Spruill v. White

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Spruill v. White

116 S.E.2d 165, 253 N.C. 71, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 452

DecidedSeptember 28, 1960

StatusPublished

This text of 116 S.E.2d 165 (Spruill v. White) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Spruill v. White, 116 S.E.2d 165, 253 N.C. 71, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 452 (N.C. 1960).

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Opinion

PeR CuRiam.

None of the deeds constituting plaintiffs’ chains of title contains any restriction purporting to limit the use of the property conveyed thereby to residential purposes. Nor does the recorded plat bear any notation indicating that lots appearing thereon are to be sold subject to such restriction. Moreover, it does not appear, and defendant does not contend, that the deed for any of the twenty lots conveyed subject to such restriction contains any provision pur[73]*73porting to subject C. W. Spruill’s remaining property to such restriction or to obligate him to convey his remaining property subject to such restriction. (See Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E. 2d 360.) In short, nothing in this record shows that a restriction limiting the use thereof to residential purposes was ever imposed at anytime or in any manner on plaintiffs’ lots. See Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E. 2d 197. Hence, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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PeR CuRiam.

None of the deeds constituting plaintiffs’ chains of title contains any restriction purporting to limit the use of the property conveyed thereby to residential purposes. Nor does the recorded plat bear any notation indicating that lots appearing thereon are to be sold subject to such restriction. Moreover, it does not appear, and defendant does not contend, that the deed for any of the twenty lots conveyed subject to such restriction contains any provision pur[73]*73porting to subject C. W. Spruill’s remaining property to such restriction or to obligate him to convey his remaining property subject to such restriction. (See Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E. 2d 360.) In short, nothing in this record shows that a restriction limiting the use thereof to residential purposes was ever imposed at anytime or in any manner on plaintiffs’ lots. See Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E. 2d 197. Hence, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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116 S.E.2d 165, 253 N.C. 71, 1960 N.C. LEXIS 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spruill-v-white-nc-1960.

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