Squire, Supt. v. Goulder

2 N.E.2d 2, 131 Ohio St. 106, 131 Ohio St. (N.S.) 106, 5 Ohio Op. 465, 1936 Ohio LEXIS 323
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedMay 13, 1936
DocketNo 25800
StatusPublished

This text of 2 N.E.2d 2 (Squire, Supt. v. Goulder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Squire, Supt. v. Goulder, 2 N.E.2d 2, 131 Ohio St. 106, 131 Ohio St. (N.S.) 106, 5 Ohio Op. 465, 1936 Ohio LEXIS 323 (Ohio 1936).

Opinions

Day, J.

In the amended petition filed by Goulder there was an allegation to the effect that at the time of the receipt of the deposit the bank was insolvent, and that the receipt of deposits under such circum *108 stances constituted fraud. However, at the trial of the case no evidence whatever was introduced in support of that allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed but must be affirmatively proved. Since there is no testimony whatever bearing upon the element of fraud we shall entirely eliminate that question from consideration.

Whether Goulder is entitled to have his claim given preference over the claims of other depositors of the bank depends entirely upon the relationship which he and the bank sustained to one another. The parties agree that if the deposit of the checks was made for collection only, the relationship of principal and agent arose, entitling Goulder to a preference. If, on the other hand, the deposit was made and accepted for credit, the relationship of debtor and creditor arose, by reason of which Goulder would not be entitled to a preference.

The question, therefore, presented for our consideration is whether the deposit of these checks was made for credit or for collection only. If the deposit was one for credit, then title to the checks passed from the depositor to the bank immediately upon the acceptance of the deposit. If, on the other hand, the deposit was for collection only, then title to the checks did not pass but remained in the depositor.

The general rule is that a deposit will be deemed one for credit rather than for collection, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary.

“A deposit in a bank is presumed to be general iis the absence of an agreement to the contrary.” 3 Ruling Case Law, 517, Section 146. See also Alston v. State, 92 Ala., 124, 9 So., 732, 13 L. R. A., 659; Officer Admr., v. Officer, 120 la., 389, 94 N. W., 947, 98 Am. St. Rep., 365; Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C., 196, 12 S. E., 245, 22 Am. St. Rep., 870; Bank of Marysville v. Windisch-Muhlhauser Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St., 151, 33 N. E., 1054, 40 Am. St. Rep., 660, and note; Leaphart *109 v. Commercial Bank, 45 S. C., 563, 23 S. E., 939, 55 Am. St. Rep., 800, 33 L. R. A., 700; Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke, State Supervisor of Banking, 126 Wash., 510, 218 P., 232, 37 A. L. R., 611.

“Unless there is some agreement to the contrary, deposits received by the bank become its property; they belong to it, and can be loaned or otherwise disposed of by it, as any other money belonging to the bank.” 3 Ruling Case Law, 521, Section 149. See also New York County Natl. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S., 138, 24 S. Ct., 199, 48 L. Ed., 380; State, ex rel. First Natl. Bank, v. Bartley, State Treas., 39 Neb., 353, 58 N. W., 172, 23 L. R. A., 67; Bank of Marysville v. Windisch-Muhlhauser Breioing Co., supra.

Unless otherwise especially agreed, the deposit of a check in a bank does not constitute a deposit for collection but a sale of the paper to the bank and passes title to the bank subject to the right of rescission if the paper subsequently proves to be without value. Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash., 150, 210 P., 499, 25 A. L. R., 716.

The record is silent as to any special agreement to the contrary, and the whole dispute centers around the wording of the deposit slip used in this case, which reads as follows:

“The Standard Trust Bank
“Cleveland, O., 12-19-1931
“For Credit oe “Martin N. Goulder
“In receiving items for deposit or collection, this bank acts only as depositors’ collecting agent and assumes no responsibility beyond the exercise of due care. All items are credited subject to final payment in cash or solvent credits. This Bank will not be liable for default or negligence of its duly selected correspondents nor for losses in transit, and each correspondent so selected shall not be liable except for its *110 own negligence. This Bank or its correspondents may send items, directly or indirectly, to any Bank including the payor, and accept its draft or credit as conditional payment in lieu of cash; it may charge back any item at any time before final payment, whether returned or not, also any item drawn on this Bank not good at close of business on day deposited.
“Please list each check separately
“Dollars Cents
“Bills
“Gold
1 ‘ Silver
“Checks Enter Separately 1200.00
“ 12.00
“ 52.50
“ 21.50
“ 8.00
“ .80
“ ' .80
“Total 1295.60
“See that all checks and drafts are endorsed”

Counsel for Goulder contend that the wording of the deposit slip means that the bank received the items for deposit only as the collecting agent of the depositor; that the deposit slip constitutes a binding agreement between Goulder and the bank; that since the deposit slip provides that the bank is only the depositor’s collecting agent the deposit of the checks did not pass title to the bank.

Let us therefore now direct our attention to the determination of the meaning of the wording on that slip. However, in doing so, we shall also direct our attention to the printed matter appearing in the commercial pass book in which the credit was entered, the same likewise being in the record, which reads as follows:

*111 “Always bring your book with your deposits.
“See that your entries agree with your ticket.
“All items payable outside of this city are taken with the understanding that this hank acts as your collecting agent and beyond using diligence does not assume responsibility for same until returns are actually received by them. (Italics ours.)
“The Standard Trust Bank “Cleveland, Ohio”

It may be noted that the wording in the pass book designates the bank as collecting agent for ‘ ‘ all items payable outside of this city,” from which we are justified in concluding that items payable within the city are not taken “with the understanding that this bank acts as your collecting agent, ’ ’ but that such items are received for credit.

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Bluebook (online)
2 N.E.2d 2, 131 Ohio St. 106, 131 Ohio St. (N.S.) 106, 5 Ohio Op. 465, 1936 Ohio LEXIS 323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/squire-supt-v-goulder-ohio-1936.