Sprint Solutions, Inc. v. Aldridge

50 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 2014 WL 4958607
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedSeptember 26, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 1:14-CV-0128-TWP-DML
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 50 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (Sprint Solutions, Inc. v. Aldridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sprint Solutions, Inc. v. Aldridge, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 2014 WL 4958607 (S.D. Ind. 2014).

Opinion

FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS REGINALD ALDRIDGE, ARRICE AL-DRIDGE AND DAMION TRANSOU

TANYA WALTON PRATT, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Sprint Solutions, Inc., Sprint Communications Company L.P. and Boost Worldwide, Inc. (collectively “Sprint” or “Plaintiffs”), brought the above-captioned lawsuit against Defendants Reginald Al-dridge, Arrice Aldridge and Damion Tran-sou (collectively “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices involving the unauthorized [1025]*1025and deceptive bulk purchase and resale of new Sprint prepaid and postpaid wireless telephones (collectively “Sprint Phones” or “Phones”) through various methods, including the use of “runners,” “credit mules,” account fraud, and mobile device theft; the theft of Sprint’s subsidy investment in the Phones; the unlawful access of Sprint’s protected computer systems and wireless network; the trafficking of Sprint’s protected and confidential computer passwords; and the willful infringement of Sprint’s trademark rights (collectively, the “Bulk Handset Theft and Trafficking Scheme” or the “Scheme”).

Defendants and their co-conspirators perpetrate the Bulk Handset Trafficking Scheme by acquiring large quantities of new Sprint Phones directly from Sprint and/or from Sprint authorized dealers and. retailers, and by soliciting others to acquire new Sprint Phones in large quantities for the benefit of Defendants. In particular, Defendants have acquired at least 106 Sprint Phones by placing fraudulent orders on the accounts of legitimate customers and reselling those Sprint Phones for profit. Defendants and its co-conspirators acquire the Sprint Phones with the knowledge and intent that the Phones will not be activated for use on the Sprint wireless network. Instead, the new Phones are trafficked and resold overseas where phones are not subsidized by wireless carriers (as they are in the United States) and where phones are not as readily available, and, thereby command high prices.

In some cases, Defendants acquire the Sprint Phones with the knowledge and intent that the Phones will be computer-hacked, or “unlocked,” to disable software installed in the Phones by the manufacturers at the request and expense of Sprint, which enables activation of the Sprint Phones exclusively on Sprint’s wireless system. The software allows Sprint to offer the Phones at a discount to the consumer while protecting Sprint’s subsidy investment in the Phone. Plaintiffs further allege that the illegally unlocked Phones are trafficked and resold as new by Defendants, at a premium, under the Sprint trademarks.

Sprint Phones are sold subject to terms and conditions (“Terms and Conditions”) which conspicuously restrict and limit the sale and use of the Phones. These Terms and Conditions are set forth in printed inserts that are packaged with each Phone and are posted on Sprint’s website. Pursuant to the Terms and Conditions of Sprint Phones, purchasers agree, among other things: (a) to pay the service charges and other related fees; (b) to activate the Sprint Phones on the Sprint CDMA network; (c) not to resell the Sprint Phones and related products and services; and (d) not to use the Phones for a purpose that could damage or adversely affect Sprint.

As a result of Defendants’ involvement in the Bulk Handset Trafficking Scheme, Sprint asserted claims against Defendant for state common law unfair competition, tortious interference with business relationships and prospective advantage, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conspiracy to induce breach of contract, common law fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq., federal trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, federal common law trademark infringement and false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B), contributory trademark infringement and conversion. Based on the undisputed positions advocated by Plaintiffs, and having reviewed the Complaint and file and being otherwise duly and fully advised in the premises, it is hereby,

[1026]*1026ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over all the parties and all of the claims set forth in Sprint’s Complaint.

2. The Court finds that Sprint has the right to use and enforce rights in the standard character Sprint® mark and stylized Sprint® Virgin Mobile, payLo, Assurance Wireless and Boost Mobile trademarks (collectively, the “Sprint Marks”), as depicted below:

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Sprint uses the Sprint Marks on and in connection with its telecommunications products and services. The Sprint Marks are valid, distinctive, protectable, famous, have acquired secondary meaning, and are associated exclusively with Sprint.

3. The Court finds that the Terms and Conditions and the language in and on the packaging constitute a valid and binding contract enforceable between Sprint and each of its customers. The Court finds the Terms and Conditions set forth certain rights and restrictions on the use of Sprint Phones. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions: (a) require that the customer pay applicable service charges and other related fees; (b) indicate that the Phone is designed to be activated on the Sprint CDMA network; (c) prohibit resale of Sprint Phones and related products and services; and (d) prohibit using the Phones for a purpose that could damage or adversely affect Sprint, for which Sprint is entitled to relief.

4. The Court finds that the conduct set forth in the Complaint constitutes the following violations: common law unfair competition (Count 1); tortious interference with business relationships and prospective advantage (Count 2); civil conspiracy (Count 3); unjust enrichment (Count 4); conspiracy to induce breach of contract (Count 5); common law fraud (Count 6); fraudulent misrepresentation (Count 7); trafficking in computer passwords, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (Count 8); unauthorized access, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C) (Count 9); unauthorized access with intent to defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (Count 10); federal trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count 11); federal common law trademark infringement and false advertising, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B) (Count 12); contributory trademark infringement (Count 13); and conversion (Count 14); and such conduct has caused substantial and irreparable harm to Sprint, and will continue to cause substantial and [1027]*1027irreparable harm to Sprint unless enjoined.

5. Sprint has suffered damages, including loss of goodwill and damage to its reputation, as a result of Defendants’ conduct that far exceeds the $5,000 aggregate annual damages under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
50 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 2014 WL 4958607, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sprint-solutions-inc-v-aldridge-insd-2014.