Srager v. Koenig
This text of 651 A.2d 752 (Srager v. Koenig) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiffs, Leslie Srager and Joan Srager, appeal from the order discharging a notice of lis pendens. The defendant asserts in his motion to dismiss that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because it was filed after the expiration of the seven day appeal period specified by General Statutes § 52-325c (b).1 We agree.
The plaintiffs brought a breach of contract action seeking damages and an injunction compelling the defendant to convey to them certain property located in Fairfield in accordance with an agreement between the parties. The plaintiffs recorded a notice of lis pen-dens in the Fairfield town clerk’s office on September 16,1993. Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-325a (c),2 the defendant filed a motion in the trial court for a discharge of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that there was no probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and notice of the court’s order was issued to the parties on September 14,1994. The plaintiffs appealed from the order on September 27, 1994.
Our Supreme Court recently considered the effect of statutory appeal periods on an appellate court’s subject matter jurisdiction in Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993). The dispositive issue in Ambroise was whether an appeal from the denial of a prejudgment remedy may be taken after the expiration of the seven day appeal period specified by General Statutes § 52-278l. The [471]*471court stated that “the proper analysis of a statutory time limitation on the right to appeal devolves into a question of statutory construction: did the legislature, in imposing the time limitation, intend to impose a subject matter jurisdictional requirement on the right to appeal?” Id., 764. The court reviewed the language, historical background and purpose of § 52-278l and concluded that the legislature did so intend. As the failure to take an appeal within the time constraints of the statute deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal was required.
Our review of General Statutes § 52-325c, informed by the Ambroise analysis, leads us to conclude that the failure to appeal within the specified time period deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.3 The language of § 52-325c (b) is clear and is virtually the same as the language of § 52-278l (b), which the Supreme Court held to impose such a jurisdictional requirement. In Ambroise, the court also stated that “[t]he literal reading of § 52-278l (b) is buttressed, moreover, by reference to § 52-278l (c), which reverses the ordinary rules regarding automatic stays on appeal by mandating that the order is not stayed by an appeal unless the party appealing posts a sufficient surety bond.” Id., 765-66. Likewise, a literal reading of the seven day appeal period in § 52-325c (b) is buttressed by the stay provisions set forth in that statute. Subsections (b) and (c) of § 52-325c4 require the appellant to post a bond if a stay is granted beyond the seven day appeal period.
[472]*472The purpose of a notice of lis pendens also supports a conclusion that the legislature intended to make the seven day appeal period jurisdictional. That purpose is to ensure “that the plaintiffs’ claim cannot be defeated by a prejudgment transfer of the property.” Williams v. Bartlett, 189 Conn. 471, 479, 457 A.2d 290, appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801, 104 S. Ct. 46, 78 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1983). The notice of lis pendens affects the defendant’s right to transfer his interest in the real property in question because the notice binds any subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer as if he were made a party to the action described in the lis pendens. See General Statutes § 52-325 (a) as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., October, 1993, No. 93-4, § 1; see also Dunham v. Dunham, 217 Conn. 24, 34, 584 A.2d 445 (1991).
The manifest purpose of the seven day appeal period following the discharge of a notice of lis pendens is to inform the parties within a very brief period of time whether that order is final or will be challenged. If no appeal is taken during the seven day period, the defendant property owner can transfer his interest in the property free of the notice of lis pendens. A conclusion [473]*473that the seven day appeal period is lengthened beyond that period would undermine that legislative purpose.
In this case, the plaintiffs appealed from the discharge of the notice of lis pendens thirteen days after the notice of that order was issued.5 The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this untimely appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
651 A.2d 752, 36 Conn. App. 469, 1994 Conn. App. LEXIS 453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/srager-v-koenig-connappct-1994.