Squire v. Abbott

23 Ohio Law. Abs. 222, 8 Ohio Op. 134, 1937 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1181
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 12, 1937
DocketNo 428882
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 23 Ohio Law. Abs. 222 (Squire v. Abbott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Squire v. Abbott, 23 Ohio Law. Abs. 222, 8 Ohio Op. 134, 1937 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

[223]*223OPINION

By HURD, J.

This is a suit brought by the Superintendent of Banks of the State of Ohio against the stockholders of the Union Trust Company, Cleveland, Ohio, for superadded stock liability under the provisions of Article XIII, §3, of the Constitution of the State of Ohio and the statutes thereunder enacted. The action comes before this court at this time for final hearing, upon the issues joined. This court has heretofore, on the 6th day of April, 1936, ruled on numerous motions and demurrers filed herein involving separate propositions of law raised by said motions and demurrers (see Squire, Supt. v Abbott et, 5 Ohio Opinions 352).

We shall not attempt to review at this time these earlier rulings except insofar as it may be necessary so to do in applying legal principles to the facts developed by the testimony but shall attempt to confine this opinion to a discussion of new issues now presented for final determination.

The fundamental question presented by the issues is whether or not the defendants, the stockholders of the Union Trust Company, shall answer for the superadded liability assessed against them by the Superintendent of Banks, who, it is conceded, is now and has been since June 15th, 1933, in charge of the business and property of said bank for purposes of liquidation. One of the serious issues raised in this case ia without doubt that issue raised by the defendants who charge in their answers that the Superintendent of Banks, in his determination that the assets of the Union Trust Company would be insufficient to pay the liabilities of such bank, was guilty of an abuse of discretion in that the bank is now and was then in fact solvent, and that the Superintendent wrongfully, unreasonably, arbitrarily, unjustly, illegally and oppressively found the contrary to be true.

This charge, if true, would constitute a fraud, and the court should by reason of such fraud invalidate the assessment. It is a fundamental proposition of law that “fraud vitiates everything that it touches,” and if this charge is substantiated the court should not only invalidate the superadded liability assessment against these defendants who have answered, but against all defendants.

Another serious issue raised by the answers of certain defendants is that the Superintendent was guilty of an abuse of discretion in that the statement of condition, upon which such determination was predicated, contained an item of loans due to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the security of which it is conceded the assets of the Union Trust Company were turned over to said Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The defendants complained that such action being without the consent and approval of the directors and stockholders was without warrant of law, a violation of their constitutional rights, and that by reason thereof the assessment of superadded liability should be set aside by this court.

Other issues are presented, some of more or less general importance, and some involving facts peculiar to particular defendants. We shall attempt in this opinion to discuss questions only of general importance as we are filing contemporaneously herewith separate findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein the cases of all defendants are separately considered and determined.

Coming now to a consideration of the allegations charging that the bank was in [224]*224fact solvent and that the Superintendent abused his discretion in that he acted arbitrarily, unreasonably and inequitably, we deem it germane to call attention to the theory of law under which such charges were entertained by the court and to discuss briefly supporting authorities.

It has been held that the determination of the Superintendent of Banks in a case such as this is not subject to attack in a suit to enforce the superadded liability; that the action of the Superintendent of Banks is in the nature of an “official act” or a “public act” which cannot become an issuable fact in the absence of fraud, or wilful act on his part amounting to a fraud. In other words mere error of judgment is not a defense.

Baumgardner v State ex, 48 Oh Ap 5, (16 Abs 671).

State ex Fulton v Murfee, Blossom & Co., 4 O.O. 443, (20 Abs 176).

Trustees of Ohio Wesleyan University v State ex Fulton, 50 Oh Ap 51, (18 Abs 487).

Collier v Smith, (Tex. Civil App.), 169 SW 1108;

Chaney v Sherman, 129 N. Y. 993;

Thompson v Bank Commissioner, 119 Olda. 166;

Davis v Moore, 197 SW 295;

Broderick v American General Corp., 71 Fed. 2nd. 864;

Donoghey v Mason, 190 Ark. 123;

Ames v American Nat’l Bank (Va.), 176 SE 204;

State ex v Weinberger, 44 Oh Ap 264, (13 Abs 554); page 269 of the opinion.

Bailey et v State of Ohio ex Squire, Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Case No. 15187, (22 Abs 145) (involving claims against stockholders of the Guardian Trust Co. of Cleveland for superadded liability).

In the latter -case Lieghley, Presiding Judge, in a well considered and logically reasoned memorandum opinion said:—

“A decision of the issue of whether or not the finding or ascertainment of the Superintendent as to insolvency is conclusive determines the questions of the sufficiency of the petition and the demurrer to the interrogatories, and the demand for a jury to try the issue of insolvency. The defendants deny the power or the authority of the Legislature to repose the duty and responsibility in a superintendent to make a final determination of the conditions of the bank and reserving only to the court the responsibility of deciding who are stockholders and how much each owes.
“Corporations are creatures of the state. Corporations organized to receive money on deposit are imbued with a -public interest. The state is the source of the right to incorporate for such purpose. It is not in dispute that the state may regulate such institutions as going concerns. It seems that the right to legally direct and control such institutions being conceded, the right to manage the liquidation of such institutions on becoming insolvent naturally follows. The state has created a state agency in the form of a banking department manned by and headed with the Superintendent of Banks especially and specifically empowered to regulate and liquidate. In the absence of a claim substantially made that the Superintendent abused his discretion in making such ascertainment of the condition of any bank — and such claim has not been made herein — it is my conclusion that such finding of the Superintendent is conclusive and final.”

This court in an earlier opinion reported in 5 Ohio Opinions, page 352, Squire v Abbott, said:

“In such action the application cannot be defeated by showing that the Superintendent erred in his determination and that the assets of the bank were in excess of its liabilities at the time it failed to meet its obligations, at the time it was taken over by the Superintendent for liquidation, or at the time the action was filed.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State of Ohio ex rel. Squire v. Porter
129 P.2d 691 (California Supreme Court, 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
23 Ohio Law. Abs. 222, 8 Ohio Op. 134, 1937 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/squire-v-abbott-ohioctapp-1937.