(SS) Adis v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 4, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00751
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JONATHAN ADIS, Case No. 2:24-cv-0751-KJM-JDP (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MICHELLE KING, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 18 (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 19 XVI of the Social Security Act. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 12 20 & 19. I recommend that plaintiff’s motion be denied and the Commissioner’s be granted. 21 Standard of Review 22 An Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying an application for disability 23 benefits will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and if the correct 24 legal standards have been applied. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th 25 Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 26 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 27 support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 28 1 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

2 testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.

3 2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

4 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”

5 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court will not affirm on

6 grounds upon which the ALJ did not rely. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)

7 (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”).

8 A five-step sequential evaluation process is used in assessing eligibility for Social

9 Security disability benefits. Under this process the ALJ is required to determine: (1) whether the

10 claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a medical

11 impairment (or combination of impairments) that qualifies as seve re; (3) whether any of the 12 claimant’s impairments meet or medically equal the severity of one of the impairments in 20 13 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and 14 (5) whether the claimant can perform other specified types of work. See Barnes v. Berryhill, 895 15 F.3d 702, 704 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps 16 of the inquiry, while the Commissioner bears the burden at the final step. Bustamante v. 17 Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 Background 19 Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability beginning February 15, 2019. 20 Administrative Record (“AR”) 239-48. After his application was denied initially and upon 21 reconsideration, plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 22 (“ALJ”). AR 36-59, 155-60, 171-77. On March 20, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding 23 plaintiff not disabled. AR 17-29. Specifically, the ALJ found that:

24 1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 25 June 4, 2021, the application date.

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27 2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder. 28 1 * * * 2 3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 3 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of

4 the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5 * * *

6 4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 7 finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

8 following nonexertional limitations: he can understand, remember and apply simple job instructions. He can maintain concentration, 9 persistence, and pace for simple job tasks. He can occasionally interact with the public. He can frequently interact with coworkers 10 and supervisors but no teamwork assignments with coworkers. He 11 can less than occasionally perform fast paced or hi gh quota jobs but he can maintain a regular productive pace. 12 * * * 13 5. The claimant has no past relevant work. 14

15 * * *

16 6. The claimant was born [in] 1966 and was 54 years old, which is defined as an individual of advanced age, on the date the 17 application was filed.

18 * * * 19 7. The claimant has at least a high school education. 20 * * * 21 8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant 22 does not have past relevant work. 23 9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 24 residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform. 25

* * * 26

27 10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since June 4, 2021, the date this application 28 was filed. 1 AR 19-28 (citations to the code of regulations omitted).

2 Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied the request. AR 1-6. He

3 now seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

4 Analysis

5 Plaintiff raises three arguments for reversing the ALJ’s decision. First, he asserts that the

6 ALJ failed to properly characterize plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. ECF No. 12-1 at 3.

7 Specifically, he contends that the ALJ failed to offer, as Ninth Circuit precedent demands,

8 “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting claimant’s testimony as to the severity of

9 his symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff argues that, here,

10 the ALJ did little more than summarize the medical evidence and “make a generalized statement”

11 that the record undermined claimant’s testimony. ECF No. 12-1 a t 5-6. 12 I disagree. At his oral hearing, plaintiff alleged that his schizophrenia prevented him from 13 working and that the medicine he was prescribed for that condition rendered him sluggish and 14 lacking in focus. ECF No. 11-1 at 45, 49-50, 58-60. In finding plaintiff non-disabled, the ALJ 15 properly cited various instances in the record showing that plaintiff’s condition had improved and 16 was stable with medication. Id. at 428-29, 436-38, 445-46, 533-34, 541-42, 551, 554-55. The 17 ALJ also found that plaintiff got along well with his brother, with whom he lived, and that he was 18 able to cook, clean, and do errands. Id. at 29. These records are, admittedly, not purely positive. 19 There are provider notes indicating that plaintiff showed belligerence to staff and that it was 20 difficult to envision him working even a part-time job. Id. at 559-60. These ambiguities do not 21 militate in favor of reversal, however, for two reasons. First, it is the province of the ALJ, not 22 this court, to resolve those ambiguities. See Treichler v. Comm’r of SSA, 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 23 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the 24 testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.”). Second, plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ 25 failed to offer sufficient or specific enough reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony is, as 26 explained above, belied by the decision and its various citations to the record. “[T]he ALJ must 27 specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what 28 evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 1 2001). The ALJ did so here. That argument is distinct from whether the ALJ interpreted the

2 record correctly or in the most persuasive manner. Regardless, an argument as to the correctness

3 of the interpretation would also fail because the ALJ’s determination was not irrational. See

4 Tomasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The court will uphold the ALJ’s

5 conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.”).

6 Plaintiff’s second argument is that the ALJ erred by improperly using his activities of

7 daily living to attack his credibility. ECF No. 12-1 at 7. This argument is also unpersuasive. An

8 ALJ may discount a claimant’s credibility on account of his daily activities if the “claimant is

9 able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of

10 physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be

11 sufficient to discredit an allegation of disabling excess pain.” Fai r v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 12 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff spending a substantial amount of time with his 13 brother, with whom he lived, cut against claims that his propensity for interpersonal conflict 14 would render him unable to work. ECF No. 11-1 at 29. Similarly, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s 15 contention that he slept well and was refreshed most mornings weighed against a finding that 16 sluggishness or tiredness precluded employment. Id. Thus, the ALJ properly found that the 17 qualities inherent in these activities, an ability to interact with others and the energy to perform 18 tasks, were transferable to a work setting. 19 This evidence is, of course, susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, as 20 plaintiff points out in his motion. It is also undoubtedly true that the ALJ could have drawn a 21 more explicit line between each activity and the skill or function transferable to a work setting. 22 Nevertheless, the argument is obvious to any reader taking the decision in good faith and “where 23 the ALJ’s ‘path may reasonably be discerned,’ the Court will still defer to the ALJ’s decision.” 24 Record v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00495-BAM, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56721, 2023 WL 2752097, 25 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting Wilson v. Berryhill, 757 F. App’x 595, 597 (9th Cir. 26 2019)). 27 Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred in failing to find that plaintiff had an 28 “extreme” limitation in interacting with others. ECF No. 12-1 at 8. The ALJ made this 1 | determination, however, based on the evidence—including medical findings from state agency 2 | psychological consultants, neither of whom found an “extreme” limitation in that regard. ECF 3 | No. 11-1 at 25, 119-20, 141-42. In arguing for an “extreme” limitation, plaintiff offers no 4 | countervailing medical evidence and appears to offer only his own, layman’s analysis of the 5 | record evidence. This argument should be rejected. 6 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 12, be DENIED. 8 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19, be 9 | GRANTED. 10 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor and 11 | close the case. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 13 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days 14 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 15 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 16 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 17 | objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 18 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 19 || appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 20 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 ( q oy — Dated: _ February 4, 2025 ow—— 24 JEREMY D,. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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