Spriggs v. City of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 12, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01006
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND SPRIGGS, Case No.: 24-CV-1006 W (KSC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; OFFICER AMENDED COMPLAINT [DOC. 15] CAMERON WATSON; and DOES 1 15 through 50, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s, City of San Diego (the “City”), Motion to 20 Dismiss Plaintiff’s, Raymond Spriggs, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Mtn. 21 [Doc. 15].) The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral 22 argument. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons provided below, the Court GRANTS 23 IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Dismiss. 24 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On January 9, 2022, Mr. Raymond Spriggs, a Black man over 50 years-old, alleges 27 he was sitting in a car in a parking lot waiting for his cousin to return from the store. 28 (SAC [Doc. 14] at 3, ¶ 8.) While waiting, Mr. Spriggs observed Officer Cameron Watson 1 and other officers staring at him, making him feel uneasy. (Id. at ¶ 10.) When his cousin 2 returned, the two began driving away only to be immediately stopped by the officers who 3 had been previously staring at Mr. Spriggs. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 4 Asserting that “illegally tinted windows” prompted the stop, the officers demanded 5 to see Mr. Spriggs’s identification. The SAC asserts that the windows were not illegally 6 tinted. (Id.) At first, Mr. Spriggs refused to produce identification because he was a 7 passenger. (Id.) However, one officer peered into the vehicle and claimed to see 8 marijuana, which Mr. Spriggs asserts was untrue. (Id.) The officers arrested Mr. Spriggs 9 and began searching the car. (Id.) Although he was arrested, no citation was issued for 10 the allegedly illegally tinted windows and no charges were brought against Mr. Spriggs 11 based on that incident. (Id.) 12 Then, in March 2023, Mr. Spriggs was pulled over again for allegedly illegally 13 tinted windows. (Id. at 4, ¶ 12.) The SAC again asserts that the windows were not 14 illegally tinted. (Id.) The officers asked for Mr. Spriggs’s identification, which he 15 provided. (Id.) However, the officers claimed they needed to perform a “safety” search 16 of the vehicle. (Id.) Remembering the prior incident with police where he was detained 17 and arrested, Mr. Spriggs alleges that he consented to the search out of fear of retaliation. 18 (Id.) The officers conducted the search but did not find anything unlawful inside the car. 19 (Id.) When the search turned up fruitless, the officers let Mr. Spriggs leave without 20 revisiting the tinted windows issue. (Id.) 21 Since these two encounters with the police, Mr. Spriggs claims that on various 22 occasions he has seen San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers parked outside and 23 staring at his home. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Mr. Spriggs believes that by patrolling and staring at 24 his home, the officers are trying to intimidate him. (Id.) As a result of these incidents 25 and the prior traffic stops, Mr. Spriggs claims that he has suffered economic and 26 emotional injuries, including severe emotional distress, anxiety, stress, anger, trouble 27 sleeping, mistrust of police, and humiliation. (Id. at ¶ 14.) 28 1 In response, on March 11, 2024, Mr. Spriggs brought various civil rights and tort 2 claims against the City and various officers in the San Diego Superior Court. (Complaint 3 [Doc. 1-2].) The City then filed a Notice of Removal to have the action heard in the 4 United States District Court for the Southern District of California. (Notice of Removal 5 [Doc. 1].) The Complaint was amended [Doc. 3], but this Court granted the City’s 6 Motion to Dismiss the FAC with leave to amend [Doc. 13]. Mr. Spriggs then filed the 7 Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 14], and the City has moved to dismiss [Doc. 15]. 8 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to 11 dismiss for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12”). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s 13 sufficiency. See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 14 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal 15 theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter 16 Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). Additionally, in evaluating the 17 motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must “construe 18 them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 19 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 8(a)(2) (“Rule 8”). The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual 23 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. 24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). The allegations in the complaint must 25 “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 26 plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). 27 While well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, a court is not required to 28 accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable 1 inferences. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State 2 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 4 III. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS (CLAIMS 1 AND 2) 5 Mr. Spriggs has brought a False Arrest and False Imprisonment claim against Officer 6 Watson and other DOE officers based on the two alleged traffic stops. (SAC at 8–9, ¶¶ 19– 7 30.) Specifically, Mr. Spriggs asserts the traffic stops were unconstitutional searches and 8 seizures under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 8, ¶¶ 21–22; 9, ¶¶ 29.) In response, the City 9 has moved to dismiss these claims arguing that because Mr. Spriggs does not allege that 10 he owned the car, he lacks Fourth Amendment standing to contest “the illegal search of his 11 vehicle.” (Mtn. [Doc. 15] at 7: 17–24.) Therefore, Mr. Spriggs has failed to state a claim 12 that the traffic stops were unconstitutional. However, as explained below, the Supreme 13 Court has held that a passenger is seized during a traffic stop and has standing to challenge 14 the reasonableness of the stop. Therefore, Mr. Spriggs has standing to challenge the initial 15 traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. 16 17 i. FOURTH AMENDMENT 18 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the 19 government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment ‘applies to all seizures of 20 the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional 21 arrest.’” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 22 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). “Even a brief 23 traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore is 24 subject [] to the ‘constitutional imperative’ that it be reasonable under the 25 circumstances.” United States v. Brooks, No. CR 17-16-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 297572, at 26 *3 (D. Mont. Jan. 4, 2018) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). 27 “In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s strictures, an investigatory stop by the 28 police may be made only if the officer in question has ‘a reasonable suspicion [or 1 probable cause] supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot[.]’” 2 Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1129 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 3 (1989)). “A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.” United 4 States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). Police may conduct traffic 5 stops based on “individualized ‘reasonable suspicion’ [or probable cause] of unlawful 6 conduct.” Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Whren, 7 517 U.S. at 809–10 and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). 8 Determining if the officers in question had “reasonable suspicion” or “probable 9 cause” to initiate the traffic stop is an “objective” inquiry, concerned only with whether 10 the stop was “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances. Ornelas v. United States, 11 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). However, courts may not delve into “concerns about improper 12 motives and pretext” to invalidate otherwise lawful stops supported by reasonable 13 suspicion or probable cause. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 739 (2011) (citing 14 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812). 15 16 ii. ANALYSIS 17 The City argues that Mr. Spriggs’s Fourth Amendment claims must be dismissed 18 because he lacks standing to challenge the vehicle searches. Put simply, the City asserts 19 that because Mr. Spriggs did not allege that he owned the vehicle in either traffic stop, he 20 did not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy” or a property interest in them 21 sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment protections. (Mtn. at 7:17–20.) The City’s 22 argument is premised on a line of cases that hold that a passenger in a vehicle, without 23 more, cannot contest the validity of a search under the Fourth Amendment because they 24 lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 25 128, 149–50 (1978); United States v. Schram, 901 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) 26 (citations omitted) (“A person may not claim his Fourth Amendment rights have been 27 violated if that person lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises 28 searched.”); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (unauthorized 1 driver of a rental car without permission from owner lacked standing to challenge 2 search). 3 Although a mere passenger generally does not have standing to challenge a search, 4 the City’s argument is flawed because Mr. Spriggs is challenging the traffic stop as an 5 unlawful seizure. The Supreme Court has explained that a passenger of a vehicle is 6 seized during a traffic stop and has standing to challenge the reasonableness of the stop. 7 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251–52 (2007); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 8 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (emphasis added) (“A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is 9 pulled over . . . for a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers 10 ordinarily continues . . . for the duration of the stop.”); Villanueva v. California, 986 F.3d 11 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in 12 Brendlin that when a traffic stop occurs the passenger is also seized, because during a 13 traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver.”); United States 14 v. Bautista, 484 F. App’x 142, 142–43 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (“Law 15 enforcement agents may briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate . . . . Such a stop 16 is a Fourth Amendment seizure of everyone in the vehicle and each occupant has 17 standing to challenge the stop.”); United States v. Macias-Encinas, No. 06-CR-01708-H, 18 2009 WL 3088394, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009), aff’d, 430 F. App’x 582 (9th 19 Cir. 2011) (passenger lacked standing to challenge the search of the car, but had standing 20 to challenge the traffic stop as a seizure); United States v. Marcum, 797 F. App’x 278, 21 281 (9th Cir. 2019). 22 Mr. Spriggs’s False Arrest and False Imprisonment claims challenge the traffic 23 stops as unlawful seizures, asserting that the officers could not have relied on the alleged 24 window tint as a basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct the traffic 25 stop. (SAC at 8, ¶ 22) (“At the time of PLAINTIFF’S arrests and detentions during both 26 incidents, [the officers] had no probable cause to believe that PLAINTIFF had committed 27 a crime.”). The SAC alleges that during the two traffic stops, Mr. Spriggs was pulled 28 over for “illegally tinted windows.” (SAC at 3, ¶ 11; 4, ¶ 12.) However, the SAC adds 1 that “the tinting on the vehicle was not illegal,” an allegation that the Court must accept 2 as true for purposes of the current motion. (Id.) See Keates v. Koile, 888 F.3d 1228, 3 1235 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen a district court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a 4 claim . . . [it] consider[s] whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts, taken as true, [] 5 support the claim . . . .”). 6 Regardless of whether Mr. Spriggs was a passenger or if he owned the car, he has 7 standing to challenge whether the traffic stops were supported by reasonable suspicion or 8 probable cause. Therefore, the City’s motion to dismiss the first two causes of action is 9 denied. 10 11 IV. MONELL LIABILITY 12 Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, municipalities such as 13 the City cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their 14 employees. 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Instead, “a municipality can be found liable under 15 § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” 16 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (emphasis in original). 17 Thus, to be liable under Section 1983 for a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show that 18 either: (1) “a [municipal] employee committed the alleged constitutional violation 19 pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which 20 constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity”; (2) “the 21 individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making 22 authority and that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official 23 governmental policy”; or (3) “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a 24 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Mendoza v. County 25 of San Bernadino, 2020 WL 2066142, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2020) (quoting Gillette v. 26 Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342,1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)). 27 // 28 // 1 i. ANALYSIS 2 Mr. Spriggs asserts several Monell claims against the City for Failure to Properly 3 Screen and Hire (SAC at 9); Failure to Properly Train (id. at 10); Failure to Properly 4 Supervise and Discipline (id. at 11); and an Unconstitutional Practice or Policy (id. at 9– 5 12.) For the same reasons as stated in this Court’s prior order [Doc. 13], Mr. Spriggs has 6 failed to state valid Monell claims. See Spriggs v. City of San Diego, No. 24-CV-01006- 7 W-KSC, 2024 WL 4469218, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024). In that order, this Court 8 recognized two specific deficiencies with Mr. Spriggs’s claims. First, Mr. Spriggs had 9 failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 10 However, the amendments made in the SAC plausibly state a claim that Mr. Spriggs’s 11 Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Therefore, one of the issues with the Complaint 12 has been resolved. 13 The second problem was that Mr. Spriggs had failed to demonstrate what he 14 believes is deficient about the City’s screening/hiring, training, supervision/discipline 15 practices, or allege any facts demonstrating a custom, policy, or practice of SDPD 16 officers improperly acting without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The 17 constitutional issue Mr. Spriggs presents in the SAC is an alleged systemic problem of 18 SDPD officers initiating traffic stops without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 19 However, as explained in the prior order, the facts alleged in the SAC do not support that 20 conclusion. 21 Mr. Spriggs cites several SDPD policies in the SAC, but their inclusion is to no 22 avail. Those policies include: (1) searches and stops for those on probation cannot be 23 arbitrary, capricious, or harassing; (2) traffic policies must be policed equally and fairly; 24 and (3) police must adhere to principles of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to 25 reduce and eliminate bias in policing. (SAC at 7, ¶ 17.) Then, Mr. Spriggs asserts that 26 the policies are either “ineffective, are being ignored, or there are failures in training, 27 hiring, and/or retention of officers.” (Id.) While unclear from the SAC, Mr. Spriggs 28 appears to be asserting a Monell claim based on deliberate indifference. To prevail on a 1 deliberate indifference claim, he must show (1) inadequate training and (2) “deliberate 2 indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into 3 contact.” See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted) (bracket in 4 original). However, in Connick, the Supreme Court explained 5 ‘deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. 6 Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a 7 particular omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent 8 if the policymakers choose to retain that program. 9 Id. at 62 (internal citations omitted). 10 In order to demonstrate a municipality’s policymakers had notice that their training 11 program was inadequate, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 12 employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ . . . .” Id. at 62. For a single constitutional violation 13 to trigger government liability, the violation must be highly predictable and the obvious 14 consequence of an inadequate training program. Id. at 63–64. 15 Here, Mr. Spriggs has done nothing more than name various SDPD policies with 16 the statement “given PLAINTIFF’S experience and the experience of scores of other 17 citizens of color, it is clear that SDPD’s policies are ineffective, are being ignored, or 18 there are failures in training, hiring, and/or retention of officers.” (SAC at 7, ¶ 17.) 19 However, these allegations are conclusory and not supported by facts alleged in the SAC. 20 To prevail, Mr. Spriggs would have to point to specific deficiencies in the policies or 21 their implementation and allege facts demonstrating the City was on notice of those 22 deficiencies. See Piccini v. City of San Diego, No. 21-CV-01343-W-KSC, 2022 WL 23 2788753, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2022). 24 Mr. Spriggs also points to various studies and statements to support his Monell 25 claims, including: 26 • Senate Bill 50 (“the Bill) in California aimed to prohibit police officers from 27 stopping or detaining a driver for a low-level infraction, unless an independent 28 1 basis for the traffic stop exists. (SAC at 4, ¶ 8.) A statement by the Bill’s 2 author that “Black, Latinx, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander Californians 3 are more likely to be subject to pretextual stops than their white counterparts 4 . . . .” (Id.) 5 • Research for the Bill indicating that “pretext stops” have failed to 6 “meaningfully improve safety.” (Id. at 5, ¶ 9.) 7 • A San Diego State University study of the SDP showing that Black and 8 Hispanic people are more likely to be stopped and questioned. (Id. at ¶ 10.) 9 • An NBC San Diego study showing that Black people are five times more 10 likely to be prosecuted for minor offenses. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 11 • The National Justice Database City Report on the SDPD, finding that Black 12 citizens made up 14.8% of all people who experienced traffic stops from 2017 13 to 2020, and when stopped, Black people were 2.5 times more likely to be 14 searched than White people. (Id. at 5–6, ¶ 12.) 15 • The Police Scorecard found that the SDPD engaged in discriminatory 16 policing, specifically that Black people were more than twice as likely to be 17 stopped than White people. (Id. at 13–14.) Additionally, the SDPD was more 18 likely to search, arrest, and use force against Black people than White people. 19 (Id.) 20 While these statistics tend to show that SDPD might engage in racially 21 discriminatory practices, the constitutional issue the SAC raises is whether Mr. Spriggs 22 was lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment. To that end, these statistics do not 23 show that the SDPD has a practice of pulling people over without reasonable suspicion or 24 probable cause. As explained in the prior order, “[t]o be clear, the Court is not holding 25 the kinds of studies Plaintiff cites can never be used to establish a pattern or practice for 26 Monell claims or put municipalities like the City on notice of constitutionally deficient 27 practices; but that as alleged here, these specific studies do not link the racial disparity in 28 stops, searches, and arrests to any of the conduct Plaintiff complains of . . . [to] stops, 1 searches, and arrests without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” Spriggs v. City of 2 San Diego, No. 24-CV-01006-W-KSC, 2024 WL 4469218, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 3 2024). 4 Although Mr. Spriggs has failed to allege what specifically was deficient about the 5 cited policies or allege facts showing the City was on notice of those deficiencies, that is 6 not to say that he could not do so in an amended complaint. Therefore, leave to amend 7 should be granted. 8 9 V. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM 10 Mr. Spriggs also asserts an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim 11 against all defendants. To establish a valid IIED claim, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme 12 and outrageous conduct by a defendant with the intention, or reckless disregard of the 13 probability, of causing emotional distress; (2) that the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme 14 emotional distress; and (3) that emotional distress was the actual and proximate cause of 15 the defendant’s conduct. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1052 (2009). However, 16 “outrageous conduct” is conduct that is so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that 17 usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 18 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1991). 19 Mr. Spriggs has failed to adequately plead a claim for IIED, because the SAC fails 20 to demonstrate that he has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress. The SAC 21 alleges in conclusory terms that “PLAINTIFF suffered severe emotional distress . . . .” 22 (SAC at 14, ¶ 59.) Without more facts, Mr. Spriggs has merely restated one of the 23 elements of his IIED claim, falling short of the pleading requirement. See Bell Atl. Corp., 24 550 U.S. at 558–59. Because Mr. Spriggs has failed to adequately plead the elements of 25 an IIED claim, it will be dismissed with leave to amend. 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 VI. BANE ACT CLAIM 2 Mr. Spriggs also asserts a claim under the California Bane Act. The Bane Act 3 creates civil liability for anyone who “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion . . . 4 with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals or rights secured by the 5 Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or 6 laws of [California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. To successfully plead a claim under the 7 Act, a plaintiff must show (1) interference with or attempted interference with a state or 8 federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) that the interference or attempted interference 9 was by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Sanchez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 10 CV201146DSFPVCX, 2020 WL 9074714, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020). 11 The City has moved to dismiss the Bane Act claim on the grounds that Mr. Spriggs 12 has failed to allege misconduct involving threats, intimidation, or coercion independent 13 of any threats, intimidation, or coercion inherent in the underlying constitutional 14 violation. (Mtn. at 14:9–11.) However, California courts have taken the position that 15 “[n]othing in the text of the statute requires that the offending ‘threat, intimidation, or 16 coercion’ be ‘independent’ from the constitutional violation alleged.” Cornell v. City & 17 Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 800 (2017); Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 18 888 F.3d 1030, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 801–02). 19 Because the Bane Act does not require Mr. Spriggs to allege threats, intimidation, 20 or coercion independent from the constitutional violation alleged, the City’s motion to 21 dismiss the claim will be denied. 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 VII. CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 27 the City’s Motion [Doc. 15]. The Motion is DENIED as to claims 1, 2, and 8. Claims 3– 28 1 ||7 are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. However, no further opportunities will 2 || be given to amend the complaint after this final attempt. 3 4 || IT ISSO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: February 12, 2025 \

7 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 8 Unted States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28