(SS) Alvarez v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 1:21-cv-01711
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SANDRA ALVAREZ, Case No. 1:21-cv-01711-CDB (SS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT1 13 v. (Docs. 18, 19, 20) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Sandra Alvarez (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 19 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her applications for 20 disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). The matter is currently before the 21 Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument. (Docs. 18, 19, 20). 22 Upon review of the Administrative Record (“AR”) and the parties’ briefs, the Court finds and 23 rules as follows. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 A. Administrative Proceedings and ALJ’s Decision 26 Plaintiff filed a Title XVI application for supplemental security income on May 21, 2019, 27

1 Based on the parties’ consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction for all purposes, this action was 1 and a Title II application for disability insurance benefits on June 17, 2019. (AR 216-32). 2 Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a 3 hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 73-139, 158-59). On January 21, 2021, 4 ALJ William Stanley held a hearing, during which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and an 5 independent vocational expert testified. (AR 36-72). The ALJ issued his decision on February 6 10, 2021, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 16-27). On November 18, 2021, the Appeals 7 Council declined Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-3). 8 In his decision, the ALJ engaged in the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth by 9 the Social Security Administration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ 10 found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2016, the alleged 11 onset date. (AR 19). At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe 12 impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; mild cervical spine spondylosis; 13 trochanteric bursitis of the right hip; question of fibromyalgia/myofascial pain syndrome; and 14 history of migraine headaches, by report.” (AR 19). 15 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment, or combination of 16 impairments, that met or medically exceeds the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 17 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 22-23). The ALJ specifically considered listings 18 related to the musculoskeletal system and neurological disorders. (AR 22). The ALJ indicated 19 his conclusion was consistent with assessments of Plaintiff’s physical functional capacity made 20 by the state agency physicians. (AR 23). 21 The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a 22 range of work activity that: “requires no more than a ‘light’ level of physical exertion; requires no 23 climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, no more than occasional climbing of stairs, and no more 24 than frequent balancing or stooping; requires no more than frequent fine (fingering) or gross 25 (handling) manipulation; and entails no concentrated exposure to hazards, such as heavy, 26 dangerous machinery and unprotected heights.” (AR 24). In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the 27 ALJ considered Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, finding Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 1 “hearing testimony, written and other attributed assertions of record concerning the intensity, 2 persistence and limiting effects of such impairment-related symptoms are not found to be fully 3 persuasive, consistent or adequately supported by objective medical and other findings.” (AR 4 25). 5 In formulating the RFC, the ALJ considered medical opinions in the record. The ALJ 6 found the State agency physicians’ opinions concluding Plaintiff could sustain medium physical 7 exertion were not persuasive because they overestimated Plaintiff’s functionality and understated 8 her impairment-related symptoms. (AR 25-26). Thus, the ALJ “credited the evidence and 9 [Plaintiff’s] complaints to warrant the more restrictive [RFC] determination.” (AR 26). The ALJ 10 concluded Dr. Michele Cao “over-estimated [Plaintiff’s] limitations,” and such limitations were 11 not supported by the objective evidence in the record. (AR 26). 12 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing her “vocationally 13 relevant” past jobs as a cleaner, as generally performed within the national economy, and as a 14 phlebotomist and medical assistant, both as performed generally and by Plaintiff. (AR 26). Thus, 15 the ALJ concluded at step four that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from June 30, 2016, 16 through the date of the decision. (AR 27). 17 B. Medical Record and Hearing Testimony 18 The relevant hearing testimony and medical record were reviewed by the Court and will 19 be referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 20 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 22 governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the 23 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or 24 is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial 25 evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 26 conclusion.” (Id. at 1159) (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial 27 evidence equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” (Id.) (quotation 1 to support a conclusion.” Healy v. Astrue, 379 Fed. Appx. 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2010). In 2 determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire 3 record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. (Id.). 4 The court will review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination 5 and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely. Social Security Act § 205, 6 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 7 judgment for that of the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the 8 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 9 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account 10 of an error that is harmless. (Id.). An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 11 [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” (Id). (quotation and citation omitted). The party 12 appealing the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was 13 harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009). 14 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” and eligible for 15 benefits within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to 16 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 17 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 18 expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 19 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only 20 unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 21 experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 22 economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 23 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a 24 claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the 25 Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the 26 claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the 27 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 1 two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20 2 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of 3 impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work 4 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s 5 impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the 6 claimant is not disabled. (Id.). 7 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to impairments 8 recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in 9 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more 10 severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant 11 disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 12 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the 13 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual 14 functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s 15 ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her 16 limitations (20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the 17 analysis. 18 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 19 claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant 20 work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant 21 work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If 22 the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 23 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 24 claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 25 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational 26 factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. (Id.). If the claimant is 27 capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not 1 analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to 2 benefits. (Id.). 3 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel, 4 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the 5 Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such 6 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran 7 v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 III. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS 9 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her 10 applications. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff raises the following issues: 11 1. Whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence where all medical 12 opinions were not addressed. (Doc. 18 at 13). 13 2. Whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence where Ms. Alvarez’s 14 neuropathy was not considered. (Id.). 15 3. Whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence where third-party 16 statements were not considered. (Id. at 14). 17 4. Whether the ALJ used the correct legal standard when he considered the prior claim. 18 (Id.). 19 A. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision where all medical 20 opinions were not addressed 21 Plaintiff first argues “there is an opinion from Dr. Huott that was never considered – or 22 even mentioned – by the ALJ” such that the ALJ failed to consider all medical opinions. (Doc. 23 18 at 15). Plaintiff cites a January 28, 2021 letter from Dr. Huott, reading:

24 My patient, Sandra C. Alvarez … has been followed by myself since September 2016 for a painful idiopathic peripheral 25 neuropathy. Due to that condition and other conditions (e.g. degenerative changes of her cervical and lumbar spine, arthralgias 26 of multiple sites, and chronic migraine), she experiences pain on a daily basis and also has worse pain during flareups. Flareups occur 27 frequently and may last anywhere from 1 week to 5 weeks at a time, making it very difficult for her to be able to work or function 1 which makes her an unreliable employee due to the unpredictable nature of her conditions. Her painful idiopathic peripheral 2 neuropathy condition is chronic and will likely be progress over her lifetime. Due to these conditions, she should be considered for 3 permanent disability. 4 (AR 34). 5 Defendant responds that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions in assessing 6 Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. 19 at 25). Defendant asserts the “regulations exclude statements about 7 whether a claimant is disabled from the persuasiveness analysis” because such statements are 8 “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive.” (Id. at 26 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)). 9 Defendant argues “Dr. Huott’s statement was not an opinion under the new regulations, and the 10 ALJ was under no duty to evaluate it” because “an opinion is only a statement about ‘limitations 11 or restrictions’ in a number of specifically enumerated work activities.” (Id.). 12 In reply, Plaintiff argues “[t]he Commissioner’s post hoc rationalization for the ALJ’s 13 omission of Dr. Huott’s statement in the ALJ’s decision cannot be used to affirm the 14 Commissioner’s decision.” (Doc. 20 at 2). Plaintiff also argues Dr. Huott’s letter is a medical 15 opinion because he “gave an opinion about Ms. Alvarez’ impairment-related limitations on her 16 ability to work – that her pain limits her ability to function.” (Id. at 3). 17 The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. There is no dispute that the ALJ does not 18 discuss or cite to Dr. Huott’s letter. Such does not automatically amount to reversible error as the 19 Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that an ALJ need not discuss all evidence presented to her. 20 Rather, she must explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Kilpatrick v. 21 Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). The approach accounts 22 for “the competing interests at stake,” recognizing that an ALJ cannot “engage in meaningful 23 review of a disability claim” if he ignores significant probative evidence that bears on the 24 disability analysis but “a rule requiring ALJs to address every argument or piece of evidence, 25 however meritless or immaterial, would unduly detain ALJs in their orderly consideration of 26 Social Security disability benefits claims.” Id. 27 Here, the dispute between the parties focuses on whether Dr. Huott’s letter is a medical opinion. Under the regulations applicable to Plaintiff’s applications, the Commissioner does “not 1 defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical 2 opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical 3 sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). The regulations further provide that the 4 Commissioner will articulate the persuasiveness of “all medical opinions and all of the prior 5 administrative medical findings in [the] case record” and sets forth specific factors that must be 6 addressed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)-(c). Thus, if Dr. Huott’s letter is a medical opinion and 7 the ALJ failed to articulate how persuasive he found the opinion under the regulations, the ALJ 8 erred. 9 The problem, however, is that the ALJ’s complete failure to discuss Dr. Huott’s letter 10 means he did not address whether the letter was a medical opinion such that its treatment required 11 the articulation set forth by the regulations. (See AR 16-27). The Ninth Circuit addressed a 12 similar situation in its unpublished decision in Johnson v. Kijakazi, No. 21-15919, 2022 WL 13 2593516, at *1 (9th Cir. 2022). There, the parties disputed whether a letter from the claimant’s 14 licensed clinical social worker “contain[ed] medical opinions such that the ALJ had to analyze 15 their persuasiveness using the five factors enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), and 16 articulate in his written decision how he considered the supportability and consistency factors as 17 required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).” While the ALJ’s decision cited the provider’s letter in 18 his decision, “nowhere d[id] the ALJ’s decision examine the substance of [the] letter.” Id. The 19 Ninth Circuit concluded it could not address whether the letter was an opinion because this issue 20 “went unanswered by the ALJ.” Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case “so the agency 21 c[ould] address in the first instance whether [the] letter include[d] medical opinions.” Id. 22 Here, as in Johnson, the ALJ did not address whether Dr. Huott’s letter contained medical 23 opinions. Because a court may “review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 24 determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely,” the Court 25 cannot affirm the ALJ’s decision. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). 26 Rather, the ALJ erred in failing to discuss Dr. Huott’s letter at all. Defendant does not argue that 27 any such error is harmless (see Doc. 19 at 20-21) and, indeed, it is doubtful an error of this type een eee RE III III IIE IIE IIE

1 | (Bea, J., dissenting) (concluding any error by ALJ in considering a medical opinion contained in a 2 | two-page letter was harmless given every limitation described in the letter was considered by the 3 | ALJ elsewhere). Accordingly, as in Johnson, remand to allow the ALJ to address in the first 4 | instance whether Huott’s letter contains medical opinions is appropriate. 5 B. Remaining Arguments 6 Because the Court finds remand is warranted, the Court need not address Plaintiffs 7 | additional arguments related to the ALJ’s failure to consider her neuropathy and third-party 8 | statements,” and whether the ALJ erred in failing to reopen her prior claim. See Marcia v. 9 | Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Because we reverse, we do not reach the other 10 || arguments raised.”); see also Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); 11 | Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he 12 || Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff 13 | with any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”’). 14 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 15 For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 16 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED; 17 2. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is remanded back to the 18 Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 19 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Sandra Alvarez 20 and against Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. 21 | ITIS ORDERED. ** | Dated: _ April 2, 2025 | Narn D ba 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 | 2 The Court notes, however, that while at the time of the parties’ briefing it remained an “open question 26 whether ALJs are still required to consider lay witness evidence under the revised regulations,” Fryer v. Kijakazi, No. 21-36004, 2022 WL 17958630, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2022), the Ninth Circuit recently 97 || clarified that “nonmedical sources—including lay testimony from friends and family—are still considered in determining the ‘consistency’ of ‘medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),’” but 28 || “the governing regulations now expressly allow ALJs to discount nonmedical evidence without explanation.” Hudnall vy. Dudek, 130 F.4th 668, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2025).