Spira Footwear, Inc. v. Basic Sports Apparel, Inc.

545 F. Supp. 2d 591, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19372, 2008 WL 558044
District Court, W.D. Texas·Decided February 26, 2008·No. 3:07-cv-129·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID BRIONES, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered Plaintiff Spira Footwear, Inc.’s “Motion For Summary Judgment Pursuant To Rule 56 FRCP And Brief In Support Thereof,” filed in the above-captioned cause on December 10, 2007. On December 21, 2007, Defendant Basic Sports Apparel, Inc. filed a “Response Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment.” After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied for the reasons that follow.

Background

This case concerns an alleged infringement of a federally registered trademark. The cause of action arose when Plaintiff Spira Footwear, Inc. began marketing its shoes and apparel under the name SPIRA. Plaintiff is a Texas corporation and has its principal place of business in El Paso, Texas. Defendant Basic Sports Apparel (“BSA”) is incorporated in the State of Texas, and has its principal place of business in El Paso, Texas.

In 1992, Hilel and David Chowaiki began operating BSA as a clothing manufacturer, and sold their products to various wholesale companies. In 1997, BSA launched its own clothing line under the brand name SPIRAL. On June 15, 1997, BSA began selling its clothing line through retail stores under the brand name. 1 At that time, BSA manufactured slippers out of excess material, mainly “Polartec” fabric, and sold these slippers in various sizes and colors. BSA shipped the clothing articles from its warehouse to its retail stores. 2 At the point of sale, BSA issued a register receipt itemizing the amount of each product sold, but did not identify the product. 3

While managers were selected from within the Chowaiki family, BSA hired numerous employees for its retail operations. David Chowaiki and his mother, Nadia Chowaiki, were the on-site retail managers. 4 Nadia Chowaiki operated the first *593 store located at 900 N. Michigan Ave, in Chicago, Illinois and continues working in that capacity at different locations. SPIRAL store employee Joyce Graves, sold the slippers at the Chicago, Illinois store from 1998 through 2000. Also, Andres Salcido and Monique Wieder both worked at the SPIRAL store located in El Paso, Texas, and sold the slippers while employed during the years 2001 and 2002. From 2003 to 2004, Eleanor O’Neill sold SPIRAL slippers at the SPIRAL store located at the Galleria shopping mall in Houston, Texas.

On September 17, 1997, BSA applied for a registered trademark with the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“USP-TO”) for use in connection with various apparel, including shoes. 5 The USPTO approved the application and registered the trademark on January 19, 1999. 6 Then, on January 19, 2005, BSA filed a declaration with the USPTO, stating that it was currently using the trademark in connection with the listed goods. On June 28, 2005, BSA filed a second declaration with the USPTO, indicating that it had been using its registered trademark for five (5) consecutive years on all the listed goods. In 2003, Spira began marketing its shoes and athletic apparel under the brand name SPIRA. Although Spira applied for a registered trademark, the USPTO did not grant a registered trademark.

Plaintiff filed this cause of action on October 27, 2006, in the 168th Judicial District Court of El Paso County claiming that, at no time, had it ever infringed upon Defendant’s federally registered trademark SPIRAL. Plaintiff further filed a state-law claim alleging that Defendant violated the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute. Defendant removed the instant case to federal court and filed a counterclaim. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief; compensatory, actual, and punitive damages; and back pay and interest, costs, and attorney fees. The instant Motion followed.

Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Crv. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that requires a fact finder to resolve the truth of the matter, rather than one that is conclusively established. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate where a material fact is “genuine” in that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, the Court considers all the evidence in the record, but makes no determination as to credibility of the evidence. See id. Further, the Court views factual questions and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir.2002).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, the discovery, and the disclosure materials on file which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 *594 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party-fails to meet this burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995). If the movant meets this burden, however, the nonmovant must designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant discharges this burden by alleging more than mere legal conclusions drawn from the pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (stating the nonmovant may not successfully oppose summary judgment by merely citing the pleadings). Instead, the nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case, the movant is entitled to summary judgment, “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Discussion

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Spira Footwear, Inc. v. Basic Sports Apparel, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 591, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19372, 2008 WL 558044 (W.D. Tex. 2008).

545 F. Supp. 2d 591 (Spira Footwear, Inc. v. Basic Sports Apparel, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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