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9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12 SPICE JAZZ LLC, Case No. 19-cv-583-BAS-WVG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 14 AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 15 v. DISMISS
16 YOUNGEVITY INTERNATIONAL, [ECF No. 21] INC. et al., 17 Defendant. 18 19
20 Plaintiff Spice Jazz LLC was once a successful multi-level marketing 21 operation with profits in the millions of dollars. Plaintiff is now bankrupt, and it 22 alleges this downfall occurred because of the actions of Colleen Walters and 23 Defendant Youngevity International, Inc. Plaintiff has filed a complaint against 24 Youngevity as well as Plaintiff’s former employee Bianca Reyne Djafar-Zade. 25 Youngevity moved to dismiss the complaint. (ECF No. 13.) The Court granted in 26 part and denied in part the motion, granting Plaintiff leave to amend. (“Prior Order,” 27 ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint. (“SAC,” Second 1 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion, (“Opp’n,” ECF 2 No. 23), to which Youngevity filed a reply, (“Reply,” ECF No. 24). 3 The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers and 4 without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court 5 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion. 6 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 7 Plaintiff sold culinary recipes and spices to customers using a multi-level 8 marketing (“MLM”) sales force composed of individual sales representatives. (SAC 9 ¶ 2.) Sales force members were recruited, provided with marketing materials and 10 strategies, entrusted with secret recipes, and encouraged to sell the products 11 throughout Australia and the United States. (Id.) Plaintiff hired Colleen Walters to 12 be its CEO, and Walters successfully recruited sales team members and ran the 13 company’s operation. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) But during her employment with Plaintiff, 14 Walters worked with Defendant Youngevity, a direct competitor also running an 15 MLM sales force. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 27.) Walters “hatched a scheme” to steal Plaintiff’s 16 business and bring it to Youngevity, who offered her “a sweeter deal for her spices.” 17 (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Walters then left Plaintiff’s company, taking with her all of Plaintiff’s 18 sales force and “a treasure trove of proprietary recipes and products.” (Id. ¶ 31.) 19 Youngevity allegedly “look[ed] the other way” when Walters brought over a wealth 20 of valuable information, or maybe conspired with her in a plan to “sabotage 21 Plaintiff’s business operation.” (Id. ¶¶ 66, 71.) 22 Plaintiff brings claims against Youngevity and against Bianca Reyne Djafar- 23 Zade. Ms. Djafar-Zade was an employee on Plaintiff’s payroll but “never actually” 24 did any work, by virtue of being Walters’ daughter. (Id. ¶ 90.) Djafar-Zade is not a 25 part of the pending Motion. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 27 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 2 must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe 3 them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 4 Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a 5 Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, 6 rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 7 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 11 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 12 liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 13 to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 14 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 15 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 16 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 17 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original). A court need 18 not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference 19 the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume 20 that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants 21 have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 22 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 23 (1983). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 Youngevity moves to dismiss only some of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 26 A. Interference with Prospective Economic Relationships Claim 27 Plaintiff previously brought two claims for tortious interference with 1 dismissed without prejudice the negligent interference with prospective economic 2 relationships claim because Plaintiff has not pled that Youngevity owed it any duty, 3 (Prior Order at 10–11) but denied the motion to dismiss the intentional interference 4 with prospective economic relationships claim. (Id. at 13–14.) In its amended 5 complaint, Plaintiff again includes allegations for intentional interference. Plaintiff’s 6 claim stems from the allegation that Plaintiff lost future business opportunities 7 because “Plaintiffs’ existing sales force members were actively recruiting additional 8 members, and would have continued to do so but-for Defendants’ wrongful conduct.” 9 (SAC ¶ 121.) “Plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood—indeed a certainty—of entering 10 into profitable economic relationships with additional sales force members as its 11 business continued to grow.” (Id. ¶ 122.) 12 The Court previously addressed Youngevity’s argument that the interference 13 claim should be dismissed because “the alleged interference must have been 14 wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself.” (Prior Order 15 at 14 (quoting Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1404 16 (2014)). After analyzing Plaintiff’s claim and finding it sufficiently pled, the Court 17 denied the motion to dismiss the claim. Youngevity now moves to dismiss the claim 18 based on two new grounds: first because Plaintiff “fails to specifically identify the 19 third party or parties with whom it had a prospective economic relationship” and 20 second because “Plaintiff has not identified any facts from which the Court can 21 reasonably infer that any identified party had a ‘probability of future economic 22 benefit.’” (Mot. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff argues Youngevity has waived its opportunity to 23 make these arguments. 24 Courts are divided on the issue of whether a defendant may raise objections to 25 causes of action that existed at the time it filed its previous motion to dismiss. On 26 one hand, courts hold the defendant cannot raise such objections if the grounds for 27 dismissal raised in a defendant’s motion “could have properly been raised” in the 1 Supp. 3d 1320, 1326 (N.D. Cal.
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9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12 SPICE JAZZ LLC, Case No. 19-cv-583-BAS-WVG 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 14 AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 15 v. DISMISS
16 YOUNGEVITY INTERNATIONAL, [ECF No. 21] INC. et al., 17 Defendant. 18 19
20 Plaintiff Spice Jazz LLC was once a successful multi-level marketing 21 operation with profits in the millions of dollars. Plaintiff is now bankrupt, and it 22 alleges this downfall occurred because of the actions of Colleen Walters and 23 Defendant Youngevity International, Inc. Plaintiff has filed a complaint against 24 Youngevity as well as Plaintiff’s former employee Bianca Reyne Djafar-Zade. 25 Youngevity moved to dismiss the complaint. (ECF No. 13.) The Court granted in 26 part and denied in part the motion, granting Plaintiff leave to amend. (“Prior Order,” 27 ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint. (“SAC,” Second 1 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion, (“Opp’n,” ECF 2 No. 23), to which Youngevity filed a reply, (“Reply,” ECF No. 24). 3 The Court finds this Motion suitable for determination on the papers and 4 without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court 5 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion. 6 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 7 Plaintiff sold culinary recipes and spices to customers using a multi-level 8 marketing (“MLM”) sales force composed of individual sales representatives. (SAC 9 ¶ 2.) Sales force members were recruited, provided with marketing materials and 10 strategies, entrusted with secret recipes, and encouraged to sell the products 11 throughout Australia and the United States. (Id.) Plaintiff hired Colleen Walters to 12 be its CEO, and Walters successfully recruited sales team members and ran the 13 company’s operation. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) But during her employment with Plaintiff, 14 Walters worked with Defendant Youngevity, a direct competitor also running an 15 MLM sales force. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 27.) Walters “hatched a scheme” to steal Plaintiff’s 16 business and bring it to Youngevity, who offered her “a sweeter deal for her spices.” 17 (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Walters then left Plaintiff’s company, taking with her all of Plaintiff’s 18 sales force and “a treasure trove of proprietary recipes and products.” (Id. ¶ 31.) 19 Youngevity allegedly “look[ed] the other way” when Walters brought over a wealth 20 of valuable information, or maybe conspired with her in a plan to “sabotage 21 Plaintiff’s business operation.” (Id. ¶¶ 66, 71.) 22 Plaintiff brings claims against Youngevity and against Bianca Reyne Djafar- 23 Zade. Ms. Djafar-Zade was an employee on Plaintiff’s payroll but “never actually” 24 did any work, by virtue of being Walters’ daughter. (Id. ¶ 90.) Djafar-Zade is not a 25 part of the pending Motion. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 27 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 1 Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 2 must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must construe 3 them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. 4 Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). To avoid a 5 Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, 6 rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 7 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 11 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 12 liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement 13 to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 14 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 15 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 16 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 17 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alteration in original). A court need 18 not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the deference 19 the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume 20 that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants 21 have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 22 Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 23 (1983). 24 III. ANALYSIS 25 Youngevity moves to dismiss only some of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 26 A. Interference with Prospective Economic Relationships Claim 27 Plaintiff previously brought two claims for tortious interference with 1 dismissed without prejudice the negligent interference with prospective economic 2 relationships claim because Plaintiff has not pled that Youngevity owed it any duty, 3 (Prior Order at 10–11) but denied the motion to dismiss the intentional interference 4 with prospective economic relationships claim. (Id. at 13–14.) In its amended 5 complaint, Plaintiff again includes allegations for intentional interference. Plaintiff’s 6 claim stems from the allegation that Plaintiff lost future business opportunities 7 because “Plaintiffs’ existing sales force members were actively recruiting additional 8 members, and would have continued to do so but-for Defendants’ wrongful conduct.” 9 (SAC ¶ 121.) “Plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood—indeed a certainty—of entering 10 into profitable economic relationships with additional sales force members as its 11 business continued to grow.” (Id. ¶ 122.) 12 The Court previously addressed Youngevity’s argument that the interference 13 claim should be dismissed because “the alleged interference must have been 14 wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself.” (Prior Order 15 at 14 (quoting Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1404 16 (2014)). After analyzing Plaintiff’s claim and finding it sufficiently pled, the Court 17 denied the motion to dismiss the claim. Youngevity now moves to dismiss the claim 18 based on two new grounds: first because Plaintiff “fails to specifically identify the 19 third party or parties with whom it had a prospective economic relationship” and 20 second because “Plaintiff has not identified any facts from which the Court can 21 reasonably infer that any identified party had a ‘probability of future economic 22 benefit.’” (Mot. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff argues Youngevity has waived its opportunity to 23 make these arguments. 24 Courts are divided on the issue of whether a defendant may raise objections to 25 causes of action that existed at the time it filed its previous motion to dismiss. On 26 one hand, courts hold the defendant cannot raise such objections if the grounds for 27 dismissal raised in a defendant’s motion “could have properly been raised” in the 1 Supp. 3d 1320, 1326 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Fed. Agric. Mortg. Corp. v. It’s A Jungle Out 2 There, Inc., No. C03-3721, 2005 WL 3325051, at *5 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 2005) (“The 3 filing of an amended complaint will not revive the right to present by motion defenses 4 that were available but were not asserted in timely fashion prior to the amendment of 5 the pleading. . . .”). On the other hand, some courts see the filing of an amended 6 complaint as an event that revives the defendant’s opportunity to raise any defense, 7 allowing defendants “to challenge the entire amended complaint—including those 8 causes of action the court had previously found sufficient.” See e.g., O’Connor v. 9 Uber Techs, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Sony Grand Wega 10 KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV Television Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 11 1077, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“When Plaintiffs filed the FACC, it superseded their 12 previous complaint, and Sony was therefore free to move again for dismissal.”). 13 The Court finds the second string of cases to be more persuasive, as the Court 14 is disinclined to deny a motion to dismiss solely on procedural grounds and prefers 15 to resolve matters on their merits. If a defendant’s objection to a cause of action is 16 valid (which, as seen herein, it is), the Court does not find it to be judicially efficient 17 to allow a cause of action to go forward if it is insufficiently pled. Thus, the Court 18 turns to Youngevity’s arguments. 19 The elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic 20 advantage are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third 21 party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the 22 defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts of the part of the 23 defendant designed to disrupt the relationship (4) actual disruption of the 24 relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts 25 of the defendant. Korean Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1143, 26 1153 (2003). 27 Youngevity argues Plaintiff has not pled a relationship between it and a third 1 had a prospective economic relationship.” (Mot. at 3.) Indeed, a plaintiff may not 2 vaguely claim a defendant disrupted a potential economic relationship with 3 “prospective customers” or “the general public.” See Varsity News Network, Inc. v. 4 Carty Web Strategies, Inc., 17-cv-2574 PSG (Ex), 2017 WL 7201873, at *11 (C.D. 5 Cal. Aug. 30, 2017); Blue Dolphin Charters, Ltd. v. Knight & Carver Yachtcenter, 6 Inc., No. 11-cv-565, 2011 WL 5360074, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2011). Plaintiffs 7 “must allege a relationship with ‘a specific, albeit unnamed’ third party.” R Power 8 Biofuels, LLC v. Chemex LLC, No. 16-cv-716-LHK, 2016 WL 6663002, at *16 (N.D. 9 Cal. Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enterps., 10 177 Cal. App. 1120, 1133 (1986)). 11 Here, Plaintiff pleads that Youngevity interfered with Plaintiff’s “future 12 business opportunities” with “additional sales force members.” (SAC ¶¶ 121, 122.) 13 “Plaintiff was a growing business, with a growing marketing sales force, whose very 14 essence was incentivizing sales force members to recruit new sales force members. 15 Accordingly, Plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood—indeed a certainty—of entering 16 into profitable economic relationships with additional sales force members as its 17 business continued to grow.” (Id. ¶ 122.) 18 To define the third party in this cause of action as any and all potential, 19 additional sales force members is insufficient. This could include anyone, as there 20 does not appear to be any limits or restriction on who the existing sales force 21 members could have recruited to sell Plaintiff’s products. This tort cannot be applied 22 “to hypothetical relationships not developed at the time of the allegedly tortious 23 acts.” Silicon Labs Integration, Inc. v. Melman, No. C08–04030–RMW, 2010 WL 24 890140 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010). Allegations that a defendant interfered with a 25 relationship with an “as yet unidentified” customer will not suffice. See, e.g., 26 Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 527 (1996) 27 (“Without an existing relationship with an identifiable buyer, [plaintiff’s] expectation 1 future benefit’”). Because it has not identified a specific third party, Plaintiff cannot 2 claim that the third party could have provided it with a “probability of future 3 economic benefit.” Plaintiff’s allegations here are no different than pleading it has a 4 potential economic relationship with future unnamed employees or consumers. Such 5 a claim fails. See Damabeh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-1739-LHK, 2013 WL 6 1915867, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2013). 7 The Court GRANTS Youngevity’s Motion to Dismiss the fourth cause of 8 action. Because it is possible that Plaintiff can amend this claim, the Court dismisses 9 the claim with leave to amend. 10 B. Trade Secret Misappropriation Claims 11 Youngevity moves to dismiss the misappropriation of trade secret claims “to 12 the extent those claims are based on spice recipes not identified in the SAC.” (Mot. 13 at 5.) 14 Youngevity previously argued that Plaintiff had not described its alleged trade 15 secrets in enough detail. A plaintiff need not “spell out the details of the trade secret,” 16 Autodesk, Inc. v. ZWCAD Software Co., Ltd., No. 14-cv-1409, 2015 WL 2265479, at 17 *5 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015), but must “describe the subject matter of the trade secret 18 with sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the 19 trade or of special persons who are skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant 20 to ascertain at least the boundaries within which the secret lies.” Pellerin v. 21 Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Diodes, 22 Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 253 (1968)). The Court dismissed the claim 23 because Plaintiff had only generally described its trade secrets as its “spice blends 24 and recipes” and this did not provide Youngevity with enough detail to understand 25 “the boundaries” of the trade secret. (Prior Order at 15.) 26 Plaintiff amended the claim to add examples of certain recipes it alleges were 27 misappropriated, specifying that these spice blends were stored on a password- 1 misappropriation claims should be limited to only the listed spice recipes. (Mot. at 2 9.) The Court declines to set such a ruling at this stage. The Court’s evaluates 3 whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the details of its trade secret. In pleading 4 misappropriation, plaintiffs may not include “vague pleading with the blanks to be 5 artfully filled in only after discovery,” and must “identify, up front, and with 6 specificity the particulars of the trade secrets.” Jobscience, Inc. v. CV Partners, Inc., 7 No. C 13-04519 WHA, 2014 WL 852477, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014). Plaintiff 8 has done so. Youngevity is on notice of Plaintiff’s claims and the Court declines to 9 set any limiting rules now regarding Plaintiff’s trade secret claims. The Court 10 DENIES Youngevity’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s misappropriation claims. 11 C. Restitution Claim 12 “[I]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for ‘unjust 13 enrichment,’ which is synonymous with ‘restitution.’” Astiana v. Hain Celestial 14 Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015). But a restitution theory is not 15 irrelevant, as it describes “the theory underlying a claim that a defendant has been 16 unjustly conferred a benefit ‘through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.’” Id. If a 17 plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may construe the claim “as a quasi- 18 contract claim seeking restitution.” Id. (quoting Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza 19 Del Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221 (2014)). 20 In its prior order, the Court construed Plaintiff’s restitution claim as a quasi- 21 contract claim seeking restitution but found that Plaintiff had not alleged any facts to 22 show a quasi-contractual relationship. (Prior Order at 12.) Plaintiff amended the 23 cause of action to contain more allegations against both Djafar-Zade and Youngevity; 24 the Court only focuses on the allegations against Youngevity. Plaintiff alleges 25 Youngevity received benefits from Plaintiff in the form of key employees and 26 members of the sales force. Plaintiff alleges Youngevity “conspired with” Walters 27 to steal Plaintiff’s sales force and obtained benefits through fraud and duress. This 1 ||relationship between Plaintiff and these Defendants.” (SAC 4 192.) 2 Even if Youngevity formed an agreement with Walters to defraud Plaintiff, 3 ||this does not create a quasi-contractual relationship between Youngevity and 4 || Plaintiff. An unjust enrichment theory cannot exist without a prior relationship 5 || between the parties. Doe I. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 6 ||2009). There is no prior relationship or contractual relationship between Plaintiff 7 |jand Youngevity before this lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a restitution 8 ||claim and cannot amend the cause of action to sufficiently state a claim. 9 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss this cause of action and 10 || dismisses it with prejudice. 11 ||IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part 13 || Youngevity’s motion to dismiss. If Plaintiff seeks to file an amended complaint, it 14 ||may do so on or before March 24, 2020. If Plaintiff does not file an amended 15 ||complaint by this date, Defendant shall file an answer to the complaint on or before 16 || March 31, 2020. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 || DATED: March 11, 2020 / yy 30 (ypillg (Mohan 6 How. Cynthia Bashant 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 ||! The Court only dismisses the restitution cause of action. In its prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks, 3g inter alia, “the unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation of Plaintiff’s trade secrets.” Youngevity did not file a motion to strike this remedy.