(SS) Andrade v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, E.D. California·Decided May 23, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-00861·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JUAN ANDRADE, Case No. 1:22-cv-00861-EPG Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL v. SECURITY COMPLAINT COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 1, 16).

Defendant. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding his application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to entry of final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff presents the following issues: 1. The ALJ failed to incorporate limitations from the State Agency medical consultant, Randall J. Garland, Ph.D., despite finding his opinion persuasive.

2. The ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT as required by Social Security Ruling 00-4p (ECF No. 16, p. 2). law, the Court finds as follows: A. Dr. Garland’s Limitations Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate limitations opined by Dr. Garland despite finding his opinion persuasive. (ECF No. 16, p. 4). Before addressing this issue, some background information is necessary. In May 2018, Dr. Patricia Heldman, a State agency consultant, concluded that Plaintiff was moderately limited in “[t]he ability to understand and remember detailed instructions” but opined that Plaintiff could “understand and remember instructions for simple tasks.” (A.R. 88). At the reconsideration stage, Dr. Garland, a State agency consultant, concluded that Dr. Heldman’s “[p]rior ass’t remains appropriate & is adopted.” (A.R. 118). More specifically, Dr. Garland also concluded that Plaintiff was moderately limited in understanding and remembering detailed instructions, but concluded that Plaintiff was capable of the following: For recon: Prior ass’t adopted. Cl should at least be able to meet the following criteria on a sustained basis in a competitive, remunerative work context: To understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions (e.g., understanding and learning terms, instructions, and procedures; maintaining attention /concentration for approximately 2 hour blocks; understanding, carrying out, & remembering 1 to 2 step instructions; recognizing a mistake and correcting it; being able to work consistently and at a reasonable pace for approximately hour segments between arrival, first break, lunch, second break, and departure; attending work regularly without excessive early departures or absences during the typical 8 hour per day 5 days per week or equivalent schedule); to make simple judgments and work-related decisions; to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work situations (e.g., asking simple questions or requesting assistance, accepting instructions, responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors, cooperating with others, appropriately handling disagreements with others, not distracting others or exhibiting behavioral extremes); and to deal with changes in a routine work setting. (A.R. 122). Upon review, the ALJ found persuasive the opinions of Dr. Heldman, Dr. Garland, and another doctor—Dr. Ekram Michiel—who found Plaintiff capable of carrying out simple job instructions. (A.R. 33, 820). The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: functional capacity to perform a range of work at the medium exertional level as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c). Specifically, he is able to lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. He has no standing, walking or sitting limitations. He can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and use scaffolds. He can use stairs on an occasional basis. He should not work in a hazardous work environment, such as working at unprotected heights, operating fast or dangerous machinery or driving commercial vehicles. The claimant can do all jobs that require monocular vision only. He is precluded from work that requires binocular vision or depth perception. The claimant is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and can only communicate in Spanish. In addition, he has the ability to read and write simple messages in Spanish. (A.R. 28). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding Dr. Garland’s opinion persuasive but yet failing to limit Plaintiff in the RFC to “understanding, carrying out, & remembering 1 to 2 step instructions.” (ECF No. 16, p. 4; A.R. 122). And had the ALJ incorporated this limitation, Plaintiff would not be capable of the occupations relied on by the ALJ at Step 5 because they “require a reasoning level of 2 or greater” and “[a] limitation to 1-2 step instructions or tasks conflicts with work requiring more than reasoning level 1.” (ECF No. 16, p. 5); see Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting of the six GED Reasoning Levels, “Level One reasoning requires a person to apply ‘commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions.”’). Defendant argues that the ALJ did not need limit Plaintiff to following 1 to 2 step instructions because this “was an example of work that Plaintiff could perform,” not an opinion on “the most” that Plaintiff could do. (ECF No. 17, p. 8). Moreover, Defendant contends that “a limitation to simple work accounts for moderate limitations.” (Id.). A claimant’s RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). “In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing findings of fact with respect to RFC assessments, this Court determines whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal citation omitted). Because Plaintiff applied for benefits in 2018, certain regulations concerning how ALJs must evaluate medical opinions for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, govern this case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. (AR 24). Notably, an ALJ cannot reject a medical opinion “without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. K

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(SS) Andrade v. Commissioner of Social Security, (E.D. Cal. 2023).

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