3 4 WILLIAM EDWIN AGUILERA, No. 1:21-cv-00819-GSA 5 Plaintiff, 6 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EAJA ATTORNEY’S FEES 7 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, acting Commissioner of Social Security, (Doc. 21) 8
9 Defendant. 10 I. Introduction and Procedural Background 11 On May 20, 2021 Plaintiff William Edwin Aguilera (“Plaintiff”) sought judicial review of 12 a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying 13 his application for social security benefits. Doc. 1. 14 After plaintiff moved for summary judgment the parties stipulated to remand the matter to 15 the agency for further proceedings. Doc. 19. Pursuant to the stipulation, judgment was entered for 16 Plaintiff the same day. Doc. 20. 17 On August 24, 2022, Plaintiff brought the instant motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the 18 Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 21. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 19 $6,453.82 for 28 hours expended pursuing the case to judgment plus $400 in costs to cover the 20 filing fee payment. Id. Defendant responded indicating no objection to the request. 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Substantial Justification 23 1. Legal Standard 24 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final 25 judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses 26 which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from 27 any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 28 1 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was 2 substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil 3 action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses
4 are sought.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
6 A plaintiff appealing a denial of Social Security benefits need not be awarded benefits to be
7 considered a prevailing party. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993). A plaintiff who
8 obtains a remand order pursuant to sentence four of 42 U. S.C. § 405(g) is also considered a 9 prevailing party under the EAJA. Id. A prevailing party is entitled to a fee award when the position 10 11 of the United States was not substantially justified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). While the 12 prevailing party must only allege that the position of the United States was not substantially 13 justified, the United States must carry the burden of establishing substantial justification. See 28 14 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004). 15 “To establish substantial justification, the government need not establish that it was correct 16 or ‘justified to a high degree’ . . . only that its position is one that ‘a reasonable person could think 17 it correct, that is, has a reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Ibrahim v. DHS, 912 F.3d 1147, 1167 18 19 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)). The substantial 20 justification standard is satisfied if there is a “genuine dispute” of fact or law, even if the court 21 ultimately rules against the government. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. The determination of 22 substantial justification is within the discretion of the district court. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 23 552 (1988); McDonald v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1473 (1st Cir. 1989). 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) ‘“position of the United States’ means, in addition 25 to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency 26 27 upon which the civil action is based . . .’” Thus, the substantial justification standard applies not 28 1 only to the underlying agency action in denying benefits, but also to the legal and factual positions
2 advanced by the government’s attorneys during the litigation.
3 2. Analysis
4 Plaintiff is a prevailing party, having obtained a judgment pursuant to stipulation. There is 5 no contention that he is otherwise ineligible under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) based on his assets. 6 7 Substantial justification of the Defendant’s position is not at issue as Defendant did not file an
8 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, nor did Defendant oppose the fee motion.
9 A fee award is therefore appropriate.1 10 B. Fee Amount 11 1. Legal Standard 12 Having determined a fee award is appropriate, the Court must consider the reasonableness 13 of the fee request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The Court has an “independent obligation for 14 15 judicial review of the reasonableness of the amount of fees sought under the EAJA regardless of 16 whether the request is opposed.” Douzat v. Saul, 2020 WL 3408706, at *1 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020), 17 citing Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1999). “This obligation is consistent 18 with Ninth Circuit precedent outside the EAJA context that similarly highlights the Court's duty to 19 review the reasonableness of a fee request.” Id, citing Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1401 20 (9th Cir. 1992) (in addressing request for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, indicating that “the district 21 court is required to independently review [a] fee request even absent . . . objections”). 22 23 Under fee shifting statutes, the movant generally bears the burden of documenting hours 24 and establishing reasonableness of the fee request. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 25 434 (1983). Counsel is entitled to compensation for all work a reasonable and prudent lawyer 26
27 1 In such circumstances, the common practice in this district is for the parties to file a stipulation and proposed order for payment of EAJA fees. Despite Defendant indicating no objection to the motion, no stipulation or proposed order 28 was forthcoming. 1 would undertake to advance her client’s interests. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830,
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3 4 WILLIAM EDWIN AGUILERA, No. 1:21-cv-00819-GSA 5 Plaintiff, 6 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EAJA ATTORNEY’S FEES 7 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, acting Commissioner of Social Security, (Doc. 21) 8
9 Defendant. 10 I. Introduction and Procedural Background 11 On May 20, 2021 Plaintiff William Edwin Aguilera (“Plaintiff”) sought judicial review of 12 a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying 13 his application for social security benefits. Doc. 1. 14 After plaintiff moved for summary judgment the parties stipulated to remand the matter to 15 the agency for further proceedings. Doc. 19. Pursuant to the stipulation, judgment was entered for 16 Plaintiff the same day. Doc. 20. 17 On August 24, 2022, Plaintiff brought the instant motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the 18 Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 21. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 19 $6,453.82 for 28 hours expended pursuing the case to judgment plus $400 in costs to cover the 20 filing fee payment. Id. Defendant responded indicating no objection to the request. 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Substantial Justification 23 1. Legal Standard 24 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final 25 judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses 26 which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from 27 any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 28 1 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was 2 substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil 3 action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses
4 are sought.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
6 A plaintiff appealing a denial of Social Security benefits need not be awarded benefits to be
7 considered a prevailing party. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993). A plaintiff who
8 obtains a remand order pursuant to sentence four of 42 U. S.C. § 405(g) is also considered a 9 prevailing party under the EAJA. Id. A prevailing party is entitled to a fee award when the position 10 11 of the United States was not substantially justified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). While the 12 prevailing party must only allege that the position of the United States was not substantially 13 justified, the United States must carry the burden of establishing substantial justification. See 28 14 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004). 15 “To establish substantial justification, the government need not establish that it was correct 16 or ‘justified to a high degree’ . . . only that its position is one that ‘a reasonable person could think 17 it correct, that is, has a reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Ibrahim v. DHS, 912 F.3d 1147, 1167 18 19 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)). The substantial 20 justification standard is satisfied if there is a “genuine dispute” of fact or law, even if the court 21 ultimately rules against the government. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. The determination of 22 substantial justification is within the discretion of the district court. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 23 552 (1988); McDonald v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1473 (1st Cir. 1989). 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) ‘“position of the United States’ means, in addition 25 to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency 26 27 upon which the civil action is based . . .’” Thus, the substantial justification standard applies not 28 1 only to the underlying agency action in denying benefits, but also to the legal and factual positions
2 advanced by the government’s attorneys during the litigation.
3 2. Analysis
4 Plaintiff is a prevailing party, having obtained a judgment pursuant to stipulation. There is 5 no contention that he is otherwise ineligible under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) based on his assets. 6 7 Substantial justification of the Defendant’s position is not at issue as Defendant did not file an
8 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, nor did Defendant oppose the fee motion.
9 A fee award is therefore appropriate.1 10 B. Fee Amount 11 1. Legal Standard 12 Having determined a fee award is appropriate, the Court must consider the reasonableness 13 of the fee request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The Court has an “independent obligation for 14 15 judicial review of the reasonableness of the amount of fees sought under the EAJA regardless of 16 whether the request is opposed.” Douzat v. Saul, 2020 WL 3408706, at *1 (D. Nev. June 11, 2020), 17 citing Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1999). “This obligation is consistent 18 with Ninth Circuit precedent outside the EAJA context that similarly highlights the Court's duty to 19 review the reasonableness of a fee request.” Id, citing Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1401 20 (9th Cir. 1992) (in addressing request for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, indicating that “the district 21 court is required to independently review [a] fee request even absent . . . objections”). 22 23 Under fee shifting statutes, the movant generally bears the burden of documenting hours 24 and establishing reasonableness of the fee request. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 25 434 (1983). Counsel is entitled to compensation for all work a reasonable and prudent lawyer 26
27 1 In such circumstances, the common practice in this district is for the parties to file a stipulation and proposed order for payment of EAJA fees. Despite Defendant indicating no objection to the motion, no stipulation or proposed order 28 was forthcoming. 1 would undertake to advance her client’s interests. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830,
2 839 (9th Cir. 1982).
3 EAJA hourly rates are capped at $125.00 per hour plus annual cost of living adjustments
4 pursuant to the formula set forth in Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005), 5 and published electronically by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6. The 6 7
rate set for 2021 and 2022 was $217.54 per hour and $231.49, respectively.2
8 2. Analysis
9 Here, counsel seeks compensation for 28 hours of work. Doc. 21-1. “Courts should 10 generally defer to the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was 11 required to spend on the case.’” See Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 12 (9th Cir. 2012), quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)). 13 Some district courts decline to do a line-by-line review of the fee petition where the overall 14 15 number of hours expended was reasonable. Allen v. Berryhill, Case No. 17-cv-03384-SI, 2019 WL 16 343422 (N.D. Cal. January 28, 2019) (70.85 hours); Thompson v. Colvin (E.D. Cal., Apr. 17, 2015, 17 No. 2:12-CV-01850-AC) 2015 WL 1767733, at *2 (63.4 hours); Schneider v. Colvin (E.D. Cal., 18 Feb. 9, 2016, No. 1:14-CV-0034-SKO) 2016 WL 500595, at *4 (55.4 hours)). 19 Other courts do conduct line-by-line reviews of fee petitions and deduct time sought for 20 non-compensable work and for certain time entry practices. See e.g., Henderson v. Comm'r of Soc. 21 Sec., No. 1:20-CV-0562 JLT, 2021 WL 2457540, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (eliminating time 22 23 entries for duplicative tasks); Mallard v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-01212 - JLT, 2019 WL 2389506, 24 at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2019) (same); Neil v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 495 F. App’x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 25 26 27 2 See United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000039 (last visited November 7, 2022). 1 2012) (unpublished) (affirming reductions for clerical tasks, vague narratives, block billing, and
2 use of quarter-hour billing increments).
3 Here, a line by line review reveals no excessive, vague, or non-compensable billing entries.
4 To the contrary, the entries contained detailed descriptions of the work performed. Moreover, 28 5 hours is more than reasonable to review a 1584 page administrative record and draft what appears 6 7 to be a detailed motion for summary judgment. The request will be granted.
8 III. Order
9 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs (Doc. 21) is granted. Fees of 10 $6,453.82 and costs of $400, for a total amount of $6,853.82 are awarded in favor of Plaintiff 11 William Edwin Aguilera and against Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, acting Commissioner of Social 12 Security. 13 Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff. The Department of the Treasury shall determine 14 15 whether Plaintiff owes a federal debt. If he does not, then the government shall cause the payment 16 of $6,853.82 in fees and costs to be made directly to Plaintiff’s Counsel, Jonathan Omar Peña, 17 pursuant to the assignment executed by Plaintiff (Doc. 21-2).3 18
19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: November 8, 2022 /s/ Gary S. Austin 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 3 See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 593, 597 (2010).