response to medication and therapy. Moreover, she has not required psychiatric hospitalization. Further, while she has often presented as 11 depressed and anxious, she has also largely presented as friendly and cooperative. 12 Moreover, while memory has varied, attention has largely remained intact. She also admitted performance of some activities of daily living. Additionally, 13 treatment notes reflect situational stressors, especially parenting concerns and 14 worry about her young daughter. Ultimately, the claimant appears mentally capable of performing simple, routine 15 and repetitive tasks; working in a low-stress environment defined as requiring only 16 occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in work setting; and having occasional interactions with the public and with co-workers. 17 (A.R. 30). 18 As seen above and elsewhere in the record, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective 19 complaints, in part, because there was a lack of supporting evidence. (See, e.g., AR 30 – 20 “Additionally, exams since the 2020 application date generally lacked observation of delusions or 21 paranoia. Further, the claimant had not required psychiatric hospitalization or frequent 22 intervention for anxiety attacks.”). While the lack of supporting evidence cannot be the sole basis 23 to discount testimony, it can be a factor, and was properly considered here. See Rollins v. 24 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be 25 rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the 26 medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its 27 disabling effects.”). Moreover, the Court notes that, while the ALJ ultimately declined to fully 28 2 example, by limiting Plaintiff to “a low-stress environment.” 3 Additionally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints because the record was 4 inconsistent with disability. For example, the ALJ noted that while examinations have been 5 “mixed,” Plaintiff’s “bipolar disorder was described as only mild to moderate in severity (Ex. 6 B2F/76),” her sessions sometimes reflected “family stressors (Ex. B2F/29-30, 34-35)” as the 7 source of her problems,” “after her application date, [Plaintiff] admitted improvements in anxiety 8 attacks, depression and mood swings (Ex. B2F/19-21),” and “she admitted some medication 9 non-compliance (Ex. B2F/38-40).” (A.R. 29). It was reasonable for the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s 10 complaints as contradicted by the record evidence. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (“Contradiction 11 with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony.”); 12 see Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 13 improvement is a factor that can be considered for purposes of whether a claimant is disabled). 14 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rationale for two main reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that 15 “the ALJ does nothing beyond reciting the medical findings and failed to state which of the 16 findings contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations, contrary to law.” (ECF No. 15, p. 13). The Court 17 disagrees. Notably, as seen by the examples above, the ALJ cited specific evidence that the ALJ 18 believed contradicted Plaintiff’s complaints. 19 Second, Plaintiff accuses the ALJ of “improperly cherry picking evidence” and “maintains 20 that the medical and other evidence are entirely consistent with her allegation that, at certain 21 unpredictable times, she will be incapacitated by symptoms related to the multiple underlying 22 mental health impairments.” (ECF No. 15, p. 13). Again, the Court disagrees. Here, the pertinent 23 question is not whether an alternative reading of the record would support disability; rather, it is 24 “whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt, 53 F.4th 25 at 499. Upon review of the record and the ALJ’s opinion, the Court finds no error. In short, while 26 Plaintiff certainly experienced varying degrees of symptoms, it was reasonable for the ALJ to 27 conclude that Plaintiff’s lack of severe symptoms, the normal findings, and medical improvement 28 warranted a finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. 1 In short, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided legitimate reasons to reject □□□□□□□□□□□ 2 | subjective complaints and thus did not fail to include work-related limitations in the RFC 3 | I. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 Based on the above reasons, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 5 | affirmed. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social 6 | Security and to close this case. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ July 13, 2023 [spe ey □□ 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28