Spotted Elk v. Department of Health

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedMarch 23, 2018
Docket4:16-cv-04019
StatusUnknown

This text of Spotted Elk v. Department of Health (Spotted Elk v. Department of Health) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Spotted Elk v. Department of Health, (D.S.D. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA SOUTHERN DIVISION .

ANDREW GREGORY SPOTTED ELK, 4:16-CV-04019-LLP Plaintiff, ys. □ ORDER DR. BRAD ADAMS, Doctor at SDSP, in his individual capacity; and DR. EUGENE REGIER, Doctor at SDSP, in his individual capacity; . Defendants. ‘

Plaintiff Andrew Gregory Spotted Elk, filed this pro se lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket 28) contending that summary judgment should be granted based on qualified immunity. Spotted Elk thereafter filed motions to appoint counsel (Docket 38 and 40) but did not respond to the defendants’ □

motion for summary judgment. Having considered the written record in this case and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted based upon qualified immunity. .

FACTUAL BACKGROUND The local rules for this district require that the moving party on a motion for summary judgment submit a statement of the material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried, D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(A). The opposing party is required to respond to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of material facts, and to identify any material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine material issue to be tried. D.S.D.

CIV. LR 56.1(B). All material facts set forth in the moving party's statement of material facts are deemed admitted if not controverted by the statement required to be served by the party opposing summary judgment. DSD. CIV. LR 56.1(D); see also On Target Sporting Goods, Inc, v. Attorney General of the United States, 472 F.3d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Illinois Nat'l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 724-25 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deem that plaintiff had admitted all of defendants’ statements of material facts as a sanction for noncompliance with local summary judgment rules). Such rules are properly intended “to prevent a district court from engaging in the proverbial search for a needle in the haystack.” Libel v. Adventure Lands of America, Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing a similar lowa Local Rule); see also Huckins v., Hollingsworth, 138 Fed. Appx. 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's application of D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1 “even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by [Plaintiffs] that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion”). “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n. 46 (1975)). Additionally, a district court has no obligation to “plumb the record in order to find a genuine issue of material fact.” Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor is the court “required to speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” Jd. Summary judgment could be

granted without further analysis, because a party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” FED.R.CIV .P. 56(e). The defendants filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Docket 163) along with supporting affidavits and exhibits. The defendants’ undisputed facts are recited below: 1. Plaintiff, Andrew Spotted Elk, is an inmate currently incarcerated at the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP) in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Docket 7 at 29. On or about July 15, 2014, Spotted Elk pled guilty to Aggravated Assault in violation of SDCL 22-18- 1(2). Subsequent thereto, on or about December 10, 2014, Spotted Elk was sentenced to serve fifteen (15) years in the SDSP. Docket 21 at 113. 2. The injuries which now form the basis for Spotted Elk’s current complaint occurred prior to his incarceration at the SDSP. Dockets 31 4; 29-11; 19-57. When seen by Health Services at the SDSP on December 3, 2015, Spotted Elk indicated that he injured his lower back when he “jumped off a trailer and landed wrong.” Dockets 31 4-5; 29-11; 29-57. According to Spotted Elk, he suffered severed tendons and nerves in his right arm from a “deep laceration.” 3, On December 9, 2015, Spotted Elk told Health Services that he suffered a “significant laceration to right inter forearm” when he “fell through a window - 2002-2003.” Dockets 31 § 5; 29-36; 29-57. As for the injury to his back, Spotted Elk again indicated that he “jumped off a trailer (house) landed on legs and went to IHS.” According to Spotted Elk, he was “cleared with no fractures” and “no x-rays performed.” Docket 29-57.

.

Defendant Eugene Regier is a licensed physician authorized to practice medicine in the State of South Dakota since on or about June 1965. Docket 31 4] 1. Dr. Regier has been providing medical services to inmates incarcerated at the SDSP since on or about June 1996. Docket 31 4 2. He became an employee of the South Dakota Department of Health (SDDOB) in May 2001 when said agency undertook the responsibility of providing medical care of inmates incarcerated in the State’s correctional facilities. Docket 31 2. 5. In Count 1 of his Complaint, Spotted Elk alleges that Defendant Regier “willingly supports Dr. Adams in his malpractice and stands firm in supporting his action not to place me back on the medication I was taken off due to reason unknown.” Docket 7 at 32. According to Spotted Elk, Dr. Regier is “allowing me as well to suffer from the chronic arm and back pain by his unwillingness to adjust or manage my pain medication.” _

6. Spotted Elk, in Count 2 of his Complaint, alleges that “due to a Incident Report which was dismissed the two individuals [Regier/Adams] above will not provide any care to me related to the area the write up was issued.” Docket 7 at 33. It is alleged that “DOC officials had stated to these individuals that the write up is nonexistent and that they cannot refer to it or use it against me but Dr. Adams and Dr. Regier continue to.” 7. Finally, Spotted Elk contends, in Count 3 of his Complaint, that “these individuals continue to exercise defamation of character by allowing the notes on my chart to state medication abuse which has affected the medical services I receive negatively.” Docket 7 at 34, 8. The Court, in an Order dated August 12, 2016, found that “to the extent that Spotted Elk raises a claim based on Defendant’s failure to follow the policies of the South Dakota

Department of-Corrections (SDDOC), it is dismissed.” Docket 11 at 81. As found by the Court, “there is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.” Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997). 9. In regards to Spotted Elk’s allegations that Defendants defamed him by stating that he abused medication in his medical file, the Court found that “this file . . - by its nature is not published.” Docket 11 at 81-82. Thus, to the extent that Spotted Elk raises a claim for defamation, his claim is dismissed.” 10.

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Spotted Elk v. Department of Health, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/spotted-elk-v-department-of-health-sdd-2018.