OPINION
POLOZOLA, District Judge.
Emmett Spooner was elected to the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board on November 6, 1984 and assumed the duties of that office in early 1985. On August 15, 1984, Spooner was convicted of forgery, a felony under Louisiana law.1 He was sentenced to six months in the West Baton Rouge Parish Jail and placed on probation for a period of three years. Spooner was convicted of attempted forgery on September 27, 1985.
During the October 16, 1985 meeting of the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, Spooner was informed by the president of the Board that Spooner was suspended as a member of the School Board under the provisions of Act 994 of the 1985 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, La.R.S. 42:1411,2 because of his two felony convictions. Thereafter, the Board [707]*707appointed Joseph Anderson to replace Spooner pending exhaustion of Spooner’s appeals of his criminal convictions. On September 27, 1986, plaintiff was reelected to the School Board for a term commencing January 1, 1987. On December 19, 1986, the West Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney sent a letter to plaintiff advising him that the School Board would continue its suspension into plaintiff’s new term in office under Act 994.
Spooner filed suit in this Court for damages, attorney’s fees, and an injunction against the enforcement of Act 994.3
Plaintiff alleges that Act 994 violates provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and the United States Constitution, specifically those provisions concerning voting rights, bills of attainder, due process, and equal protection of the laws. A special three-judge court was appointed to consider [708]*708plaintiffs voting rights claims. The three-judge court dismissed plaintiff's claim that the defendants violated the provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 when it suspended plaintiff under Act 994. After issuing its ruling, the three-judge court disbanded and the remaining claims were transferred to a single judge for decision.
Thereafter, the Court granted the motion of the defendants, Gauthe and Bergeron for summary judgment. The School Board and its individual members have now filed a motion for summary judgment. For reasons which follow, the Court finds that this motion should be granted.
I. Introduction
Act 994 of the 1985 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was signed by the Governor on July 23, 1985 and became effective on September 6, 1985. Act 994 requires that a public official who is convicted of a felony during his term of office be suspended without compensation from the date of conviction until the appeals have been exhausted. The Act also provides for the appointment of a replacement for the suspended official during the time the appeals are pending. Should the suspended elected official’s conviction be reversed, he is reinstated with back pay. If the conviction is affirmed, the official is permanently removed from office.
II. State Law Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the suspension and removal provisions of Act 994 violate the separation of powers mandate of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. However, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has recently held in a suit filed by Spooner that Act 994 does not violate the Louisiana Constitution, noting ^that the constitution “expressly gives the legislature permission to enact general laws for the removal by suit of public officials____”4 This Court agrees with the Louisiana state courts that Act 994 does not violate the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 for reasons set forth by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in its opinion.
III. Federal Claims
A. Bill of attainder
Plaintiff contends that Act 994 is a bill of attainder, and as such violates Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.5 The Supreme Court has defined a bill of attainder as a “legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.”6 Under Act 994, an official may be suspended but not removed without a trial. However, Act 994 is not a bill of attainder because it is not penal in nature. Its purpose is not so much to punish the criminal as it is to protect the integrity of the political process. In Trop v. Dulles,7 the Supreme Court stated in a plurality opinion that “because the purpose of [a statute denying the franchise to convicted felons] is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, [the] law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.” 8 Similarly, this Court holds that a statute suspending the right of a convicted felon to hold public office pending a final decision of his conviction is not a bill of attainder.
B. Due process
The Fifth Circuit set forth the test for due process in Williams v. Taylor,9
Due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Math[709]*709ews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). It calls for “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, due process depends on three factors: first, the private interests involved; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of these interests through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional procedures; and third, the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden that additional procedures would entail. 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903; Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir.1982). Furthermore, proof of a denial of due process may require a showing of substantial prejudice. E.g., United States v. Lober, 630 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1980).10
Plaintiff’s interest in holding public office is not a fundamental right.11 Therefore, the denial of that right to felons must bear only a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. This Court holds that there is a legitimate state interest in suspending public officials who have been convicted of a felony from holding office while the felony conviction is being appealed. The state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the political process cannot be questioned under the facts of this case. The procedure which the state uses protects both the public and the elected official.
Upon conviction of a felony, the official is automatically suspended from office pending exhaustion of appellate review of the felony conviction. Within ten days after the conviction is final, the district attorney institutes suit in state district court to permanently remove the official from office. A hearing is held within twenty days after the official is served, and judgment is rendered within ten days after the hearing.
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OPINION
POLOZOLA, District Judge.
Emmett Spooner was elected to the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board on November 6, 1984 and assumed the duties of that office in early 1985. On August 15, 1984, Spooner was convicted of forgery, a felony under Louisiana law.1 He was sentenced to six months in the West Baton Rouge Parish Jail and placed on probation for a period of three years. Spooner was convicted of attempted forgery on September 27, 1985.
During the October 16, 1985 meeting of the West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, Spooner was informed by the president of the Board that Spooner was suspended as a member of the School Board under the provisions of Act 994 of the 1985 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, La.R.S. 42:1411,2 because of his two felony convictions. Thereafter, the Board [707]*707appointed Joseph Anderson to replace Spooner pending exhaustion of Spooner’s appeals of his criminal convictions. On September 27, 1986, plaintiff was reelected to the School Board for a term commencing January 1, 1987. On December 19, 1986, the West Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney sent a letter to plaintiff advising him that the School Board would continue its suspension into plaintiff’s new term in office under Act 994.
Spooner filed suit in this Court for damages, attorney’s fees, and an injunction against the enforcement of Act 994.3
Plaintiff alleges that Act 994 violates provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and the United States Constitution, specifically those provisions concerning voting rights, bills of attainder, due process, and equal protection of the laws. A special three-judge court was appointed to consider [708]*708plaintiffs voting rights claims. The three-judge court dismissed plaintiff's claim that the defendants violated the provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 when it suspended plaintiff under Act 994. After issuing its ruling, the three-judge court disbanded and the remaining claims were transferred to a single judge for decision.
Thereafter, the Court granted the motion of the defendants, Gauthe and Bergeron for summary judgment. The School Board and its individual members have now filed a motion for summary judgment. For reasons which follow, the Court finds that this motion should be granted.
I. Introduction
Act 994 of the 1985 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was signed by the Governor on July 23, 1985 and became effective on September 6, 1985. Act 994 requires that a public official who is convicted of a felony during his term of office be suspended without compensation from the date of conviction until the appeals have been exhausted. The Act also provides for the appointment of a replacement for the suspended official during the time the appeals are pending. Should the suspended elected official’s conviction be reversed, he is reinstated with back pay. If the conviction is affirmed, the official is permanently removed from office.
II. State Law Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the suspension and removal provisions of Act 994 violate the separation of powers mandate of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. However, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has recently held in a suit filed by Spooner that Act 994 does not violate the Louisiana Constitution, noting ^that the constitution “expressly gives the legislature permission to enact general laws for the removal by suit of public officials____”4 This Court agrees with the Louisiana state courts that Act 994 does not violate the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 for reasons set forth by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in its opinion.
III. Federal Claims
A. Bill of attainder
Plaintiff contends that Act 994 is a bill of attainder, and as such violates Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution.5 The Supreme Court has defined a bill of attainder as a “legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.”6 Under Act 994, an official may be suspended but not removed without a trial. However, Act 994 is not a bill of attainder because it is not penal in nature. Its purpose is not so much to punish the criminal as it is to protect the integrity of the political process. In Trop v. Dulles,7 the Supreme Court stated in a plurality opinion that “because the purpose of [a statute denying the franchise to convicted felons] is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, [the] law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.” 8 Similarly, this Court holds that a statute suspending the right of a convicted felon to hold public office pending a final decision of his conviction is not a bill of attainder.
B. Due process
The Fifth Circuit set forth the test for due process in Williams v. Taylor,9
Due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Math[709]*709ews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). It calls for “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, due process depends on three factors: first, the private interests involved; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of these interests through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional procedures; and third, the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden that additional procedures would entail. 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903; Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1063, 1068 (5th Cir.1982). Furthermore, proof of a denial of due process may require a showing of substantial prejudice. E.g., United States v. Lober, 630 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1980).10
Plaintiff’s interest in holding public office is not a fundamental right.11 Therefore, the denial of that right to felons must bear only a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. This Court holds that there is a legitimate state interest in suspending public officials who have been convicted of a felony from holding office while the felony conviction is being appealed. The state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the political process cannot be questioned under the facts of this case. The procedure which the state uses protects both the public and the elected official.
Upon conviction of a felony, the official is automatically suspended from office pending exhaustion of appellate review of the felony conviction. Within ten days after the conviction is final, the district attorney institutes suit in state district court to permanently remove the official from office. A hearing is held within twenty days after the official is served, and judgment is rendered within ten days after the hearing. The statute also provides a procedure for appellate review. If the conviction is reversed, the suspended official is allowed to resume his position with back pay.
This Court holds that the above statutory procedure is adequate to ensure a fair determination of whether an officer should be removed from office. Furthermore, Spoon-er has made no showing that the procedure was not followed in his case. It is clear that Spooner is a convicted felon and should have been suspended pending his appeal. The Court finds that Act 994 more than complies with due process requirements.
C. Equal protection
Plaintiff also asserts that Act 994 is a denial of equal protection of the law. There is no evidence that the statute has been applied in such a way as to discriminate against any suspect class. Convicted felons do not constitute a suspect class.12 Furthermore, the right to hold public office is not a fundamental right.13 A statute is constitutional if it bears a rational relation to achieving a legitimate state interest. As was noted above, Act 994 does further the interest of protecting the integrity of Louisiana’s political process and its desire to either suspend or remove from office those public officials who are convicted of a felony. Therefore, this Court concludes that Act 994 does not violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.
Therefore:
IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be and is hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed with prejudice.