RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0762-ME
S.R. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE DOUGLAS BRUCE PETRIE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-AD-00015
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND K.G.D.M., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND CETRULO, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: S.R. (“Mother”) appeals from findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment of the Boyle Family Court terminating her parental rights to her minor child, K.G.D.M. (“Child”). Upon careful review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“the Cabinet”) filed the root action in July 2024 seeking involuntary termination of rights of Mother.1 The circumstances which led to the filing began in fall 2023 when the Cabinet received a report of Child and Mother both threatening to commit suicide. Mother was also reported to be using methamphetamine in the presence of Child. While Mother was being assessed by social services, Child indicated a desire to kill himself. He was assessed and found to need mental health treatment. Mother did not agree to the need for treatment, but did take Child to an emergency room where he was released with directions to follow up with therapy.
Mother agreed to a case plan with the Cabinet that included no use of illegal drugs, drug testing, and obtaining needed medical treatment for Child. Within days of that agreement, the Cabinet was notified that Child had gone to a neighbor’s home and asked if he could stay there, indicating that he had not eaten for a while. The police were called and, upon arrival, the dispatch record indicates that Child then ran into Mother’s home and came out with a loaded gun that had been left on a chair. Police located a second loaded gun within Mother’s home. Mother was arrested and charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Child was briefly placed with a relative. During that placement, the
1 Child’s father died in October 2023.
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Cabinet received a report that Child had threatened to kill himself and a neighbor’s dog. The Cabinet obtained temporary custody so that Child could receive inpatient mental health treatment at Ridge for Crisis Stabilization Center.
According to the petition, the Cabinet had continuing concerns regarding Child’s mental health, problems with Mother’s substance abuse and criminal actions, and issues with Mother’s failure to provide food and other basic necessities. Child was placed in a foster home in October 2023. He has continued to receive therapy. In December 2023, Mother stipulated to abuse/neglect and was given a case plan to work which included a mental health assessment, parenting classes, substance abuse assessments, and drug screens. Mother did ultimately attend the mental health assessment and parenting classes. However, the record reflects that Mother repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled drug screens. Mother was incarcerated on some occasions during these proceedings, but we do not have the details of those dates and/or charges within the record on appeal. The social worker testified that she believed Mother was only incarcerated for a few months. Other than during those times of incarceration, she did exercise some visitation with Child. She was frequently late and sometimes did not appear at all. Mother concedes in her appeal that her visitation was “inconsistent” due to transportation, scheduling, or “other issues outside of her control.” In March 2024, Child was suspended from school after aggression against another child. In light of other
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disturbing comments, he was again admitted for inpatient mental health treatment, and, upon his release, interactions with Mother were limited and supervised.
In June 2024, the Cabinet sought to change its permanency plan from reunification to adoption which was approved by the family court. This action for involuntary termination was commenced, and a hearing on the termination was conducted on March 21, 2025. The sole witness at the hearing was Social Worker Laurie Eldridge (“SW Eldridge”). She testified that she had been involved with Child and Mother since November 2023. The court was asked to take judicial notice of the underlying juvenile court case pertaining to Child, with no objection.2 SW Eldridge testified that Mother’s underlying substance abuse issues were ongoing. She also testified that Mother had outstanding warrants for additional criminal charges, including bail jumping. While Mother had completed some parenting classes and undergone a substance abuse assessment, she continued to deny having any substance abuse problem and had refused to undergo over 100
2 Notably, Mother did not contest consideration of the juvenile record before the family court. However, it is clear from our review that the family court relied heavily upon that juvenile record. Such reliance is permissive. See E.L.T. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 647 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Ky. App. 2022) (citations omitted) (finding a juvenile court record admissible in a parental termination action because that record was a self-authenticating public document). A court may take judicial notice of such records and rulings, “whether requested or not.” Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 201(c). However, the juvenile record was not originally included with the record on appeal. As such, this Court sua sponte requested the juvenile court record for review on appeal. See Dunn v. Solomon Found., 723 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Ky. 2025) (citing Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 18 n.83 (Ky. 2010)) (“appellate court may properly consider, sua sponte, public records and government documents”). To maintain the confidentiality of those records and Child’s privacy, we shall not include details from that record beyond those necessary for a fair and just review.
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requested drug screens. In the only drug test she took, which was in 2023, she tested positive for methamphetamine. She had also admitted to using illegal drugs in open court in 2024, but otherwise she continued to deny having any substance abuse issues. SW Eldridge also testified that Mother knew of this court date, although she did not appear. She further testified that she confirmed the court date with Mother that week and personally heard Mother advise Child during a visitation that she was turning herself in on the pending criminal charges on that date. The family court noted that there were outstanding warrants for Mother’s arrest. Her court appointed attorney confirmed that he was aware of that as well, and otherwise did not explain his client’s absence.
Counsel for Mother asked very few questions of the sole witness, and the hearing was brief. The Cabinet asked the family court to take judicial notice of Mother’s pending criminal proceedings. From the bench, the court indicated that it had done so and that it was terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. The written findings included the following:
11. The Court having taken judicial notice of the court records of the underlying juvenile case 23-J-000126, including all paper and video records therein, and having incorporated such into this matter, has considered the relevant and admissible information pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 901(b)(7), 902(4), 201(b) and 803(8), and E.L.T. v. [Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs.,]
647 S.W.3d 561 (Ky. [App.] 2022), M.A.B. v.
Commonwealth Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 456 S.W.3d 407 (Ky. App. 2015), Lage v. Esterle, 591
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S.W.3d 416 (Ky. App. 2019), and Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.3d 304, (Ky. App. 2023).
12. During and at the conclusion of the offer of proof, this Court made oral factual findings which are readily apparent upon review of the video record and specifically incorporated those oral findings into this written order pursuant to Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811 (Ky. 2021).
13. The criminal history of and drug use by Respondent Mother as it appears in the underlying juvenile case 23-J- 000126 and judicial records within this Court reflect a pattern of conduct not conducive to a safe home environment for a child. Respondent Mother was offered throughout the pendency of both actions paid drug screens and assistance with access to additional resources that could facilitate improvement and return of the child. But recent drug screens, multiple failures to comply with court orders, failure to provide sufficient or any financial support for necessary care of the child’s needs, failure to visit with the child due to Respondent Mother’s own conduct, and lack of progress on her case plans all reveal that this child still does not have a safe home to which to return.
14. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services has provided or offered to provide all reasonable services to the Respondent Mother in an effort to keep the family together. However, Respondent Mother has failed to access these services to a degree that would lead to an improvement in the circumstances that brought about this case. Further, Respondent Mother has failed to maintain contact with her social workers, her court appointed attorney, and this Court.
15. [Child]’s physical, emotional, and mental health has improved while in care and is expected to continue to improve if termination is ordered.
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Additionally, the family court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest for termination of Mother’s parental rights to occur; found that Child was a neglected child as defined in KRS3 600.020; and found that the factors of KRS 625.090(3) had been met by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Decisions terminating parental rights are innately fact specific. P.S. v.
Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 596 S.W.3d 110, 115 (Ky. App. 2020). We review the family court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, giving due regard to the opportunity of the family court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Blackaby v. Barnes, 614 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Ky. 2021) (citing Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Ky. 2012) and CR4 52.01).
If the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and the correct law is applied, the family court’s ultimate decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Coffman v. Rankin, 260 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Ky. 2008). Abuse of discretion results when the decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principle.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citation omitted). Thus, the test is not whether we would have decided the matter differently, but whether the family court’s findings
3 Kentucky Revised Statute.
4 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
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are clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or whether it abused its discretion. B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Ky. App. 2005) (citations omitted). Questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes and application of legal standards, are reviewed de novo. Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky. 2006) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Mother’s appellate counsel filed an A.C. brief – pursuant to A.C. v.
Cabinet for Health & Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App. 2012) – stating counsel found no meritorious issues to present to this Court on appeal. Mother was notified of her right to file a supplemental brief, which she exercised. As Mother correctly notes in her supplemental filing, the filing of an A.C. brief does not relieve this Court of its obligation to independently review the record and determine whether reversible error occurred. Id. at 371. We do so now.
The Cabinet’s case was presented succinctly, even though there is every indication in the record that the worker was very familiar with the facts of the case and the status of Child, as well as Mother. The family court clearly had familiarity with the case as well, having presided over the juvenile proceedings.
Perhaps because of this familiarity, the Cabinet relied in large part on the juvenile proceedings, of which it asked the family court to take judicial notice, and simply referred to criminal proceedings involving Mother, which it also asked
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the family court to consider. As previously noted, the family court acted within its authority in considering that additional information within its knowledge. The entire record contains further information regarding Mother’s mental health, as well as Child’s mental health and behavior which has improved in foster care.
On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in terminating her parental rights because (1) the family court violated her due process rights; (2) the Cabinet did not use reasonable efforts to reunite her with Child; and (3) the family court’s findings under KRS 625.090 were not supported by substantial evidence.
First, Mother alleges due process violations as she “was not properly informed of key proceedings or the nature of the hearing or their significance.” She does not state, nor does she refer to any evidence within the record, that she did not know of the actual hearing date or the fact that it was a hearing to terminate her rights. Her own attorney indicated she had knowledge of the hearing and the nature of the hearing. SW Eldridge also testified that she informed Mother as to the date of the termination hearing. Due process merely requires Mother to be informed of the date and given an opportunity to be heard and defend against the Cabinet’s allegation. P.S., 596 S.W.3d at 116. The right to personally confront and cross-examine witnesses was not required in an action to terminate parental rights. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 344-47 (Ky.
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2006). As the record indicates Mother was informed of the hearing, but chose not to attend, we find no due process violation on appeal.
Next, Mother argues the Cabinet did not use reasonable efforts to reunite her with Child under KRS 625.090(3)(c). Whether the Cabinet provided reasonable efforts is one of the factors that a court must consider in determining the best interests of the child. Here, SW Eldridge testified that Mother had been offered services by the Cabinet including mental health assessments, parenting classes, free drug screenings, and supervised visitation, but the social worker did not believe there were any other services that could be offered that would support any reunification with Child. This Court has previously held that the foregoing efforts constitute “reasonable efforts” under Kentucky law. See C.A.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Ky. App. 2013). The family court found that the Cabinet had provided reasonable efforts but that Mother had failed to access these services to a degree that would lead to any improvement. Moreover, Child’s mental and physical health had improved considerably in foster care. We find no error in the court’s ruling in this regard.
Finally, Mother asserts that the family court’s findings under KRS 625.090 were not supported by substantial evidence. The law is well-established that the court must find only one of the factors set forth in KRS 625.090(2)(a)
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through (k).5 Here, the family court found grounds existed under KRS 625.090(e)
and (g).
The sole testimony on those grounds came from SW Eldridge, but she did testify that Mother had continuously failed to provide parental care and
5 (2) No termination of parental rights shall be ordered unless the Circuit Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one (1) or more of the following grounds:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days;
(b) That the parent has inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental means, serious physical injury;
(c) That the parent has continuously or repeatedly inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental means, physical injury or emotional harm;
(d) That the parent has been convicted of a felony that involved the infliction of serious physical injury to any child;
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child;
(f) That the parent has caused or allowed the child to be sexually abused or exploited;
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child;
(h) That:
1. The parent’s parental rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated;
2. The child named in the present termination action was born subsequent to or during the pendency of the previous termination; and 3. The conditions or factors which were the basis for the previous termination finding have not been corrected;
(i) That the parent has been convicted in a criminal proceeding of having caused or contributed to the death of another child as a result of physical or sexual abuse or neglect;
(j) That the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the cabinet for fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights; or (k) That the child has been removed from the biological or legal parents more than two (2)
times in a twenty-four (24) month period by the cabinet or a court.
KRS 625.090(2).
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protection for Child and that there was no reasonable expectation of improvement considering the age of Child, who was born in 2015. While there was no testimony as to Mother’s wage earning ability or housing situation, Mother had failed to pay child support and failed to provide food, clothing, shelter, or medical care for Child for a period of more than six months. The evidence was clear that Mother’s situation was still uncertain and, as the family court noted, “lack of progress on her case plans all reveal that this child still does not have a safe home to which to return.” While we would prefer a family court establish a more complete written record of its rationale, we cannot determine that its findings under KRS 625.090(2) lacked sufficient support in these circumstances.
Therefore, the family court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and that court did not misapply the law nor abuse its discretion. See B.C., 182 S.W.3d at 219-20. As such, we find no reversible error.
Again, appellate review of the decision to terminate parental rights affords great deference to a family court’s factual findings and permits a family court “wide discretion in terminating parental rights.” J.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 719 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Ky. App. 2025) (citation omitted). “When the facts are not seriously disputed, the appellate courts are disinclined to disturb trial- court findings.” Id. (quoting R.M. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 620 S.W.3d 32, 38 (Ky. 2021)) (cleaned up).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we must AFFIRM the judgment of the Boyle Family Court’s terminating Mother’s parental rights.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
Mary E. Wesley FAMILY SERVICES: Harrodsburg, Kentucky Dilissa G. Milburn
S.R., pro se Mayfield, Kentucky Hustonville, Kentucky