Splunk Inc. v. Cribl, Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided August 19, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-07611·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

10 SPLUNK INC., 11 Plaintiff, No. C 22-07611 WHA

12 v.

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO SEAL 13 CRIBL, INC., 14 Defendant.

15 16 This order addresses all pending motions to seal and supporting declarations (Dkt. Nos. 17 190, 191, 201–04, 208, 209, 224, 230, 237, 238, 241, 242, 251, 261, 272, 280, 298, 302, 340). 18 1. THE LEGAL STANDARD. 19 There is a strong public policy in favor of openness in our court system and the public is 20 entitled to know to whom we are providing relief (or not). See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of 21 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, access to motions and their 22 attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed only 23 upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 24 LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 815 (2016). Filings that are 25 only tangentially related to the merits may be sealed upon a lesser showing of “good cause.” 26 Id. at 1097. Evidentiary motions, like motions in limine and Daubert motions, can correlate 27 with the merits of a case. Id. at 1098–1100. Indeed, the “‘compelling reasons’ standard 1 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Pintos, 562 2 U.S. 1134 (2011)). 3 Additionally, parties in this district must ensure their sealing motions meet basic 4 adequacy requirements. Above all, they must “narrowly tailor” requests “to seal only the 5 sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c). And they must list each document or passage to be 6 sealed — here each passage (Dkt. No. 141) — together with its rationale for sealing. Ibid. For 7 each listed, they must specifically state: (1) the legitimate private or public interests that 8 warrant sealing; (2) the injury that will result should sealing be denied; and (3) why a less 9 restrictive alternative to sealing is not sufficient. Civil L.R. 79-5(c). They must provide 10 evidentiary support where necessary, such as by sworn declaration. Ibid. And, for pleadings, 11 parties must file both redacted and unredacted copies (or ensure another party does), and 12 include in the unredacted copies highlighting to show proposed redactions. Id. at (d)–(e). 13 Failure to follow the rules suggests a lack of cause or interest to seal, and risks summary denial 14 (Dkt. No. 141). See Civil L.R. 79-5(f)(6), (g)(2). 15 Redaction may be appropriate where publication “could result in infringement upon trade 16 secrets.” Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 17 U.S. 986 (2012). So too where “business information” might “harm a litigant’s competitive 18 standing,” particularly where the public has “minimal interest” in that information. See 19 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). And, in general, redaction will be 20 appropriate where publication would turn “court files [into] a vehicle for improper purposes,” 21 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598), such as “to gratify private spite, 22 promote public scandal, [or] circulate libelous statements,” ibid. But “vague boilerplate 23 language or nebulous assertions of potential harm” will not suffice to support redaction. 24 Bronson v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2019 WL 7810811, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2019) 25 (citing Civil L.R. 79-5). Nor will mere “[r]eference to a stipulation or protective order that 26 allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential.” Civil L.R. 79-5(c); see also 27 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. “A party seeking to seal a judicial record [ultimately] bears the 1 1178. The final determination is “left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Ctr. for Auto 2 Safety, 809 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599). 3 Here, parties were reminded that “[n]oncompliant submissions are liable to be stricken in 4 their entirety” (Dkt. No. 69 ¶ 5). Then reminded again (Dkt. No. 124 at 2). The Court denied 5 parties’ initial sealing requests related to Rule 12 motions and discovery-letter briefs (Dkt. 6 No. 140). Still, parties next filed nearly 3,000 pages of conditionally sealed exhibits related to 7 their summary judgment and Daubert motions (Dkt. No. 141 at 2). The filings violated basic 8 requirements (id. at 3–4). But to avoid prejudice to third parties, the Court permitted parties to 9 refile narrower requests in subsequent omnibus sealing motions (id. at 4). 10 Those omnibus sealing motions and subsequent sealing motions are at issue here, 11 organized by the substantive motions to which they relate. Because Splunk and Cribl have 12 overlapping customers, many of their requests overlap, too. Nonetheless, their requests are 13 separated within each section so any salient distinctions can be drawn. 14 2. MOTIONS TO SEAL STEMMING FROM SPLUNK’S MOTION FOR 15 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 16 For the omnibus motions sealing motions covering this and other sections (Parts 2–7), parties 17 failed to timely refile every corrected copy, and some copies were refiled with more redactions 18 (not fewer). Such failings favor denying redactions outright (supra). But particularly to avoid 19 prejudice to third parties, this order will “trudge on.” Cf. Goesel v. Boley Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., 738 20 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2013) (Judge Richard Posner). This order states below where such 21 failures not only weigh in the result but tip the scales. Parties had more than “a chance to 22 show ‘compelling reasons’ and,” often, they “squandered it.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1181. 23 Splunk moved for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 131), and Cribl opposed (Dkt. 24 No. 146). Splunk’s omnibus motion to seal (Dkt. No. 190) and Cribl’s (Dkt. No. 191; see also 25 Dkt. Nos. 204, 224, 341) declare support for sealing passages. This order rules as follows: 26 27 A, SPLUNK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT 1 VII. 2 i Splunk’s Proposed Redactions. |Sealed | Public__|ResultRe_ [Reasoning 3 Dkt. No. Cf GRANTED- This document details an engineering spike to 4 133-17 Dkt. No. | IN-PART, reverse engineer the newest Splunk-to-Splunk (Exh. 27, 352-14 DENIED-IN-__| protocol, S2S v4, and its implementation with 5 S2S v4 PaRT. Splunk Enterprise. Redactions are warranted for Protocol the same reasons and to the same extent described 6 Findings, with respect to the same document at trial (see 7 CRIBL _ infra entry re Dkt. No. 352-14 (TX-45)). 00009624 8 (Exh. 34, Dkt. No. | Banking Disclosure of banking details invites security risks Cribl’s 131-35 details, while adding nothing to public understanding. 9 Purchase GRANTED. Order of 10 Splunk, 11 SPLUNK __ 00048567 a 12 li Cribl’s Proposed Redactions. 13 || [Sealed [Public [ResultRe | Reasoning Dkt. No. Dkt. No. 186:23, Proposed redactions target a repository where 14 133-6 131-14 GRANTED. Cribl keeps contracts. Cribl contends disclosure 2 15 (Exh. 13, would provide a target to bad actors. Because Sharum the name of this repository is also entirely A 16 Dep. Tr.) unrelated to the merits, redaction is warranted. 187:4, The balance shifts with these proposed 17 DENIED. redactions. They target a repository discussed in roe open court. And the deposition says Cribl has 18 not used it for this purpose for four years. 19 (See previous entry.) DENIED. 20 (See supra entry re Dkt. Nos. 133-6 at 186:23.) GRANTED. “ene GRANTED. (See id. at 187:4.) 23 DENIED. (See id. at 186:23.) 24 GRANTED. (See id. at 187:4.) 25 DENIED. 6 (See id. at 186:23.) GRANTED.

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