4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 DYNEL E. ALAMEIDA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00620-JDP 9 Plaintiff, ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL 10 11 v. ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION BELOW AND ORDERING THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 12 SECURITY, CLERK’S OFFICE ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND CLOSE 13 Defendant. THIS CASE
14 15 16 Claimant has requested judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) 17 denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. On July 9, 2020, I heard argument from 18 the parties. Because I conclude that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) opinion was 19 supported by substantial evidence and does not contain the errors asserted by plaintiff, I affirm 20 the decision below and order that the clerk’s office (1) enter judgment in favor of respondent and 21 (2) close this case. 22 DISCUSSION 23 Claimant filed a disability application in July 2015 alleging a variety of impairments, 24 including knee problems, back problems, obesity, and depression. In 2018, following a hearing, 25 the ALJ found that claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. 26 AR 18. Claimant now argues that the ALJ made five errors in assessing her case. This court has 27 jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), pursuant to which I ask whether substantial evidence 28 1 supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the ALJ’s decision conformed with applicable 2 law. 3 Claimant’s first two claims are the most serious and appear related: she argues that the 4 ALJ underestimated the severity of her mental impairments—and other impairments, such as 5 insomnia and fibromyalgia—resulting in a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment that 6 was not supported by the record. See ECF No. 13 at 4-10. Because the ALJ properly constructed 7 the RFC based on his assessments of claimant’s impairments, these challenges fail.1 8 A claimant’s RFC is the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for 9 sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 10 App. 2, § 200.00(c). More plainly, it is “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 20 11 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In constructing an FRC, the agency must consider “all of the relevant 12 medical and other evidence.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). But, as a finding reserved to agency, this 13 court asks only whether the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. 14 In this case, it was. The ALJ determined that claimant retained the RFC “to perform 15 sedentary work,” with a number of limitations, including “performing simple, routine takes with 16 only occasional public contact.” AR 27. The ALJ’s thorough discussion of the evidence 17 producing the RFC finding, see AR 27-32, was “supported by inferences reasonably drawn from 18 the record.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 19 omitted). The ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant suffered from moderate mental limitations is 20 consistent with his conclusion that she could still perform simple work. See Stubbs-Danielson v. 21 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming a decision that found moderate mental 22 limitations consistent with simple work, and noting that “an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant 23 24 1 I agree with respondent that claimant is not challenging the degree to which her impairments are 25 limiting; instead, she us challenging the construction of the RFC. See ECF No. 17 at 19; see also ECF No. 13 at 4-10 (articulating claims). Claimant has thus waived arguments regarding her 26 limitations at steps preceding the construction of the RFC. See Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673 27 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Nonetheless, I note that the ALJ’s underlying discussion of 28 plaintiff’s mental limitations, see, e.g., AR 24-26, was also supported by substantial evidence. 1 adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the 2 assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony”). 3 Alameida’s varied objections do not change this result. Claimant charges broadly that, in 4 constructing the RFC, the ALJ “rejected all medical opinions in favor of his own,” ECF No. 13 at 5 6, and “substituted his own judgment for competent medical opinion and/or made his own 6 independent medical findings not supported by the record warranting remand.” ECF No. 13 at 8. 7 But the RFC is not a medical decision reserved to the medical professionals; it is an 8 administrative finding based on the evidence (medical and otherwise) that considers a claimant’s 9 ability to “to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1545(a)(1). While “[a] limited ability to carry out certain mental activities . . . may reduce [a 11 claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work,” id. § 404.1545(c) (emphasis added), it also 12 may not reduce it, much less eliminate it. And, while claimant may wish that the ALJ had arrived 13 at a different result, and may believe that a different RFC result was possible, we are obligated to 14 “uphold the ALJ’s decision” even “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 15 interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); cf. Bayliss v. 16 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Preparing a function-by-function analysis for 17 medical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the 18 record is unnecessary.”). 19 Claimant’s more specific challenges to the RFC reflect only that the record evidence may 20 be susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 21 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the 22 ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”). Plaintiff challenges, for example, the ALJ’s 23 interpretation of the severity of her insomnia and fibromyalgia. See ECF No. 13 at 8. But while 24 plaintiff may wish that the ALJ’s interpretation was different, that interpretation was still 25 supported by substantial evidence—such as the ALJ’s observation’s that plaintiff prescription for 26 insomnia appeared to control the issue, and that plaintiff had not sought specific treatment for 27 fibromyalgia. See AR 23-24. 28 For the reasons above, claimant’s first two arguments about the RFC fail. 1 Claimant’s third argument is that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Dr. Jeng. 2 Where a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may 3 reject the opinion only “by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 4 substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin,
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 DYNEL E. ALAMEIDA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00620-JDP 9 Plaintiff, ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL 10 11 v. ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION BELOW AND ORDERING THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 12 SECURITY, CLERK’S OFFICE ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT AND CLOSE 13 Defendant. THIS CASE
14 15 16 Claimant has requested judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) 17 denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. On July 9, 2020, I heard argument from 18 the parties. Because I conclude that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) opinion was 19 supported by substantial evidence and does not contain the errors asserted by plaintiff, I affirm 20 the decision below and order that the clerk’s office (1) enter judgment in favor of respondent and 21 (2) close this case. 22 DISCUSSION 23 Claimant filed a disability application in July 2015 alleging a variety of impairments, 24 including knee problems, back problems, obesity, and depression. In 2018, following a hearing, 25 the ALJ found that claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. 26 AR 18. Claimant now argues that the ALJ made five errors in assessing her case. This court has 27 jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), pursuant to which I ask whether substantial evidence 28 1 supports the ALJ’s factual findings and whether the ALJ’s decision conformed with applicable 2 law. 3 Claimant’s first two claims are the most serious and appear related: she argues that the 4 ALJ underestimated the severity of her mental impairments—and other impairments, such as 5 insomnia and fibromyalgia—resulting in a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment that 6 was not supported by the record. See ECF No. 13 at 4-10. Because the ALJ properly constructed 7 the RFC based on his assessments of claimant’s impairments, these challenges fail.1 8 A claimant’s RFC is the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for 9 sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, 10 App. 2, § 200.00(c). More plainly, it is “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 20 11 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In constructing an FRC, the agency must consider “all of the relevant 12 medical and other evidence.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). But, as a finding reserved to agency, this 13 court asks only whether the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. 14 In this case, it was. The ALJ determined that claimant retained the RFC “to perform 15 sedentary work,” with a number of limitations, including “performing simple, routine takes with 16 only occasional public contact.” AR 27. The ALJ’s thorough discussion of the evidence 17 producing the RFC finding, see AR 27-32, was “supported by inferences reasonably drawn from 18 the record.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 19 omitted). The ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant suffered from moderate mental limitations is 20 consistent with his conclusion that she could still perform simple work. See Stubbs-Danielson v. 21 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming a decision that found moderate mental 22 limitations consistent with simple work, and noting that “an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant 23 24 1 I agree with respondent that claimant is not challenging the degree to which her impairments are 25 limiting; instead, she us challenging the construction of the RFC. See ECF No. 17 at 19; see also ECF No. 13 at 4-10 (articulating claims). Claimant has thus waived arguments regarding her 26 limitations at steps preceding the construction of the RFC. See Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673 27 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Nonetheless, I note that the ALJ’s underlying discussion of 28 plaintiff’s mental limitations, see, e.g., AR 24-26, was also supported by substantial evidence. 1 adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the 2 assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony”). 3 Alameida’s varied objections do not change this result. Claimant charges broadly that, in 4 constructing the RFC, the ALJ “rejected all medical opinions in favor of his own,” ECF No. 13 at 5 6, and “substituted his own judgment for competent medical opinion and/or made his own 6 independent medical findings not supported by the record warranting remand.” ECF No. 13 at 8. 7 But the RFC is not a medical decision reserved to the medical professionals; it is an 8 administrative finding based on the evidence (medical and otherwise) that considers a claimant’s 9 ability to “to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1545(a)(1). While “[a] limited ability to carry out certain mental activities . . . may reduce [a 11 claimant’s] ability to do past work and other work,” id. § 404.1545(c) (emphasis added), it also 12 may not reduce it, much less eliminate it. And, while claimant may wish that the ALJ had arrived 13 at a different result, and may believe that a different RFC result was possible, we are obligated to 14 “uphold the ALJ’s decision” even “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 15 interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); cf. Bayliss v. 16 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Preparing a function-by-function analysis for 17 medical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the 18 record is unnecessary.”). 19 Claimant’s more specific challenges to the RFC reflect only that the record evidence may 20 be susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 21 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the 22 ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”). Plaintiff challenges, for example, the ALJ’s 23 interpretation of the severity of her insomnia and fibromyalgia. See ECF No. 13 at 8. But while 24 plaintiff may wish that the ALJ’s interpretation was different, that interpretation was still 25 supported by substantial evidence—such as the ALJ’s observation’s that plaintiff prescription for 26 insomnia appeared to control the issue, and that plaintiff had not sought specific treatment for 27 fibromyalgia. See AR 23-24. 28 For the reasons above, claimant’s first two arguments about the RFC fail. 1 Claimant’s third argument is that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Dr. Jeng. 2 Where a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may 3 reject the opinion only “by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 4 substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ met that 5 standard here, noting that “Dr. Jeng’s opinions are not supported by the medical evidence, as 6 stated above, showing mild arthritic changes in the knees, normal tone and motor strength in the 7 lower extremities, independent ambulation while wearing braces on both knees, and treatment 8 limited to prescription medication.” AR 30. While the ALJ could have said more, these reasons 9 were specific and legitimate. 10 Claimant’s fourth claim is that the ALJ erred in discounting her subjective symptoms. To 11 properly discount such testimony, “the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what 12 evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 13 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). The ALJ’s detailed discussion met this standard. See AR 28. 14 While Alameida correctly points out that an ALJ cannot reject symptom testimony solely because 15 of the objective medical evidence, here, the ALJ used a combination of objective medical and 16 other evidence—including inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and activities—that was 17 proper. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain 18 testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective 19 medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 20 claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”); see also AR 28 (“[T]he claimant engaged in activities 21 inconsistent with her allegations of disabling mental and physical symptoms.”). This discussion 22 meets the relevant standard, and claimant’s arguments to the contrary again amount to the claim 23 that the evidence was amenable to more than one different rational interpretation. 24 Claimant’s final argument is that the ALJ improperly rejected the evidence from lay, 25 third-party witnesses—specifically, claimant’s sister and husband. To disregard such testimony, 26 the ALJ must give reasons that are germane to each witness. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 27 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the ALJ did that: “Mr. Sanders [the husband] and Ms. Alameida [the 28 sister] lack program knowledge and are unfamiliar with the medical record as a whole, which 4:40 □□ OU YET MMU ot PN eerie □□□ VI
1 | shows the claimant’s symptoms are managed with prescribed medication, as discussed below.” 2 | AR 29. These reasons are sufficiently germane. 3 | ORDER 4 For the reasons above, we affirm the decision below and order that the clerk’s office enter 5 || judgment in favor of respondent and close this case. 6 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
| Dated: _ September 18, 2020 —N prssann — 9 UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 No. 205. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28